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Abstract 
 
The English Premier League is regarded as one of the most prominent sporting competitions in 
the world. In the last decade the league (and by definition it’s member clubs) have become 
highly attractive to wealthy foreign investors, having taken ownership of a number of clubs 
across the league. This thesis seeks to investigate the motivations and consequences behind this 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The study uses a multi-method approach not commonly found 
within the sports economics or FDI literature combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. The thesis has generated responses from ‘elite’ level respondents at Premier League 
clubs together with members of the supporters’ movement. Existing data from club sources and 
market reports has been collected in order to assess the motivations and consequences of FDI.  
 
The thesis finds the motives behind football FDI to be somewhat different to those held by other 
forms of business organisation.  Football is a mostly loss-making industry, but despite this 
weakness, some investors have purchased Premier League clubs for economic reasons. The 
importance of non-economic motives, such as profile enhancement, and the notion of the 
trophy asset were also found to be influential motives behind some football FDI. These aspects 
are not strongly reflected in the FDI literature, and they imply football is different to other forms 
of investment.  
 
FDI is shown to be mostly beneficial for the clubs receiving the investment, but for non-acquired 
clubs negative consequences are found in terms of wages, transfer costs, profits, and debt. For 
the Premier League itself, FDI has been positive in terms of enhancing the league’s stature, 
revenues, and the quality of matches. Some benefits were found at the regional level.  This 
thesis covers the gap within the literature surrounding FDI and football, and also raises wider 
points about the generalizability of FDI theory to all industries.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
On May 19th 2012, Chelsea F.C, owned by a Russian billionaire, Roman Abramovich, who had an 
estimated net wealth of £10.3bn (The Guardian, 2011), achieved the Champions League title for 
the first time in Chelsea’s history. This was a significant event for both the club and its owner.  
Abramovich had spent around £1 billion of his own personal wealth following his takeover of 
Chelsea in July 2003 (Burt, 2012). The Champions League is regarded as Europe’s premier club 
competition, and in winning the tournament, Chelsea became the first side from London to 
secure the title of European Champions. For Abramovich, this completed the ‘jigsaw’ of major 
honours, to place alongside Chelsea’s  earlier Premier League, FA Cup, and League Cup 
successes, but in order to reach this point, Abramovich had ruthlessly moved through eight 
managers in nine years (Burt, 2012). Alongside this ‘hire and fire’ approach, Abramovich had also 
been subject to substantial losses in order to sustain the performance of Chelsea’s squad. Earlier 
in the same month, Manchester City, owned by Sheikh Mansour, a member of the ruling family 
in Abu Dhabi with an estimated wealth of £20 billion (The Guardian, 2011), secured their first 
Premier League title after an investment also of around £1 billion (Bond, 2012). From September 
2008, under the control of Sheikh Mansour, Manchester City had become one of the strongest 
sides in English football after several decades of struggle both on and off the field when they 
were unable to compete with Manchester United, Arsenal, Liverpool, and Chelsea.  
 
However, the move to foreign ownership was not unique to Chelsea and Manchester City. By 
2012/2013, eleven clubs were controlled by foreign investors and nine controlled by domestic 
owners. Manchester United, Arsenal, Aston Villa, Sunderland, and Liverpool all had North 
American ownership, with Russian ownership of Reading, Swiss ownership of Southampton, 
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Malaysian and Indian ownership of Q.P.R, and Egyptian ownership of Fulham. Furthermore, 
Blackburn, Birmingham, Derby, Portsmouth, and West Ham had all been subjected to a foreign 
takeover while competing in the Premier League, and alongside this a number of lower division 
clubs were now controlled by foreign investors.  
 
Many sports are now global big businesses and none seemingly more so than football and the 
English Premier League in particular. In the last two decades through a global distribution of 
television rights, televised football has come to have an audience measured in billions and 
Premier League clubs and individual stars have become iconic global brands. It is easy to see 
why, therefore, football might be an attractive sector for foreign direct investment  
 
In sporting terms too, as foreign ownership has grown in English football, the level of success 
generated by (English) foreign owned clubs has increased. The last club to win the Premier 
League under domestic ownership was Arsenal in the 2003/2004 season, and since then foreign 
owned Chelsea, Manchester United, and Manchester City have all won the title. Both the FA Cup 
and League Cup have also been dominated by foreign owned clubs in recent seasons.  But while 
foreign direct investment (FDI) appeared to bring sporting success on the field for some clubs, it 
often came at the expense of substantial financial losses. The investment in the pursuit of ‘on-
field success’ has been achieved at the expense of the ‘off-field losses’. So what are the reasons 
behind the growth of FDI in the English Premier League? And what are the consequences, for 
both clubs and league of this change in ownership.   
 
The economics of sport and ‘sports economics’ are considerable fields in their own right (Andreff 
& Szymanski, 2006)  But limited attention has so far been played to the issue of FDI and its 
relationship to football.  One reason for this is the difficulty of finding good information sources, 
a problem that this thesis has had to deal with. But another, more significant problem is 
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theoretical through the debate on whether sport in general, and football in particular, should be 
seen as ‘an industry like any other’, attracting investment on the basis of economic opportunity? 
Nash (2000) has argued that football is social in nature, but economic in basis, fulfilling a 
complex set of needs. The apparent trade-off between club profit and success on the field may 
be an example of this (Hamil & Walters, 2010). But these issues are long standing. Herbert 
Chapman, regarded as one of Arsenal’s greatest ever managers noted some club directors saw 
‘takings at the turnstile’ as a measure of success rather than results on the field (Chapman, 
2011). As these comments were made in the 1920’s, it was apparent the tension between 
economic and sporting aspects in a football club is long-standing.  
 
In exploring the issue of foreign direct investment in English Premier League football this thesis 
seeks to cover a significant gap in the current literature concerning football itself within sports 
economics but in engaging with the wider arguments about how sport should be analysed. So to 
what extent is FDI in football determined by the theoretical models underpinning other forms of 
FDI, and to what extent is football a “different” business?  
 
1.2 What is Sport? 
 
“Some people believe football is a matter of life and death, I am very disappointed with that 
attitude. I can assure you it is much, much more important than that” (Attributed to Bill Shankly, 
Liverpoolfc.com) 
 
Bill Shankly is regarded as one of the greatest British football managers of all-time, with his spell 
at Liverpool between 1959 and 1974, yielding three First Division titles, two FA Cups, and a UEFA 
Cup. Shankly was appointed as Liverpool manager when the club were languishing in the Second 
Division, but his period in charge transformed the club into one of the strongest in the English 
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top flight during his reign. Shankly’s legendary comment not only outlines his attitude towards 
the game and its importance, but also reflects a societal meaning, in recognising sports’ 
importance to supporters and followers of the game (Peace, 2013).  
 
The meaning and importance of sport has often been compared to organized religion. Both 
affect the needs of the spirit and the psyche rather than the needs of the flesh, neither bear on 
what is needed for physical survival, both stand outside the world of work. Sport, it is said, offers 
three components of life that religion also offers. There is a diversion from daily life; a model of 
coherence and clarity; and it provides heroic examples which can be admired and emulated. In 
the spirit of the Shankly quotation such observations do not treat sport in narrow economic 
terms, but point far beyond the material and the mundane (Mandelbaum, 2004). 
 
The origins of organized sport are believed to have come from Ancient Greece where sport was 
promoted for its benefits in terms of health and well-being.  Individual participants would 
compete against each other at Olympia in the forerunner of today’s ‘modern Olympics’. 
However, the winners of these ancient events would not receive financial rewards for their 
success, and the participation in the games was by amateur athletes. The early competitors in 
Ancient Greece were mostly wealthy, and only males of a “noble-background” were able to 
participate, so sport could be classed as an elite past-time. Wealth also created further barriers, 
as finance was needed in order to keep records, confer recognition, prepare, compete and 
provide organisation (Mandelbaum, 2004).  
 
The creation of team sport came long after the development of individual sport with the 
development of modern industrial societies. With this development also came the notion that 
sport could be representational, with a team representing a specific area or group. Two 
millennia later, in the nineteenth century, the first football clubs were formed in England out of 
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local neighbourhood or religious movements suggesting a wider non-economic rationale in the 
formation of team sports (Meier, 2008). Even today it is rare for a team to completely leave its 
community although this can happen (and is a feature of some North American sports).  
 
Throughout its recent organised history, competitive team sport has almost always had an 
economic element. Clubs need resources. They also have the possibility of incomes. The essence 
of sport is the uncertainty of the outcome associated with a contest (match) between the teams 
(Neale, 1964). This uncertainty of outcome will attract spectators, as a sense of excitement will 
be created through the openness of the result.  This excitement can be transformed into 
financial revenues and if this excitement is taken away from the sporting context then demand 
for the product will diminish (Hamil & Chadwick, 2010).  
 
But the basis of interest is also non-economic. There can be pleasure in the enjoyment or 
interest in the game itself. Sport is said to have a wider ‘ethic’ expressed in the idea of 
sportsmanship. This extends to the integrity of competitions, which help clubs, players, and fans 
within a competitive framework. Team sport can also encourage cross class solidarity, which can 
then counter elitism.  Through this interest, sport’s supporters will associate with particular 
teams, and this can then be used as a method to communicate particular political, economic or 
social values (Hamil & Chadwick, 2010). In football, clubs have been used to express religious 
values (i.e. Glasgow Rangers and Glasgow Celtic), and national independence (F.C. Barcelona has 
long been associated with parts of the Catalan nationalist movement, Burns, 2012). In terms of 
national state identity and politics, sport in general, and football in particular, carries much 
larger connotations.  For example, English football supporters sometimes chant against German 
fans ‘two world wars and one world cup.’  The different economic, social, political and 
psychological streams that feed into sport are therefore easily evident (Nash, 2000).  
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1.3 Sport as a Business 
 
Even if we exclude these bigger questions and look at some of the issues posed by seeing sport 
within a narrower economic context significant economic problems still emerge. The sports team 
can be defined as an economic enterprise as they produce goods, hence a sports team must 
keep track of receipts and expenditures. A sports club through its management structure must 
also create plans, manage the organisation, and market its goods. However, this does not have 
to be associated with profit seeking motive (Heinemann, 1984), thereby distinguishing it from 
‘business’.  There are peculiarities involved in a sports club which are not present in other 
business. For instance, Heinemann (1984) points out that the more democratic and voluntary 
structures within a sports club have distinguished them from other forms of business. Alongside 
these differences, sports clubs also rely on joint financing. A sports club does not necessarily 
meet its costs through the payment of membership fees or the sale of services. Therefore, some 
other elements of financing, possibly related to an investor, or other business subsidies and 
donations are feasible (Heinemann, 1984).  
 
Sport has a further distinctive element which is joint-production. In sport at least two teams will 
have to combine resources in order to produce a match and many teams are required to 
produce a league (Flynn & Gilbert, 2001). A team must have rivals in order to play matches and 
generate interest. In the 1960s in his analysis of baseball, Neale (1964) pointed out that if the 
Yankees bought all of the rival franchises up then they would have no opponents. A single team 
cannot supply the entire market. This separates sport from other industries where the 
acquisition of rival firms can be used as a method of eliminating competition. In sport, 
competition is necessary. Within a league, sporting competition is potentially more beneficial to 
participants than sporting monopoly (Neale, 1964).  
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But there is an additional question of how wide the sports industry should be considered. Demy 
de Zeeuw, a Dutch international footballer, put it this way,  
 
“There are complaints that we [footballers] earn too much, but the whole world earns money 
from your success as a footballer: newspapers, television companies” (Demy de Zeeuw in Kuper & 
Szymanski, 2012, p58). 
 
While these comments concentrate on the media element of sport, other sectors such as 
gambling have also benefitted from sports’ increased commercialisation. Sport can be used to 
directly promote a company (i.e. sponsorships). Televised sport offers further opportunities to 
generate business for these companies. These issues were identified long ago as a problem but 
still remain to be dealt with adequately (Neale, 1964).  
 
Finally, the bigger sport has become the more other contradictions have opened- up, and not 
least with its support base. The growth of the sports industry over the last twenty years has 
provided benefits for a range of individuals. At one level, the owners and players from sports 
have benefitted from the additional revenues brought into sport. A recent pay dispute in the 
North American National Hockey League (NHL) was described as a clash between billionaire 
owners and millionaire players (The Economist, 2012).  But these gains rest upon a customer/ 
community base of tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, of much poorer but loyal sports 
fans. Their relationship to sport as a profit orientated business is much more ambiguous.  
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1.4 The Nature of Football  
 
When we turn to football more specifically we see these conflicting positions also arising, not 
only in differences between economists and non-economists, but also between economists 
themselves.  Some argue that football is a business and this is beyond doubt. As clubs have been 
quoted on stock markets, and generate turnovers worth millions of pounds per season (Banks, 
2002). However, in contrast others have argued that football is not such an impressive business. 
They suggest football is not a ‘big’ business nor a ‘good business’, and that an argument can be 
made to suggest that football isn’t actually a business (Kuper & Szymanski, 2012).  
 
While Banks (2002) points to football as business, using turnover and stock market listings, 
Kuper & Szymanski (2012) suggest that such indicators lack perspective. Using the example of 
BBA Aviation they point out that this “little-known business” has a turnover and employee 
numbers which far exceed those of Manchester United, the English club with the highest level of 
turnover. However, is there middle ground? Are football clubs actually businesses, but a unique 
form of business? The public interest in a football club was long-established, as the former 
manager of Arsenal, Herbert Chapman noted in the 1920’s. Whilst trying to sign a player from 
Sheffield United, Chapman reported how other people (whether they were journalists or 
football fans) were highly aware of Arsenal’s attempt to sign the player (Chapman, 2011). Thus, 
football has a public element, which differentiates it from other types of business. Managerial or 
staff changes at Manchester United are much more publicised than those at BBA Aviation.  
 
Amongst the peculiarities of football that make analysis difficult, several other issues can be 
noted. There are internal ones such as the processes of selecting managers and players, which is 
found to be highly restrictive.  A first-team manager or head coach is virtually always a white-
 9 
male former football player. When scouting players, those with blond hair are said to stand out 
more to scouts irrespective of talent (Kuper & Szymanski, 2012).  
 
Despite the poor ‘business model’ with consistent financial losses recorded by football clubs, 
football is also a highly stable industry. When comparing the 1922/1923 season with 2007/2008, 
Kuper & Szymanski (2012) found that 85 of the 88 league clubs from 1922/1923 still existed and 
75 of these clubs were still competing in the top four divisions of English football in 2007/2008. 
Furthermore, 48 of these clubs were still in the same division as they were in 1922/1923, and 
only 9 of the clubs present in 2007/2008 were two or more divisions away from where they 
were in 1922/1923. Contrast this with the top 100 global companies from 1912, where 49 had 
ceased to exist by 1995, with some of the surviving firms having branched out into different 
sectors (Kuper & Szymanski, 2012).  
 
Those sports teams who cannot keep pace with the other competition in a league can survive in 
a lower division after relegation, they are not forced to exit the market completely. Clubs can 
operate despite having a lower income during a recession or after relegation, while in instances 
of excessive bad investment, the club is not likely to be forced to exit the market. In the latter 
case, a football club can run-up large debts, and if the debts cannot be repaid a new set of 
directors will simply take the club over from the existing board. Manchester City with Thaksin 
Shinawatra selling to Sheikh Mansour, and Tom Hicks and George Gillett being forced to sell 
Liverpool to the Fenway Sports Group in 2010 are two such examples of this trend. Supporters 
can lose interest, but there will always be some form of catchment area for a club.  Foreign firms 
are unable to enter the market directly, and supply football at a cheaper price than domestic 
firms. They cannot ‘import’ football from another country and sell this product at a ‘cheaper’ 
rate than domestic producers. The football product itself must be produced in the host nation. 
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Finally, the core technology of sport cannot be obsolete as the basic technology is the game 
itself (Kuper & Szymanski, 2012).  
 
There is also the peculiar issue of fan loyalty. Football is an industry which creates a level of 
passion far greater than other products. Football team supporters are loyal to their club; there 
are few instances of supporters openly changing their allegiance (Giulianotti, 2002). In an 
analysis built on a rational choice approach, it can be argued that a product will no longer be 
purchased if it does meet customer requirements. The customer will switch to a better quality 
substitute, but in football, the product is consumed in a less rational manner so the argument of 
switching does not hold (Hamil & Chadwick, 2010). This loyalty can be exploited economically by 
football clubs in terms of merchandising and other sales opportunities, as this merchandise will 
help a supporter to strengthen the bond between them and their club. This provides football 
clubs with a lucrative income stream (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000), highlighting both the possible 
economic and social aspects of a football club and their distinctive interaction. 
 
1.5 The Unit of Analysis  
 
While there is a need for cooperation between teams, what should be considered as the unit of 
analysis? The seminal work of Neale (1964) argued that the unit of analysis is the sports league. 
While the sports team in a legal sense is a firm, but the sports league will set the framework for 
competition between the different teams. The sports league will exert control over fixtures, 
player mobility, and the entry and exist of clubs from the league. As the league has control of 
these matters, the sports league can be viewed as a multi-plant firm, with the individual teams 
acting as the plants who are subjected to the decisions taken at the league level (Neale, 1964).  
In his work on English football, Sloane (1971) rejected this approach. According to Sloane, the 
sports league only sets the rules and frameworks in which the sports teams will freely operate. It 
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will be the member teams who will make the economic decisions on player investment or 
stadium development, and not the sports league. He also suggested that the arguments by 
Neale (1964) over emphasize the mutual interdependence between sports teams, and this is not 
a sufficient condition to analysis the football context as though the league was the firm (Sloane, 
1971).   
 
For the purpose of this study, the key economic decision maker is the football club rather than 
the league. The football club will be treated as the firm rather than the Premier League. Football 
clubs will operate in the confines of the Premier League, but the key decisions surrounding the 
purchase and sale of a club will be made independently of the Premier League. Hence, the club is 
the key actor in the process.  
 
1.6 Foreign Direct Investment  
 
This thesis is concerned with inbound foreign investment in the Premier League. Currently, there 
is no study which seeks to apply the concepts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the specific 
case of the Premier League. FDI can be  defined as an investment which involves a long-term 
relationship, reflecting a lasting interest between two entities with one (the direct investor) 
located in a different economy to that of the recipient (Unctad, 2007). Intrinsically, FDI has been 
analysed through the development of a range of theories. These included the OLI paradigm 
(Ownership, Location, and Internalisation), developed initially by Dunning (1980), and the four 
determinants of FDI which follow from this paradigm, market-seeking, strategic-asset seeking, 
efficiency seeking, and resource seeking (Dunning, 1994). Over time, these theories have 
evolved in order to take into consideration the changing environment for multinational 
enterprises (MNE’s). Knickerbocker (1973) has analysed FDI through mimetic behaviour, whilst 
 12 
more recently institutional theory has been used to explain FDI behaviour. However, such 
theories have not been applied to football.  
 
FDI can also have a range of impacts on areas such as economic growth, competitiveness, 
technology, productivity, wages, and employment (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). A separate body of 
literature, which covers the spillover effects of FDI, has investigated these issues. Again, this 
literature has not been used within the football context despite some references to changes in 
competitive balance and productivity. This thesis will seek to apply the theories surrounding the 
determinants (motives) of FDI and the spillover effects to the specific context of Premier League 
football.  
 
1.6.1 FDI and Football  
 
FDI within the sports industry is a relatively new phenomenon. The ownership of sports teams 
has traditionally been tightly regulated, and this has not encouraged foreign investors due to the 
complex set of arrangements needed to be overcome in the purchase of a club. With the 
deregulation of sporting markets since the 1980’s, instances of foreign ownership have become 
more common with the English Premier League the “hotbed” of FDI activity in European sport, 
but it is not only the Premier League that has been able to entice such investors. Foreign 
investors have also entered the English Football League, Scottish Premier League, Scottish 
Football League, Spanish Primera Division, the top two flights of French football, and Italy’s Serie 
A. As football is the most prominent sport across the majority of Europe it is no surprise to see 
this particular trend. But what are the motives behind such investments? Little knowledge of 
these motives exists. Foreign owners of sports teams are highly secretive. Some will not discuss 
motives; others state that the motive is that they are fans of the club, while others do not 
profess a love of football (Conn, 2013). There is also little debate about the short and long-term 
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consequences of such a trend. The nature of ‘ownership’ of the club as an asset is a problem 
(Conn, 2013). Despite not owning shares in a club, supporters have been viewed to be ‘club 
owners’, whilst the formal owners might be considered as ‘custodians’ of a club.  Of course such 
a perspective can be romanticised, but the commercial adaptation of football clubs reflects a 
wider trend to view football clubs as no longer unique despite their societal importance.   
 
1.7 Aims and Objectives  
 
The broad aims and objectives of this thesis centre on the investigation of the motives and 
consequences behind foreign investment entering the Premier League. In order to address these 
aims and objectives this thesis will seek to address the following research questions.  
1. What motives have influenced foreign investors to take control of Premier League clubs? 
2. What direct consequences have there been on those clubs taken over by foreign 
investors?  
3. What indirect consequences have there been on the Premier League itself, other 
Premier League clubs, and professional football in general?  
 
1.8 Thesis Structure  
 
On the basis of these research questions, the thesis will be structured as follows:  
• Chapter one provides an introduction to the thesis and established the research 
questions and importance of the topic to be investigated.  
• Chapter two will provide an introduction to the context of English football and the 
development of football related institutions.  
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• The third chapter will provide a review of the relevant literature on FDI. This will include 
an assessment of the literature on motives (both economic and non-economic), entry 
modes and consequences.  
• Chapter four reviews the relevant literature on sports economics, including ownership 
objectives, football finance, and the work already conducted on foreign investment and 
the Premier League. 
• The fifth chapter sets out the methodological approach to be followed in this thesis. 
• Chapter six and seven will analyse the collected data. Chapter six covers the motives of 
FDI, whilst the latter covers the consequences of FDI entering the Premier League.  
• Chapter eight presents the thesis contribution to knowledge as well as establishing some 
of the limitations present 
Having introduced this thesis, the second chapter will now explore the contextual issues 
of English football.  
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Chapter 2: The Structures and Context of English Football 
 
To make sense of the arguments concerning the relevance and importance of foreign direct 
investment in the English Premier League, it is important to understand the structure of English 
football. The aim of this chapter is to establish this context. The literature on football is extensive 
so the concern here is to highlight some of the more important specific factors that are needed 
to make sense of the debates about the economics of FDI in relation to football and the analysis 
that follows in this thesis. 
 
2.1 Path Dependency and Institutional Structures  
 
Football has deep historical roots. This history has an interest in its own right which is not 
explored here, but it is necessary to recognise the extent to which football carries its past both 
into the present and into the future. It does so partly as a matter of choice through seeing the 
past as a proud heritage at player, club, league, national and international level. But it also does 
so because of what economists call ‘path dependency’, the extent to which initial conditions 
remain important and firms, economies and systems get locked into certain patterns of 
behaviour. 
 
In recent decades the scale of football as a sport and a business has grown. In 1991/1992, the 
top two divisions of English football (the first and second division) generated combined revenues 
of £228m (Deloitte, 2007). By 2010/2011, this had risen to £2.7bn, with £2.3bn being generated 
by the Premier League (Deloitte, 2012). With this growth there have been major changes in 
football’s organisation but the competitions and problems which exist today also continue to 
reflect older and deeper issues. Not the least of these is a question over the purpose of football, 
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and the way that this is then reflected in tensions in the different organisational structures and 
distributions of power. 
 
Running alongside the economic history of football has been the issue of commercialisation. For 
some this is the root of all evil, but for others it is the core of the sport as a modern business                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Vamplew, 1988, Williams & Neatrour, 2002, Meier, 2008). Such attitudes have helped to 
generate further tensions between the different entities and actors present in English football. 
The recent deeper commercialisation of football has intensified the tension between the 
sporting and economic aspects of the game. But such conflicting perspectives emerged early in 
the game’s development.  
 
Football originated from the upper class public schools in England, with different schools playing 
under different sets of rules. The main difference that emerged was in the nature of physical 
contact and whether hands could be used, leading to a distinction between ‘rugby’ and ‘soccer’.  
To overcome the issues relating to these differences, the Football Association (The FA) was 
formed in 1863 to develop a formalised set of rules for ‘soccer’ (Banks, 2002). 
 
In the early years after its formation, football was still the preserve of the upper-classes with 
games played between southern-based public schools competing for the Challenge Cup 
(Williams & Neatrour, 2002). The formation of the FA Challenge Cup in 1871 was one of the 
crucial early institutional developments. It was during the 1870’s that football began to increase 
its appeal as economic growth and increased leisure gave  more people time to spend playing or 
watching football (Russell, 1997). With these developments, some football clubs soon 
considered that money could be made from selling match tickets to FA Cup matches. (Buraimo 
et al, 2006). However, the FA argued that football should not be played for the benefit of 
spectators, noting that this could lead to “excessive partisanship” and “the abuse of players” 
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(Williams & Neatrour, 2002, p2). There was, thus, an early and direct conflict between the FA 
and those clubs which saw the adoption of a spectator sport model as a method of generating 
income. 
 
The FA during this time was controlled by gentlemen amateurs who sought to protect football 
from commercial exploitation (Buraimo et al, 2006, Meier, 2008). They rejected any notion that 
players should be paid for their labour, and they also insisted on ‘fair-play’ (Conn, 2005). 
Payment of players was seen as being against the ‘spirit’ of sport (Williams & Neatrour, 2002). 
However, as the game expanded into working class areas, clubs in the Midlands and the North 
took a different perspective to the southern based clubs and the FA.  Clubs from working class 
areas were willing to pay players despite the southern based clubs viewing this as a form of 
cheating and covert professionalism. In response, the northern based clubs considered forming 
their own breakaway association (Banks, 2002). Eventually, this tension forced the FA to accept 
professionalism in 1885 as its stance towards non-professionalism had become untenable 
(Buraimo et al, 2006). But this acceptance by the FA of a degree of professionalism was done in 
part to constrain it (Meier, 2008).  A number of regulations were also created at this time which 
sought to control the commercialization of football, alongside protecting the clubs themselves. 
This included a restriction on the level of dividend which could be paid to club directors.   
 
The operation of a football club at this early stage was on a voluntary basis (Dobson & Goddard, 
2011). English football clubs initially operated primarily as sporting clubs. A club would be run by 
an elected committee, which was also liable for any debts incurred by the club. English law 
dictated that financial transactions entered into by a club committee were the personal liability 
of club committee members. However, with the adoption of professionalism this structure 
became unsustainable as clubs had to invest in order to build stands and sign players. The result 
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was that the financial burden for the majority of committee members became too great 
(Buraimo et al, 2006).  
 
As a result of these weaknesses, most clubs became private limited companies. In this system, 
‘owners’ gained protection in law but ownership tended to be invested in the hands of wealthier 
individuals. By 1888 it was recommended that football clubs with a turnover of over £1,000 
should convert from the private association sports club model of operation to the limited liability 
model of ownership (Morrow, 2003).The first club to take this route was Small Heath (now 
Birmingham City) in 1888 (Williams & Neatrour, 2002), though football club owners at this stage 
were still predominantly drawn from the local business community (Buraimo et al, 2006, Dobson 
& Goddard, 2011, Williams & Neatrour, 2002, Williams & Hopkins, 2011).  
 
The motivations of the individuals who invested in football at this time stage were often non-
economic. Many of these individuals tended to be successful businessmen who were also 
supporters of the club (Szymanski & Hall, 2003). Investment was linked to a sense of civic pride 
and duty, particularly in the event of financial difficulties (Buraimo et al, 2006). The investment 
was also driven by other factors such as prestige, power, and group identification (Sloane, 1971). 
Investment into a local football club could generate an economic benefit to an owner through 
additional promotion or income for their other business interests but this tended to be a 
secondary concern (Williams & Neatrour, 2002). Club directors were considered as ‘custodians’ 
of the club, and the football club was effectively operated as a form of public amenity (King, 
1997). As a result, football clubs elected to keep ticket prices low in order to keep matches 
affordable (Kelly et al, 2012), to ensure a continuing close tie to the local community.  
 
This distinctive form of ownership and ‘business’ was re-enforced by the most prominent 
regulation known as  Rule 34 which restricted the payment of dividends and salaries to football 
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club directors. As a result of this rule, dividends were restricted to 5% of the nominal values of 
shares (Williams & Hopkins, 2011, Dobson & Goddard, 2011). The FA regulations also required 
that the existing chairman must approve any transfer of shares (thus eliminating the chance of 
hostile takeover) and, in the event of bankruptcy, a requirement was framed which would 
ensure the ownership of a club’s assets would transfer directly to the FA (thereby limiting the 
chance of asset-stripping) (Conn, 2005). Alongside these rules, the FA also imposed the “retain 
and transfer” system and in 1904 imposed a maximum wage for players. These two measures 
helped to restrict both player mobility, and the level of economic competition between clubs 
(Buraimo et al, 2006). Taken together these various measures helped to define football club 
ownership as effectively a not-for-profit activity (Dobson & Goddard, 2011).  
 
Alongside the limited adoption of professionalism was the creation of the Football League in 
1888. The Football League was initially made up of twelve clubs, all of whom were drawn from 
the midlands or the north. In 1882, the league expanded to twenty eight member clubs, and 
added a second division. By 1904, the Football League had forty member clubs (with twenty-two 
from the north or midlands), and regionalised divisions were created between 1920 and 1922, 
which helped to increase the level of participation from southern based clubs. By 1924/1925, the 
total number of clubs had reached eighty-eight, with the final expansion to ninety-two clubs 
across four divisions taking place in 1950/1951 (Williams & Neatrour, 2002). The Football League 
ensured that member clubs in each league would play each other in regular fixtures, which 
would guarantee those clubs more income security. However, the operations of the member 
clubs would be significantly regulated. In contrast to the FA, the Football League was not 
opposed to professionalism and commercialism in football. Despite this, a feature of the Football 
League was that it would redistribute revenue from the larger clubs to the smaller ones (Conn, 
2005). Over time this redistribution mechanism would prove to be problematic as the larger 
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clubs grew, and saw themselves constrained by having to share revenues with smaller rivals 
(Buraimo et al, 2006).  
 
The presence of these two institutions, created a dual governance structure where lines of 
accountability were blurred (Meier, 2008). The activities of the Football League were partly 
constrained, and the Football League even introduced its own cup competition (the League Cup) 
in 1960, in order to help to change the power balance in English football (Hopkins, 2012).  
 
This potentially conflicting organisational structure remains today. Different clubs compete in 
different leagues and are dependent upon their position in the football pyramid. The leagues are 
organized on an open basis, with promotion and relegation permitted between divisions (Noll, 
2002). At the apex of the pyramid since 1992 has been the Premier League, the top division of 
English football with twenty member clubs. The next three divisions are controlled by the 
Football League, and consist of seventy-two member clubs. The divisions below the Football 
League are considered as ‘non-league’, although the fifth tier of English football known as the 
Football Conference has a number of professional clubs. Below this level, English football is 
made up of semi-professional and amateur clubs, with leagues organized on a regional basis. 
English football continues to be governed by the FA which, like other European national 
associations, is a member of the European governing body, UEFA. UEFA is then a member of the 
global governing body of football, the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) 
(Ducrey et al, 2003).  
 
Alongside the national competitions, English football also developed a supranational element. 
This began as the European Cup and the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup in 1955. At this time both 
tournaments were based upon on a knockout structure with a small number of teams involved. 
In recent years these tournaments have been expanded to include more teams, with the 
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European Cup becoming the Champions League in 1992, and the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup becoming 
the UEFA Cup in 1971 and subsequently the Europa League in 2009. The expansion of these 
tournaments increased the number of matches played between European clubs through having 
preliminary knock-out stages, followed by separate group and knock-out stages. The benefit of 
this change was more matches and revenue. In England, the Champions League qualifiers are 
currently the top four teams at the end of each Premier League season, while the Europa League 
is open to clubs who finish between fifth and seventh, depending on the winners of the domestic 
cups. A similar system is in place across Europe depending on league strength. The number of 
European places is determined by the strength of a league’s performance in European 
competition. This is calculated through UEFA’s coefficient system.  
 
As football developed in the UK, there were elements of change in its institutional structure and 
business behaviour. But a significant contrast still existed between the pattern before the 1990s 
and that which developed subsequently. The key elements of the contrast with the later pattern 
are set out in Table 2.1. 
 
Despite the removal of some restraints, football in England prior to the formation of the Premier 
League (pre 1990’s) was heavily regulated. Indeed, the FA indicated that the most important 
objective for a club owner was to provide entertainment through a football match (Sloane, 
1971). This implied the sporting aspect of a football club was considered to be of greater 
importance than the non-sporting aspect, with the owner essentially a ‘custodian’ of the club.   
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Table 2.1 Changing Business Approaches to English Football 
 
(Source: Adapted from Meier, 2008)  
 
The notion of aggrieved actors had a dual emphasis. Firstly, it related to club owners, and 
directors who wished to maximise the financial performance of their club, but secondly, players 
were also ‘aggrieved actors’ particularly during the 1950’s. The imposition of the maximum wage 
negatively affected the earning potential of professional footballers, and this restraint was 
removed in 1961 (Szymanski, 2006). Figure 2.1 shows the major sources of revenue prior to the 
1990s. 
 
 
 
 
Issues Pre 1990s 1990s to date 
Power balance and 
regulatory capacity  
Dual governance structure, low 
capacity of the governing 
bodies  
Dominance of professional clubs  
Competition and 
coordination between 
clubs 
High degree of redistribution 
within professional football  
Low degree of redistribution, 
fierce resource competition  
Corporate governance and 
financial regime 
Corporate governance heavily 
regulated, but elements of a 
shareholder, market financed 
system included  
Increased importance of 
shareholder governance and 
market financing. Poor financial 
regime, comprehensive financial 
responsibility of clubs  
Labour market for 
professional footballers 
Restrictive player labour 
market regime to control 
player salaries (retain and 
transfer system) 
Extensively liberalized labour 
markets. Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (CBA’s) as a means 
to control labour costs.  
Dominant institutional 
domain 
Restrictive player labour 
market regime 
Commercialized product market, 
liberalized labour market.  
Institutional 
complementarity  
Low, self-defeating features 
putting stability at risk.   
Low; financial losses despite 
heavily increased revenue 
streams 
Aggrieved actors  Owners, Directors, and others 
with an interest in 
commercialisation  
Supporters and community 
actors  
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Figure 2.1 Major Revenue Streams for football clubs prior to the formation of the Premier 
League 
 
 
 
 
 
The dominant form of revenue prior to the formation of the Premier League was generated from 
ticket sales. Revenue sources from sponsors, television, and other commercial sources were less 
important at this time (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). Shirt sponsorship, for instance, did not begin 
on a large scale until the 1980s. Due to antiquated facilities, football clubs were also unable to 
generate significant revenue streams from commercial sources on a match-day such as 
hospitality, and there was little competition in the television market even though football began 
to be televised in the 1950’s. During the early stages of televised football, only two providers 
(BBC and ITV) competed for rights to matches. Through this lack of competition, the revenues 
generated from television were limited and this re-enforced the reliance on ticket income for 
football clubs.   
 
For the top clubs in the pyramid the system of revenue generation was cause for much 
frustration. As gate receipts were the most important income stream, the Football League had 
put in place a system of revenue sharing between clubs (Buraimo et al, 2006). This mechanism 
was a method of protecting smaller clubs, and improving competitive balance. However, for 
larger clubs, such a system was not beneficial as they were forced to support smaller clubs lower 
down the pyramid. With the failure to adequately generate revenues from other sources, this 
created a group of ‘aggrieved actors’ who pushed for institutional change.  
 
Revenue 
Ticket Sales Television Commercial 
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2.2 The Change in Institutional Structure: the Formation of the Premier League 
 
By the 1980s football in England was in deep difficulties and many were pessimistic about the 
possibilities for change, in particular some owners/club investors wanted the adoption of a more 
‘business like’ approach to the development of ‘the game’.  Spectator demand had  reached a 
record high after the end of the second world war, with the peak years for attendance between 
1948 and 1950 (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). From this period onwards, match attendance across 
the four divisions began to decline steadily, negatively affecting revenues made across all clubs. 
By 1986, the aggregate match attendance across all four divisions had declined by 40.2% from a 
peak figure of 41 million in 1949 (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). The decline in match attendance 
was partly a result of growing real incomes.  English football faced more competition as new 
leisure markets were opened-up to individuals who would have previously spectated at matches 
(Szymanski, 2006, Dobson & Goddard, 2011). The level of match attendance was also affected by 
the poor quality of facilities and the increasing level of fan violence.  Match attendance was 
made up of the most fanatical supporters, who tended to be white, young men, many of whom 
were on low incomes (Szymanski, 2006). Attendance declined further because of the measures 
put in place by police and clubs to try and control the problem of football violence (Dobson & 
Goddard, 2011).  
 
At the time clubs were also facing rising costs due to the removal of the maximum wage, 
exacerbated by  the introduction of freedom of contract in 1977/1978 (Meier, 2008). The 
adoption of freedom of contract gave players the right to choose whether they would move at 
the end of their contract, but player movements were still constrained due to the clubs being 
able to demand a transfer fee when a contract was offered to the player (Dobson & Goddard, 
2011).  
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These financial problems created something of a vicious cycle, as the decline in match 
attendance also meant that clubs were unable to invest in improved stadia. This not only 
deterred spectators but fed into several stadium disasters where the facilities were not fit for 
purpose (Szymanski & Smith, 1997).  
 
The decline in attendance created some pressures for change, but it needed the coming 
together of the stadium disasters to push English football to a new path. It was the biggest UK 
stadium disaster of the 1980’s which led to new government incentives to force a degree of 
change. The Hillsborough disaster in 1989, where ninety-six Liverpool supporters lost their lives, 
was a pivotal moment in the development of English football. The Taylor Report was 
commissioned to investigate the causes of the disaster, and the report argued that the top two 
tiers of English football should adopt all-seater stadia by 1994. Not only would all-seater stadia 
enhance safety, but the new facilities would be beneficial in modernizing English football, 
making match attendance more attractive (Taylor Report, 1990). The appeal of better facilities 
allowed clubs to adopt a more free-market approach to ticketing as alternative spectator groups 
could be targeted other than males on low-incomes (Nash, 2000). While the positive benefits of 
reform were clear, a problem still existed in terms of financing the development. Although the 
government made some funding available (Meier, 2008), the clubs would have to raise a 
significant level of income themselves to fund the redevelopment (Banks, 2002).  
 
A second factor, behind any change was the deregulation of television and the opening up of the 
TV market for sport, which transformed the financial situation in football and also created new 
marketing possibilities. A third element was the globalisation processes which created the 
possibility of projecting a national league onto the global stage.  
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Alongside the redevelopment of stadia and opening up of television markets, institutional 
change was also pushed by the aggrieved actors at club level. This resulted in the formation of 
the Premier League in 1992 as a twenty-two club breakaway league from the rest of the Football 
League.  As part of the new league’s formation, the member clubs had control over the league’s 
affairs, and unlike the FA and Football League there were no standing committees or board of 
directors which could dilute the power of the clubs. Like the Football League, the Premier League 
operated on a one-member one-vote principle, with a two-thirds majority required in order to 
implement a major change. With this system, the member clubs also voted through the 
appointment of a league chief-executive, commercial director, and independent league 
chairman (Banks, 2002).  
 
A feature of the formation of the Premier League was the role of the FA. The FA had published 
its own document on the structure of English football in 1991 where it argued for the creation of 
an eighteen team top division, which was independent of the Football League (Banks, 2002). The 
FA had seen the formation of a breakaway top division as a chance to re-assert itself in the 
governance of the English game, and it eventually legitimized the creation of the Premier 
League, which was initially known as the FA Premier League (Meier, 2008). However, the 
breakaway league with twenty-two teams neither eased the level of fixture congestion which 
the FA had specified as one of its objectives, nor did it create a unified approach. Furthermore, 
the Premier League did not operate as a subordinate to the FA. In-fact the league’s creation 
developed a third force in English football alongside the FA and the Football League (Banks, 
2002). The FA did however hold a golden share in the Premier League, but it had little influence 
over the day-to-day running of the league 
 
Change was also encouraged by new developments in television and the possibility of using 
football as a means of extending market penetration for new media companies.  By the 1980’s 
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the level of competition in the UK broadcast market was growing with the adoption of pay 
television broadening the level of customer choice. Not only would this increase the level of 
competition in the broadcast market, but it would also increase the level of competition for 
football television rights. The deal would break-up the terrestrial duopoly of ITV and BBC which 
had dominated football rights in English football to this point (Szymanski & Smith, 1997).   
 
Initially clubs were opposed to live televised matches in the belief that it would cause 
attendances to decline. Indeed, this chapter has already shown the relative importance of gate 
receipts compared to television income. However, the increase in live television matches helped 
to rehabilitate football’s image and the opposition to televised matches quickly diminished 
(Szymanski, 2006).  The Premier League was also free to negotiate their own television rights 
deals, and the Premier League clubs were able to keep around 80% of all revenues generated 
from television (Meier, 2008). This was a huge shift. In the previous four divisional Football 
League structure, the top division only received 50% of the revenues generated from television. 
Moreover, in the Football League, revenues from television were not exploited to the same 
extent as in the Premier League (Buraimo et al, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.2 shows how the result of these changes was the emergence of additional revenue 
streams and a changing balance in their relative importance.  
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Figure 2.2 Revenue Streams Post-1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For some clubs, revenue streams were becoming increasingly dependent on television income. 
The clubs who fitted this description were those who did not have a large local fan base or an 
attractive global profile. In addition, these clubs did not have the same commercial power as the 
larger clubs at the top of the Premier League who were attractive to sponsors. For them the 
sources of income not related to television were harder to generate.  The larger clubs, on the 
other hand, viewed this as a ‘free-rider’ problem where smaller clubs took home the financial 
benefits which had been generated by the success and growth of larger clubs.  
 
The changes also led to the adoption of new forms of organisation and patterns of behaviour in 
the Premier League, which were set out in Table 2.1. There was no longer the same dual 
governance problem which existed prior to 1992.  The formation of the Premier League gave the 
FA less control of English football (Conn, 2005). This enabled professional clubs, once the 
aggrieved actors, to become the dominant group in English football. The removal of 
redistribution mechanisms affected smaller clubs at the bottom of the pyramid, who now faced 
Revenue 
Television 
Sponsorship  Ticket Sales 
Merchandising Other Commercial 
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even greater difficulties in generating revenues. Furthermore, it had become even more difficult 
for smaller clubs in the Premier League to compete with the larger dominant clubs.  
The changes have also proved to be beneficial for players who now also had more influence. The 
creation of the Bosman ruling in 1995 enabled players at the end of their contract to move on a 
free transfer, even if they were offered a new contract by their existing club (Dobson & Goddard, 
2011). This created a dilemma for football clubs as they would have to risk losing a player on a 
free transfer if the player did not wish to sign a new contract. Football players had increased 
opportunities to move for additional money as a result of this change.  
 
The reduced dependence on ticket sales also allowed for the possibility of an increase in the 
importance of the business elements of a football club. But did this come at a cost to some? 
There were fewer aggrieved actor constituencies compared to before 1990, but despite the 
reduced dependence on ticket sales, club supporters were now in a weaker position. They faced 
higher ticket costs, as well as expensive costs for replica shirts, and an additional cost in 
purchasing television services to watch matches. The problem of aggrieved actors had moved 
away from those who felt their earning potential was being constrained to those who feel they 
are faced with an overpriced game.  
 
A football supporter is not a customer in the normal sense. Higher prices do not often lead to a 
switch to a cheaper alternative. Instead they will no longer consume their club’s product 
(matches or merchandise) or as much of it. On a larger scale this can then lead to the erosion of 
supporter networks (Duke, 2002). Football’s commercialisation has, therefore, come at a cost to 
its ‘customer’ base, but it also affected club ownership. How has this altered following the 
formation of the Premier League?   
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2.3 The Changing financial structures facing football clubs  
 
The greater marketization of football opened up the possibility of new company forms being 
adopted and for new owners coming in leading to more diversified ownership structures. One 
aspect of this was the possibility of a stock exchange listing. In 1983, Tottenham Hotspur became 
the first English club to list on the stock exchange. This decision to list on the stock exchange was 
motivated by profit considerations. A stock exchange listing circumvented the FA’s regulations 
on dividend payments. Secondly, the wider strategy from the investors at this club was to place 
Tottenham at the centre of a business empire (Banks, 2002). While the initial listing was 
considered a success (Morrow, 2003, Banks, 2002), over time Tottenham did not generate the 
expected profits and club debts increased due to other failed business interests. As a result, 
Tottenham was eventually sold onto new investors (Banks, 2002). Manchester United were the 
next club to seek a stock market listing in 1989, and in the 1990’s, the rush to the stock exchange 
accelerated with twenty-three clubs experimenting with some form of listing by the end of the 
decade (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). The type of clubs that were listed on the stock exchange 
varied between large Premier League clubs and smaller lower division clubs.  
 
Table 2.2 displays the different types of ownership structures present in English football in 1997. 
Even though a number of different clubs had listed on a stock exchange, the main shareholder 
(e.g. Doug Ellis at Aston Villa) still had significant control over their club, either through the 
percentage of shares owned, or the relationship with major shareholders. In these cases, public 
ownership did not significantly improve governance structures. At other clubs a more diversified 
system was pursued (e.g. Manchester United). In reality most clubs, whether they were private 
or publically owned, were highly concentrated in either ownership or control. In football, the 
importance of family control also remained, as is indicated in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 Classification of football companies by ownership type (1997) 
(Source: Morrow, 2003) 
 
The market expectations for football club shares that did go public were initially high, with the 
value of football club shares expected to rise through increased income from television and 
media sources (Banks, 2002). However, by 2000, the value of football club shares began to fall 
with investors losing interest due to the absence of regular dividends. Football club share prices 
were also affected by the prevailing market conditions. The dot.com boom of the late 1990’s and 
the subsequent collapse of share prices in the early 2000’s strongly influenced the prices of 
football club shares. In the long-term, the PLC model of ownership did not prove to be success. 
By 2001, clubs had begun to delist, starting with Queens Park Rangers and Leicester City in 2001 
and 2002. These two clubs were not alone in their financial difficulties.  A number of other listed 
clubs also experienced declines in profits, as increased spending on team development was 
undertaken across the division.  
 
A further feature of football clubs listed on the stock exchange came from the involvement of 
new types of investors in football clubs. Media companies sought to invest in football clubs as 
one of a series of investments into sports teams (Conn, 1997). Indeed, several media companies 
Private Companies Public Companies 
Dominant Owner Family/director 
controlled 
Dominant 
Owner 
Family/director 
controlled 
Diversified 
Ownership 
   Arsenal  
Blackburn Rovers Birmingham City Aston Villa Leicester City Leeds United 
Derby County West Ham 
United 
Newcastle U Nottingham F Manchester U 
Everton Swansea City Sheffield W Bolton W Sheffield U 
Liverpool  Sunderland Charlton A Southampton 
Wimbledon  Tottenham  West Bromwich 
A 
Middlesbrough     
  Preston N.E   
  Q.P.R   
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considered the purchase of a club as a saleable method of vertical integration, believing they 
would be in a stronger bargaining position into the next round of television rights negotiations 
(Banks, 2002, Dobson & Goddard, 2011). This posed additional problems in terms of both the 
interests of the league and the clubs and also national and European competition laws. In 1998, 
Sky attempted to purchase Manchester United, but the proposal was fraught with complexities. 
The deal was officially rejected on competition grounds as it would have reinforced Sky’s 
dominant position in the UK pay-television market as well as enhancing Manchester United’s 
dominant position in English football (Banks, 2002). In order to control the level of media 
interest in football club shareholdings, a 10% limit was applied by the FA. As a result of this, 
BskyB purchased minority shareholdings in Manchester United, Leeds United, Chelsea, 
Sunderland, and Manchester City. Granada purchased a shareholding in Liverpool, ITV invested 
in Arsenal, and NTL in Newcastle, Middlesbrough, Aston Villa, and Leicester City (Dobson & 
Goddard, 2011). The deals were particularly beneficial for the clubs who were able to inject the 
finance generated from the purchase of shares into strengthening their teams. However, for the 
media companies these deals did not generate the anticipated short or longer-term financial 
benefits due to the failure of club shares to either grow in value or to produce dividends (Banks, 
2002).  
 
The problems for some clubs did not stop wealthy individuals investing in football clubs. Local 
connections continued to be present at clubs such as Newcastle United, Middlesbrough, and 
Blackburn Rovers. Indeed, the Blackburn case highlights a successful local businessman providing 
investment in order to transform the club into the Premier League Champions (Buraimo et al, 
2006). But other club owners were not locally based.  Wulzinger (2006) points out that the new 
investors into English football clubs were racehorse owners, theatre impresarios, diamond 
dealers, heirs to fortunes, and construction magnates. Some of the new investors were also 
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considered as members of the British business elite, who were able to make substantial profits 
on the sale of their shareholdings to other investors.  
 
Finally, Figure 2.3 shows three possible major routes to ownership, from the sporting club as a 
voluntary association (unprotected in law) towards a more commercial entity.  
 
Figure 2.3 Evolution of Possible Governance forms for Football Clubs 
 
Voluntary association 
          
------------------------------------- National Competition Rules ------------------------------------------ 
---------------------------------    League Governance Regulations--------------------------------------- 
                                                           
Mutual Private Limited Company   Public Limited 
Company 
 
 
Of these routes, the mutually based ownership structure has not been common within English 
football. However, following government legislation introduced under the last Labour 
government, the supporters trust movement has enabled several clubs at lower levels to 
become supporter owned (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). In contrast, at the top, the main 
ownership forms have been and are, ostensibly, profit oriented.  
 
2.4 Foreign Ownership  
The changes outlined in section 2.3 helped to pave the way for foreign investors to enter English 
football and the Premier League.  This has taken place against a background of wider foreign 
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investment in the UK. Figure 2.4 indicates the change in inward FDI stock in the UK between 
2003 and 2012.  
 
Figure 2.4: Inward FDI stock in UK from 2003-2012 
 
(Source: UK Inward Investment Annual Report 2013). 
 
Prior to 2003, inward FDI stock was equivalent to around 40% of UK GDP. At this point just three 
Premier League clubs (Fulham, Portsmouth, and Chelsea) were foreign owned, compared to 
other industries, where the arrival of significant flows of inward FDI came late in football.  
 
Table 2.3 below shows how from the late 1990s foreign takeovers began to occur in the Premier 
League, and how they became more prominent in the 2000’s. While there had been some 
examples of foreign ownership in English football prior to the formation of the Premier League, 
these instances were extremely rare. An early instance of foreign investment was the Lebanese 
born businessman Sam Hammam, who emigrated to the United Kingdom and then purchased a 
controlling share in Wimbledon.  
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Table 2.3 Foreign Investment into PL Clubs 
Club Takeover Date Investor From Buyout Type 
Wimbledon 1997 AKER Norway Part to Full 
Chelsea July 2003 R Abramovich Russia Full 
Manchester U June 2005 Glazer Family U.S.A Full (hostile) 
Portsmouth January 2006 A Gaydamak Russia/Israel Part to Full 
Aston Villa August 2006 Randy Lerner U.S.A Full 
West Ham November 2006 B Gudmundsson Iceland Full 
Liverpool February 2007 T Hicks & G 
Gillett 
U.S.A Full 
Arsenal** April 2007 Stan Kroenke U.S.A Part  
Manchester C July 2007 T Shinawatra Thailand Full 
Arsenal August 2007 Red & White Russia Part  
Birmingham August 2007 Grandtop  Hong Kong Part to Full 
Derby January 2008 G.S.E U.S.A Full 
Manchester C September 2008 Abu Dhabi UG Abu Dhabi Full 
Sunderland May 2009 Ellis Short U.S.A Part to Full 
West Ham June 2009 CB Holding Iceland Full 
Portsmouth August 2009 S Al-Fahim Abu Dhabi Full 
Portsmouth October 2009 Falcondrone Saudi Arabia Full 
Portsmouth February 2010 Portpin Hong Kong Full 
Liverpool October 2010 FSG U.S.A Full 
Blackburn  November 2010 Venky’s Group India  Full  
Q.P.R* August 2011 T Fernandes Malaysia Part 
*= Part of Q.P.R still owned by the Mittal Family  
**= Arsenal remains listed on AIM and is not fully controlled by one investor. Alisher Usmanov 
also holds a substantial shareholding in the club.    
 
In addition, Table 2.4 shows those clubs who were foreign owned at the time of promotion to 
the Premier League  
 
Table 2.4 Clubs with foreign ownership when promoted to PL 
Club Takeover Date Investor From Buyout Type  
Fulham May 1997 M Al-Fayed Egypt Full 
Portsmouth 1999 M Mandaric Serbia/U.S.A Full 
Sunderland July 2006 Drumaville Ireland Full 
Blackpool** 2006 VB Football Latvia Part  
Q.P.R* August 2007 F Briatore/Mittal 
family 
Italy/India Full 
Reading January 2012 A Zingarevich Russia Part to Full 
Southampton July 2009 Liebherr Family Switzerland Full 
*= Q.P.R also had ownership from a domestic investor (Bernie Ecclestone)  
**= Blackpool major shareholder is a domestic investor (Oyston family)  
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From these tables it is apparent that the majority of the FDI entering English football has come 
from North America or emerging markets based in the Middle and Far East.  
 
Figure 2.5 displays the top ten inward investing countries in the UK overall.  
 
Figure 2.5 UK Inward FDI Stock in 2013 
 
(Source: UK Inward Investment Annual Report, 2013) 
 
North America has also been the largest source country for inward FDI entering the UK. 
Alongside North America, the other major investors into the UK have been mostly European.  
Football related FDI, however, has rarely come from European nations, although the role of 
North America is evident in both football and non-football foreign investment.  Nonetheless, FDI 
in the Premier League does reflect a wider global trend in FDI outflows with the rise of emerging 
and transition nations. A large amount of the FDI entering the Premier League has come from 
these sources.   
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The peak period for FDI entering English football was between 2006 and 2009. The takeovers in 
2009 were ‘repeat’ foreign takeovers where FDI was used to bailout the investment of the 
previous foreign owner. In the cases of Portsmouth and West Ham, foreign owners were unable 
to fund their clubs operations, and as a result they were forced to relinquish their ownership 
position. A similar observation can be made about Liverpool and Manchester City (Storm & 
Nielsen, 2012). Alongside this, FDI has increasingly occurred too in the Football League 
(particularly the Championship) where clubs are cheaper, and costs are lower, but the trade-off 
is lower revenue streams.  
 
2.5 Continuing Tensions and Theoretical Problems 
 
All of this might seem to suggest that a decisive shift towards a new approach to football as a 
business had been made. Even if this were true, however, there would still be the problem of 
analysing how the sector specific economic elements of football as an industry are reflected in 
foreign direct investment patterns. But other factors make this more complicated still. In 
economic terms the most obvious is that most football clubs continue to make losses which 
obviously raise questions about the extent to which a narrow economic approach can illuminate 
the present desire to own a club, particularly by a foreign investor. Football too continues to 
generate much wider emotions. As the game has grown in scale and in wealth, so too has the 
discontent of core supporters. One aspect of has been the concern of some fans to look to 
economic forms that might help clubs keep a more local focus. This has intensified interest in the 
issue of forms of mutual ownership, where supporters are able to take control of their club. The 
trusts are operated on a one member one vote principle, and give the opportunity for 
supporters to act as a collective and re-establish the link between community and football club 
(Morrow, 2003; Hamil & Morrow, 2008). The clubs which are operated in this way are primarily 
in the lower divisions of the Football League or in the non-league system. An example of a 
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mutually owned club is FC United of Manchester, which was formed by dissatisfied former 
Manchester United supporters in the response to the Glazer takeover (Dobson & Goddard, 
2011). Other clubs in lower leagues have been purchased by the supporter trust when faced 
with financial crisis.  
 
The specific characteristics, therefore, of the economics of sport and the economics of football in 
particular and beyond that, the English Premier League, pose a series of theoretical and 
empirical challenges not least when it comes to the analysis of this wave of foreign takeover and 
investment. The next chapter therefore will discuss the wider motives and effects identified in 
the FDI literature so that the thesis can situate the analysis of FDI and football in the context of 
this bigger question of the movement of capital globally.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review: Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The second chapter of the thesis set out the contextual background to the development of 
English football and outlined the economic basis for the development of the game in England. 
This next chapter assesses the literature relating more generally to FDI concentrating on the 
motives, entry modes, and consequences. It begins by considering the general theories which 
have been used to help identify the motives of FDI. Following on from this is a briefer discussion 
of the literature surrounding the entry modes of FDI. The final part of the chapter will then 
examine the literature pertaining to the consequences of FDI. The analysis of FDI is summarised 
in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1 Division of FDI Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of the literature between these three areas is uneven, with the majority of the 
FDI literature positioned towards the determinants (motives) of FDI. However, there has been 
more recent development in the literature surrounding the consequences (or spillover) effects of 
FDI, and in particular, analysing whether these spillovers are positive, neutral or negative. The 
studies in this area are often fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies. Different approaches 
(such as the use of panel data or case studies) have contributed to these inconsistencies. The 
literature on entry modes too often lacks theoretical models, and is more descriptive than the 
other aspects of FDI.  
 
Determinants/Motives 
of FDI 
Entry Modes of FDI Consequences of FDI 
 40 
The first part of the literature review will identify the economic theories and motives, while 
section 3.2 analyses the non-economic determinants. Following on from this, section 3.3 will 
cover the entry modes of FDI, and section 3.4 will survey the literature on the consequences of 
FDI 
 
3.1. Economic Theories and Motives of FDI  
  
The broad economic motives and theories of surrounding the economic aspects of FDI are 
summarised in Figure 3.2A and Figure 3.2B.  
 
Figure 3.2A Economic Theories of FDI 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
These theories have enabled a range of economic motives to be considered. These are shown in 
Figure 3.2B.  
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Theories 
Vernon  Hymer Knickerbocker 
OLI RBV Institutional 
Aliber 
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Figure 3.2B Economic Motives of FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Economic Theories of FDI  
 
Figure 3.2A highlights the main economic theories of FDI. The development of the first of these 
theories, such as Hymer began during the 1960’s. Prior to the development of the earliest 
theories, Dunning & Lundan (2008) point out that FDI theory was explained in terms of portfolio 
capital movements, various country specific factors, gains from vertical and horizontal 
integration, and international capital movements linked to entrepreneurship. As a result there 
was a limited literature in terms of the formal FDI theories, and it would be the intervention of 
Hymer (1960, 1976) which would encourage other researchers to enhance the understanding of 
FDI theory (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).   
 
Hymer (1960, 1976) argued that there were three areas of weakness in the existing theory 
surrounding portfolio capital transfers to explain multinational activity. Firstly, he argued that 
once elements surrounding risk and uncertainty were included in portfolio theory, many of its 
predictions were invalid. These imperfections effected behaviour, performance, and strategy of 
firms in supporting their overseas markets. Secondly, FDI involved the transfer of a package of 
resources including technology, management skills, and entrepreneurship, and was not simply 
Asset Seeking 
Resource Seeking 
Efficiency Seeking Market Seeking 
Escape Investment 
Motives of FDI 
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just a financial transaction. Thirdly, indirect investment through a market necessitated a change 
in ownership, but FDI did not involve any changes in the ownership of resources. This was unlike 
indirect investment which did require a change through the transaction taking place via a market 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 
The approach developed by Hymer (1960, 1976) moved the analysis of the multinational firm to 
one based around industrial organisation theory as opposed to the narrow confines of a neo-
classical approach (Rugman & Dunning, 1985). Firms must possess ownership of a foreign value-
adding entity, and the firm must hold some form of advantage in terms of cost, financial, 
marketing or innovation, which are specific to their ownership. These advantages must also have 
been greater than the disadvantages faced by competing with organisations from the host 
economy.  As these advantages highlight a form of structural market failure, firms will have to 
hold some form of proprietary or monopolistic advantage (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 
Following the work of Hymer, Vernon (1966) applied the product life cycle concept to the 
multinational behaviour of US firms. The theory was based upon the notion that the ownership 
advantages held by North American firms were influenced by the structure and pattern of factor 
endowments, institutions, and markets in the home country. Vernon argued the product was 
initially completed for use within the domestic market. However, at the later stage of the 
product’s life cycle, it would be exported to another market, and the ability to export was driven 
by the innovation and production advantages held in the home market (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). Such advantages would be influenced by the factor endowments, institutions, and 
markets available within the home market. At a later stage of the product life cycle, there is 
more scope to export, as consumer demand becomes more price elastic. As the demand 
becomes more elastic, the level of labour cost generated by the firm is of critical importance. In 
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order to minimise these costs, more ‘value-added’ operations can be placed in a foreign market. 
Hence, the product can then be exported back to the home market (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 
However, life cycle theory has some shortcomings which limit its applicability to the context of 
FDI. The theory is strongly related to the pursuit of markets by organisations, and does not relate 
to other forms of FDI (such as seeking assets). Secondly, the increasing geographical scale of 
MNE activity, plus the increasing convergence of developed markets further limits the 
applicability of the theory (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). The theory was developed by using North 
America as the home economy, and different economic conditions across other markets may 
mean that the theory was also not applicable to all FDI cases. Indeed, this raises a question as to 
whether firms do behave in the manner suggested by Vernon’s theory.  
 
Using the earlier work of Hymer (1960), Aliber (1970) sought to explain the process of FDI 
through the influence of exchange rates. The fundamental argument made by Aliber (1970) 
centred on the ability of firms from countries with strong currencies being able to borrow and 
access capital more cheaply than those firms from nations where the currency was weaker. In 
addition, it was also argued that imperfections in the foreign exchange markets, enabled firms to 
make gains by purchasing or selling assets in an under or overvalued currency. However, such a 
theory is regarded as an extension of the portfolio capital theory, rather than a specific FDI. This 
is due to the theory focusing on capital and exchange markets rather than aspects directly linked 
to foreign production (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 
Another of the early theories concerning FDI was devised by Knickerbocker (1973). 
Knickerbocker utilised oligopolistic reaction to understand why firms followed their rivals into 
overseas markets. A firm investing overseas will enhance the likelihood of its rivals extending 
into the same markets. This behaviour was particularly apparent when investigating oligopolistic 
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markets (Head et al, 2002).  There is mimetic behaviour with firms in this type of market, as they 
sought to replicate the behaviour of other firms in the market in order to protect their market 
position, and to minimise risk. Indeed, this is a feature which relates it to institutional theory. 
Thus, it was not only locational variables which are important in influencing the direction of FDI, 
but the strategic response (from firms) to the locational variables (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 
Dunning (1976) sought to combine some of the earlier aspects together in order to create a 
theory fully explaining FDI activity. The OLI (Ownership, Location, and Internalisation) paradigm 
brought together international trade theory and internalisation theory, synthesising the motives 
for organisations to become multinational organisations. In order to become a multinational, 
firms must find it profitable to combine their ownership and internalisation advantages with the 
locational advantages offered by a specific country (Ali et al, 2010). If the three advantages 
cannot be combined to generate profits then the FDI activity should not be undertaken.   
 
The purpose of the paradigm was to offer a general framework, which might provide an 
understanding, not only of the pattern of FDI undertaken by a countries’ own organisations, but 
also explain the volume of FDI undertaken by foreign organisations (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
There are three factors which underpin the OLI paradigm. Firstly, the competitive advantages 
held by firms of one particular home economy over another in a host market. These advantages 
arise from the either, ownership, access to “income-generating” assets, or from a firm’s ability to 
coordinate these assets more efficiently compared to their competitors. Secondly, the paradigm 
considers the extent to which firms internalise their markets in order to generate or use the 
assets they hold, and in the process adding value to these assets. Finally, the paradigm focuses 
on the extent to which firms locate their value-adding activities outside their home market 
(Dunning, 1998, 2001).    
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When a firm decides to become multinational it must have advantages over those firms who 
already operate in the host economy. These advantages are necessary to compensate the firm 
when dealing with the additional costs of becoming multinational, such as dealing with foreign 
regulations (Ali et al, 2010). These advantages can take a variety of forms, including patents, 
technical knowledge, management skills and reputation etc. They therefore have both tangible 
and intangible elements (Ali et al, 2010, Faeth, 2009).  
 
Ownership advantages have been split into three groups, ownership-asset advantages, 
economies of common governance, and institutional factors (Lundan, 2010). Ownership asset 
advantages refer to property rights in the intangible advantages outlined above. However, these 
advantages can also be expressed in the form of product innovation, and accumulated 
experience in marketing or finance (Dunning, 1988). These assets are considered as rare and 
difficult to imitate (Peng, 2001). The second group of ownership advantages refer to the 
economies of common governance. These advantages are created through the advantages of 
scale. The final group relates to institutional aspects which govern processes within the firm, 
including codes of conduct, corporate culture and incentive systems (Lundan, 2010).   
 
The second aspect of the OLI paradigm relates to locational advantages. FDI is concentrated 
more in some regions and economies than others. The ten most popular host economies for FDI 
during the 2008-2012 period are shown in Table 3.1:  
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Table 3.1: Top Ten Host Economies for FDI from 2009 to 2012 
Rank 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 USA USA USA USA 
2 China China China China 
3 France Hong Kong India Hong Kong 
4 Hong Kong Belgium Hong Kong Brazil 
5 UK Brazil Brazil British Virgin 
Islands 
6 Russian 
Federation 
Germany Australia UK 
7 Germany UK British Virgin 
Islands 
Australia 
8 Saudi Arabia Russian 
Federation 
Singapore Singapore 
9 India Singapore Russian 
Federation 
Russian 
Federation 
10 Italy France UK Canada 
(Sources: World Investment Report, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013) 
 
Table 3.1 contains the top-ten host economies for FDI between 2008 and 2012. Over this period, 
the United Kingdom has appeared in the top ten in each year, in contrast to competitor EU 
countries such as Germany and France. The United Kingdom was also the most popular EU 
destination for FDI in 2011 and 2012, indeed in both years it was the only EU member state to be 
in the top ten host economies. The question of what makes a particular location attractive to 
foreign investors is therefore crucial.  
 
Traditionally, location advantages have centred on political and economic factors. FDI was 
attracted to a location through factors such as political stability, low risk, large population size, 
and high gross national product (GNP) (Sethi et al, 2003). Other features such as a lucrative (i.e. 
wealthy) market, liberal government policies, a skilled and flexible labour force, strong 
technological infrastructure and cultural proximity have all influenced location choice (Reuber et 
al, 1973). Market growth, low barriers to trade, reduced production and transportation costs, 
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and the host government’s law, and tax rates have all been influential when deciding upon FDI 
location (Dunning, 1994). Those countries which are perceived as being more open have 
attracted more FDI. In support of this notion, Quazi (2007) also found a favourable domestic 
investment climate was important in attracting FDI. Finally, exchange rate stability has also 
influenced location choice (Blonigen, 2005).  
 
Agglomeration effects, too, influence FDI, and the resultant herding behaviour of multinational 
firms. This situation may be due to imperfect information surrounding country choice. With 
imperfect information, firms view the decisions made by other multinationals as a signal about 
the appropriateness of a location. There is a similarity in this approach to the mimetic behaviour 
of MNE’s as noted by Knickerbocker (1973). Agglomeration effects also create positive effects 
when firms located close to others, due to the presence of positive cluster spillover effects which 
could be generated (Campos & Kinoshita, 2002).  
 
Another influential feature of locational choice refers to the competitiveness of a particular 
region. A MNE may well begin the process of FDI by targeting a particular economic bloc (such as 
the EU). Once this has been completed, the MNE can then target a group of EU member states, 
before moving towards particular countries and regions. These choices can be partly influenced 
by the competitiveness of individual regions. This competitiveness can be influenced by demand 
conditions, future potential, productive efficiency, and availability of strategic assets. 
Furthermore, the influence of demographic, economic, and market conditions is also important 
in this aspect (Fallon & Cook, 2014).  
 
Such discussions have revealed less about the relative importance of these host country factors. 
The theory does not rank the importance of the factors relating to locational advantages. Some 
studies do not even take into consideration all of the factors outlined (Sethi et al, 2003). Indeed, 
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Ali et al (2010) argued that different locational advantages will affect different types of FDI. For 
instance, market seeking FDI might be affected by tariff rates, but other forms of FDI are not be 
as dependent on this particular factor. To add to the complexity of this issue, Dunning (2001) 
stated that any factor can be considered as a locational factor if it affects the profits of setting up 
a production process in a host economy.  
 
The final part of the OLI paradigm consists of internalisation advantages. A firm which engages  
in FDI will not only have  specific ownership advantages, but to get the greatest benefit from 
these advantages, it will need to ensure that these advantages have been internalised within the 
organisation and not sold or licensed to another firm (Ali et al, 2010). In particular these 
advantages refer to elements such as transaction costs and technology, with the firm aiming to 
lower transaction costs and minimize technology loss (Faeth, 2009). Internalisation is needed if 
the firm is to exploit market failure, and engage in foreign production. It also reduces search and 
negotiation costs, moral hazard costs and adverse selection, and the costs of broken contracts. 
Internalisation also enables the firm to control supplies and conditions of sale, and market 
outlets. Finally, buyer uncertainty could be reduced with sellers of interdependent activities 
captured, and product quality protected (intermediate or final) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).   
 
The OLI paradigm has been the dominant economic model behind FDI, and it is an obvious   
framework to consider for the analysis of football related FDI in the Premier League. The 
weakness in the model, however, as Dunning (2001) himself suggested is that the paradigm can 
be   considered as a “shopping list of variables” due to the large number of different factors 
included in the model.  Ali et al (2010) have argued that empirical testing needs to be 
undertaken in order to identify  which of the variables have the most importance (Ali et al, 
2010). But despite these weaknesses, the OLI paradigm has generated a framework to 
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understand why a firm will engage in foreign production rather than exporting (Dunning, 2000; 
Oxelheim et al, 2001).    
 
Although resources in the host economy may attract FDI, resources in firms themselves may 
influence outward FDI. There is a need therefore, to develop those relating to firm capabilities 
(RCM-Resources, capabilities and markets approach). This particular approach was used in 
Dunning & Zhang (2008) as a method of understanding the locational choices made by 
multinational firms. The approach was grounded in traditional economic theory, which has 
emphasized the importance of these aspects in determining economic welfare. Firms possess 
resources, which are valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate. In this case resources have enabled 
firms to develop competitive advantages (Penrose, 1959).  This does not solely relate to 
possession of these resources, as the firms have also been able to grow existing resources, as 
well as acquiring more resources. Thus resources can be considered dynamic in nature.  
 
In the development of the FDI literature, Peng (2001) has also found international knowledge 
and experience to be an important resource which enabled firms to engage in FDI activity. This 
was a further development of the resource based theory, as it does not solely concentrate on 
physical assets. Resources are considered particularly important as they will augment the 
ownership advantages of the firm. The augmentation of these assets then allowed a firm to 
engage in multinational activity. Recently, Driffield et al (2013) has sought to include political 
capital within the resources held by the firm.  
 
 The RCM approach outlined by Dunning & Zhang (2008) is shown in Table 3.2:   
 
 
 
 50 
Table 3.2 Resources, Capabilities and Markets 
Part Of RCM Includes 
Resources Natural resources, 
Created Assets 
 
Capabilities Intangible assets, 
Organizational capacity and governance , 
Vision/judgement in strategic decision-taking, 
Ability to frame and execute appropriate 
policies 
Markets Information/knowledge/availability of both 
domestic and foreign markets, 
Ability to tap into, exploit and coordinate 
markets, 
Understand and cater for specific (e.g. localized) 
needs 
(Source: Dunning & Zhang, 2008, p6)  
 
Whilst resources have already been explained, Dunning & Zhang (2008) highlighted capabilities 
to refer to mostly intangible assets such as education, skilled labour, and accumulated 
experience. Additionally, intangible assets also referred to the decision making process 
undertaken within the organisation. In relation to markets, Dunning & Zhang (2008) considered 
information and knowledge surrounding domestic and foreign markets (for both product and 
factors of production) to be important. Finally, some questions are raised as to the relative 
importance of RCM factors. For example, institutional factors were found to be more of a 
positive influence on the direction of FDI than the RCM factors (Dunning & Zhang, 2008).  
 
A relatively recent development in the literature has been to consider institutional theory as a 
determinant behind FDI flows. Institutions set the rules of the game in a society. These 
institutions will contain humanly devised constraints which will shape the interactions made 
between humans (North, 1990). Institutional factors have been considered along with other 
economic factors as being more important than labour costs or the availability of natural 
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resources (Hatem, 1997). Good institutions help to lower the cost of economic activity which 
also Increases profits (Ali et al, 2010).  
 
Initially, Wheeler & Mody (1992) grouped a number of institutional variables including political 
risk, quality of the legal system, and corruption into a single variable, and found that they had no 
influence on the location decisions made by multinational firms from North America. In 
countries with strong infrastructure, specialized suppliers, and an expanding market, 
agglomeration factors were of greater importance (Wheeler & Mody, 1992). However, this study 
helped to establish some of the influential institutional factors which could attract FDI.  
 
In contrast to Wheeler & Mody (1992), the importance of institutional quality in attracting FDI 
was indicated by Henisz (2000), Henisz & Williamson (1999), Mishra & Daly (2007), Benassy-
Quere et al (2007), Blonigen (2005), Daude & Stein (2007), and Ali et al (2010). When 
investigating different sectors, Ali et al (2010) found institutional quality matters for FDI for both 
the manufacturing and service sectors, but is less important for FDI which is directed towards 
the primary sector. The study by Mishra & Daly (2007), which focused on outbound FDI, 
suggested that the quality of institutions in the host economy affected the level of FDI flowing 
from the source country. Moreover, Blonigen (2005) further noted the relationship between 
poor institutions and poor quality infrastructure, which acted as a deterrent for FDI flows, not 
only from an institutional perspective but also from a locational view. The quality of institutions 
in the home market has also acted as a factor which has pushed FDI out of a particular country. 
Firms have also viewed institutions within their home market as being a constraint. Where this is 
the case, these investments were viewed as an escape from institutional weaknesses and 
restrictive government policies within the home market (Witt & Lewin, 2007, Dunning & Lundan, 
2008).   
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Property rights are argued to be one of the most significant factors which influence FDI flows. A 
country which has weak property rights carries a greater threat of expropriation (Henisz, 2000, 
Ali et al, 2010). This deters FDI flows, and Ali et al (2010) have argued that where this is the case 
a country’s legal and judicial system should be strengthened.  In particular, intellectual property 
rights, as part of property rights were suggested by Du et al (2008) to be a factor of institutional 
importance. The notion of property rights was also compared to the democratic system. An 
increase in the level of democratization will lead to an increase in the level of property rights (Li 
& Resnick, 2003).  
 
Political Risk can also influence the location of FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007, Du et al, 2008, 
Pajunen, 2008, Chang & Lu, 2013, Hayakawa et al, 2013). For instance, Du et al (2008) argued 
that US multinationals were more likely to invest in areas of China where the local government 
was less likely to interfere with their operations. Political stability, law and order, and quality of 
bureaucracy were highlighted by Busse & Hefeker (2007) as being the most important 
components of political risk, and therefore critical in influencing FDI. Stable government, low 
corruption, and weak bureaucracy were noted by Mishra & Daly (2007). Additionally, democratic 
accountability, chance of internal or external conflict, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions 
have been suggested as key influences of political risk by Hayakawa et al (2013). The nature of a 
country’s judicial system was also highlighted to be a factor which influenced political risk 
(Pajunen, 2008). Essentially a country which has government instability, excessive regulatory 
burden, unpredictable policies, and a lack of commitment from the government towards FDI, is 
considered to be less attractive to foreign investors (Daude & Stein, 2007).  
 
However, political risk levels have been considered less important when the global capital flows 
were larger. This was for two reasons. Firstly, the presence of diminishing returns to capital, and 
secondly, investment opportunities in countries with lower political risk have become more 
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scarce (Meon & Sekkat, 2012). This highlights the role of dynamic evolution in firms’ investment 
strategy, as they are forced to consider investing in more and more risky markets. Another 
feature of this part of the literature is the tendency to focus on the political risk in emerging 
nations rather than developed nations. Indeed, Pajunen (2008) notes that some regions are 
more dependent on a stable political environment than others in attracting FDI.  
 
Corruption has been shown to have a negative effect on FDI flows into a country (Hayakawa et 
al, 2013, Du et al, 2008, Wei, 2000, Pajunen, 2008, Benassy-Quere et al, 2007). In terms of 
locational influences, Du et al (2008) stated North American multinationals chose to locate in 
areas where government corruption was lower. Conversely, there is a view that the level of 
corruption does not influence the level of inbound FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005, Kolstad & 
Villanger, 2004). This is particularly the case for those countries which are non-OECD member 
states as they often attract vertical FDI flows which have been driven by the desire to access 
lower wages (Egger & Winner, 2005). These arguments suggest locational factors, such as cheap 
wage costs will be more influential in the FDI decision than the level of corruption which is 
present in a host economy. However, this argument focuses upon developing nations rather 
than developed nations where horizontal FDI flows are more prominent.   
 
Whilst excessive regulations in both the home and host market have been mentioned as being 
influential in the directing of FDI flows (i.e. Busse & Groizard, 2008), a further aspect of 
regulation deals with the strength of particular regulations. Specifically, this relates to 
regulations concerning taxation, labour and environmental issues. In terms of tax, those 
countries with lower tax rates have might be more attractive to multinational firms than those 
with higher rates (Benassy-Quere et al, 2005, Mogab et al, 2012, Bellak & Leibrecht, 2009). This 
relationship between taxation and its impact on FDI is more complex, as there are both direct 
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and in-direct forms of taxation which can affect the tax burden placed on a MNE (Desai et al, 
2004).   
 
A second regulatory aspect identified has been labour regulations. The literature on labour 
market regulations suggests  that those  nations which have more flexible labour market regimes 
are more attractive to foreign multinationals (Mogab et al, 2012). Both, Javorcik & Spatareanu 
(2005) and Gorg (2005) have provided evidence of restrictive labour market regimes being a 
disincentive for multinational firm’s activity.  
 
 
3.1.2 Economic Motives of FDI 
 
With the key theories of FDI established, a range of motives surrounding the behaviour of 
multinational firms can now be established. These motives are linked to some of the aspects 
detailed within the FDI theory. For example, the notion of market seeking, strategic-asset 
seeking, efficiency seeking, and resource seeking FDI comes from the development of the OLI 
paradigm. Also, a further motive of FDI concerns, the desire to ‘escape’ weak institutions in the 
home market, and such a motive is based upon the understanding of institutional theory, and 
how it impacts upon FDI.  
 
Market seeking FDI was defined by Bitzenis (2003) as ‘market hunting FDI’ or ‘strategic market 
hunting’. Those who sought to enter a market due to advantages such as market size or growth 
were defined as market hunters, while those who sought to take advantage of weak 
competition, or escape strong competition in the home market were considered as strategic 
market hunters. This also has elements of overlap with other forms of FDI theory, as Bitzenis 
(2003) has shown instances of mimetic behaviour also present within this approach. 
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Market seeking FDI is now considered by many as the most prominent determinant of FDI. 
Market seeking FDI is driven by the desire of multinational firms to access better markets, which 
is linked to proximity issues, agglomeration, and the desire to minimise distance costs (Thomsen, 
2000, Loewendahl, 2001). Strong growth prospects of regional and adjacent markets were 
considered as being influential in attracting this form of FDI (Dunning, 2002, Billington, 1999, 
Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Market seeking FDI has also been influenced by a multinational firm’s 
desires to safeguard existing markets or to create new markets (Dunning, 2002).  This form of 
FDI also enables firms to access complementary assets in terms of technology and management 
skills. These assets can then be used to enhance the quality of the final product through the 
usage of better quality inputs (Dunning, 1994). Firms from emerging markets have used this 
form of FDI to undertake trade support activities. For these firms the importance was to gain 
access to export markets or distribution networks (Buckley et al, 2007). Factors such as a high 
quality of infrastructure and low transport costs were also identified by Fallon & Cook (2009) as 
being important in influencing the location of this type of FDI.  
 
The second motive derived from the OLI paradigm concerns FDI which has been motivated by 
the desire to access strategic assets. This form of FDI takes into account strategic considerations 
which go beyond the immediate value of the asset itself. Indeed, Franco et al (2010) argued that 
seeking assets is simply a “residual” item, where those aspects which do not fit with the other 
motives of FDI are placed.   
 
Strategic asset seeking FDI tends to be framed in the context of multinational firms seeking to 
acquire particular technologies or managerial know-how (Fallon & Cook, 2009). Assets could also 
be acquired in terms of knowledge or intellectual property. However, Buckley et al (2007) also 
suggest that asset seeking FDI was a subgroup of resource seeking FDI. Outward FDI from some 
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emerging markets has also targeted particular Western Brands e.g. Bright Foods and Weetabix. 
Finally, a MNE can also acquire access to different cultures, consumer demands, systems, and 
preferences (Dunning, 1998). This wide range of factors illustrates the earlier concerns of Franco 
et al (2010) about the “residual” nature of strategic asset seeking FDI.  
 
Firms following an asset seeking alternative might be argued to be going multinational “without 
advantage” (Franco et al, 2010). In the case of asset seeking FDI, MNE’s seek to augment their 
limited ownership advantages (Dunning, 1998). Furthermore, the direction of this form of FDI 
has been different to other forms of FDI. The location of most strategic assets, particularly those 
relating to technology has been concentrated within developed economies (Fallon & Cook, 
2009). It is less common for this form of FDI to be directed towards emerging nations as they do 
not have the same asset base currently as developed nations. It has also been common for 
government backed organisations (such as sovereign wealth funds or state owned enterprises) 
to engage in this form of FDI. Indeed, this form of FDI has been common in the outward FDI 
flows from China and other emerging market economies (Buckley et al, 2007).  
 
The third motive developed by Dunning (1994) was Efficiency seeking FDI. This is motivated by 
investing companies looking to locate in lower cost countries, with a particular focus on those 
countries which have a lower level of labour costs (Buckley et al, 2007). This form of FDI is also 
used in order for investing firms to generate access to economies of scale, specialization, or 
potential synergies (Fallon & Cook, 2009). Such FDI not only allows an organisation access to a 
foreign market, but it also allowed a firm to access sources of supply as a result (Dunning, 1994). 
The direction of this type of investment can be influenced by a range of factors related to quality 
and quantity of labour and labour costs. Productivity, skills, and cost of labour can all determine 
the location of efficiency seeking FDI, alongside the industrial relations regime of a country 
(Fallon & Cook, 2009).  
 57 
 
It is possible that countries with higher levels of productivity can overcome situations where the 
host country has high labour costs (Ford & Strange, 1999). The conventional thinking was that 
high labour costs would deter inbound FDI, but this may not be the case if there are high levels 
of productivity (Billington, 1999). Dunning (1998) suggested that the role of government, 
through education and training programmes is beneficial in trying to attract efficiency seeking 
FDI. Several studies including Porter (2003) and Dunning (1998) made reference to the notion of 
clustering as a factor which influenced efficiency seeking FDI as this encouraged innovation and 
helped to create an entrepreneurial environment.   
 
Resource seeking FDI has been motivated by the desire of a multinational firm to acquire specific 
resources at a better quality or lower cost than is possible in their home market (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). This form of FDI has often been associated with the search for natural resources 
(i.e. Fallon & Cook, 2009, Buckley et al, 2007). Those multinational firms and investors, who 
engage in FDI in order to access natural resources, not only do it to augment their supply of 
resources, but they have also sought to provide security in supply, for example in the seeking of 
fossil fuels (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). According to Dunning (1994) this form of FDI has enabled 
multinational firms to access complementary assets (similar to market seeking factors), with 
these assets being used to enhance the quality of the product provided.   
 
Resource seeking FDI has not always been associated with the desire to obtain natural resources. 
Multinational firms have used resource seeking FDI to obtain access to cheaper labour, or to 
obtain particular technological capability, management or marketing expertise, and 
organisational skills (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Multinational firms which have engaged in this 
form of FDI have also been described as factor hunters.  Multinational firms have also used this 
form of FDI to develop an export base, and to engage in intensive production. Finally, the quality 
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of infrastructure was also important in influencing the location of this type of FDI (Dunning, 
1998).  
 
The final motive concerns the ‘escape investment’. FDI relating to assets is not solely asset-
seeking. In cases of institutional weakness, investors have sought to escape their home market 
in order to protect the assets they control (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). As a result, this is known 
as an ‘escape investment’ and is directed to countries with stronger institutions than the 
investors’ home market.  
 
But do these motives have a higher purpose? Whatever the specific motive of FDI, Bitzenis 
(2003) has noted that the overall objective of FDI is to achieve greater profits. Market seeking, 
and in particular, the access to larger markets is potentially beneficial for firms in terms of 
profits, as sales revenues will be higher. Likewise, the targeting of lower cost locations (for 
labour or materials) also presents potential advantages in terms of profits (Sethi et al, 2002). FDI 
location in these lower cost regions can replace weaker performing external or domestic 
markets (Buckley et al, 2007). The strong emphasis on profit-seeking motives has been 
reinforced by FDI being initially undertaken by mostly private firms, based in Japan, North 
America, and Europe. As these firms were not state controlled the incentive to engage in FDI has 
been assumed to be motivated by the desire to protect or enhance profits.  
 
Profit can be generated in various forms through the engagement in FDI. They can be accrued by 
an MNE in the long, medium, or short-term, and moreover, these profits can also be generated 
through direct or indirect means through various channels (Bitzenis, 2003). Profits would be 
expected to be lower in the short-term as the investment takes hold, in the long-term, the 
opportunities for sale of a foreign subsidiary offer potential profit gains, alongside enhanced 
sales. The notion of indirect profits, which could accrue to other parts of the business, implies 
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that other benefits from being multinational must be present (i.e. political influence, or benefits 
in securing contracts).  
 
However, as profit is considered as implicit behind many theories of FDI   the discussion of this 
aspect within the literature has not been as extensively deconstructed as the other theoretical 
constructs. In fact, there has been more discussion surrounding issues concerned with ‘profit 
shifting’ and tax benefits held by MNE’s through the FDI process  (i.e. Krautheim & Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2011).  
 
But is FDI activity always based around economic motives and the pursuit of profit? This chapter 
will now consider the potential non-economic motives of FDI.  
 
3.2 Non-Economic Motives of FDI  
The potential non-economic motives behind FDI are shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Non-Economic Determinants of FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conspicuous Consumption Institutionalism 
Political Motives 
 
Trophy Asset 
 
Utility Maximisation 
Non-Economic Determinants 
Positional Good 
 60 
In order to explore the gap in the FDI literature surrounding non-economic aspects of 
investment, Figure 3.3 shows a range of aspects relating to the possible non-economic basis of 
FDI.  
 
Discussion of these aspects has been more evident in institutional theory. In the past 
institutional theory has been related to FDI very much in the economic sense, although other 
issues surrounding law and culture are influential (Dunning & Zhang, 2008). In addition to this 
aspect, theories surrounding the positional good aspect (Hirsch, 1976), conspicuous 
consumption (Veblen, 1899), political motives, and the trophy asset (Hamil & Walters, 2010) are 
established approaches which consider the non-economic aspects of decision making. These 
have particular relevance to sport given the symbolic status of the sports industry. These factors 
will now be considered in-turn.  
 
3.2.1 Institutions Reconsidered 
 
In the previous section, institutions were defined in light of the economic motives of FDI, but 
they can also be considered in relation to the non-economic motives of FDI. Institutions can be 
classed as being both formal and informal (Dunning & Zhang, 2008, Ali et al, 2010). They are also 
subject to a range of enforcement mechanisms. Table 3.3 shows the institutional framework as 
depicted by Dunning & Zhang (2008)    
 
The definition of institutions has caused some debate within the literature. On one hand, 
institutions are considered as the organization or as the state, while on the other institutions can 
also refer to the behaviour and culture of a population. Institutions also relate to the different 
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elements of rules, with norms of behaviour, social conventions, and legal rules all considered as 
institutional factors.   
 
Table 3.3 Institutions 
Forms Areas of Institutional Influence (in the 
commercial domain)  
Formal Institutions:  
Constitutions, treaties, laws, regulations; 
provision for learning, upgrading cognition, 
knowledge, etc.  
Economic adjustment and stabilization  
Intellectual property protection 
Strengthening economic 
motivation/entrepreneurship   
Informal Institutions  
Tradition, cultural mores, trust, goodwill, 
reputation  
Rule setting and societal guidance (e.g. 
reduced crime)  
Enforcement mechanisms  
Less formal: self-regulation, fear, retaliation, 
blackballing  
More formal: Incentives/penalties, fines, 
enforced transparency, cancellation of 
contracts, imprisonment, etc.  
Promotion of entrepreneurship and 
competitive market structure.  
Adequate and effective financial institutions 
Education and training upgrading  
Security of people and physical assets  
Innovatory development  
Incentives/regulation of FDI 
Social equity and access to opportunity  
(Source: Dunning & Zhang, 2008, p8)  
 
The institutional field offers a theoretical framework for studying how institutions, which are 
prominent in an economy, evolve and emerge to affect the behaviour of individuals within it 
(Rossiaud & Locatelli, 2010). Institutions are features that can constrain or enable the behaviour 
of individuals. However, the presence of constraints also opens up further possibilities, in the 
area of regulation, in-effect enabling freedom (Hodgson, 2006).  In the sporting sense, the sports 
league, sports club, and sports culture can be considered as institutional factors alongside 
elements of regulation. This wide range of constructs highlights why a number of studies have 
not defined institutions precisely due to the difficulty in creating a definition. As a result, these 
studies tend to focus on “practical matters” (Hodgson, 2006) rather than theoretical models.  
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Hodgson (2004) divided institutionalism into two categories, old and new institutionalism. Old 
institutionalism refers to the development and evolution of key institutions, plus the use of 
psychology. This considers how institutions shaped the mentality of individuals. New 
institutionalism was initially developed by Williamson (1975), through his analysis of the firm 
using transaction costs. This theory considers the behaviour of individuals and their interactions, 
before giving an explanation of institutions (Hodgson, 2004).  
 
Some new institutionalism has helped to generate different perspectives, with a rejection of 
rational-actor models, the use of cognitive and cultural explanations, and the use of institutions 
as independent variables (Selznick, 1996). Selznick (1996) has also made reference to 
“institutional isomorphism” where organizations modelled their behaviour on similar 
organizations in their industry or field, which they perceive to be more successful.    
 
3.2.2 Conspicuous Consumption  
 
One of the arguments presented by Veblen (1899) considered the nature of purchases and social 
status. Through an understanding of the institution of the leisure class, Veblen devised the 
theory of conspicuous consumption. The theory suggests that the purchasing of goods and 
services is driven by the social hierarchy, with the individual electing to replicate the purchases 
made by members further up the hierarchy (Trigg, 2001). Such a construct has not been linked 
directly to FDI; however the purchases of certain companies would help to reflect an individual 
or an organisation’s status.    
 
Conspicuous consumption is based upon the presence of a leisure class whose members extract 
a surplus from the working class. As a surplus is produced, Trigg (2001) suggests that the 
relationship between social status and private property becomes more important. An individual 
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obtains property in order to protect their good name (Veblen, 1899). A hierarchy will now 
develop, with those having no property (and thus no social status) at the bottom of the rung 
(Trigg, 2001). Those individuals who own some property will then develop esteem from this.   
Wealth can be transformed into status, and Veblen (1899) noted that wealth can be displayed in 
two ways: extensive leisure activities and through the consumption of goods and services.  
‘Veblen effects’ are present in goods when a more expensive price is paid for a functionally 
equivalent good (Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996).  
 
There are, however, problems with this theory. The consumption patterns of individuals are 
often associated with lifestyles, which may not relate directly to the social hierarchy of an 
individual. A postmodern perspective, does not consider that lifestyles can only be shaped by 
income, which will affect the position in the social hierarchy. Secondly, the theory is too reliant 
on the trickle down of consumption from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom. Trigg (2001) 
suggests that consumption patterns can be led by those at the bottom of the hierarchy and not 
just at the top. Finally, it has been argued that wealth is not always displayed through 
conspicuous means, as status can be displayed through more subtle means such as charity 
activities (Trigg, 2001).  
 
But the role of conspicuous consumption is particularly important in analysing sport. There are 
some sports which are more conspicuous in nature, and this is driven by differences in television 
coverage and global interest. Football and Formula One are two sports where wealthy investors 
have sought to take control of competing teams. In contrast, cricket and rugby has not attracted 
the same profile of investors.  In both football and Formula One, the level of television coverage 
is for  a global audience, but for cricket and rugby leagues the coverage is often much more 
localised, though recent developments in may be globalising them, i.e. the Indian Premier 
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League (IPL). However, even in the case of the IPL, the level of global markets taking an interest 
is much smaller than English Premier League football.  
 
As a result, the status that can be derived from owning a football club is greater than owning 
cricket or rugby teams. Sport is an effective mechanism to display wealth as an investor 
purchasing a team will often have their name referred to in relation to the club, and this can be 
used to enhance their own image and profile. A further implication of this theory is that an 
investor will seek to choose a larger club in a prominent league. This will give them greater 
benefits, and this fits into the luxury good argument specified by Veblen. An investor might 
select to purchase a smaller lower league team, but this would not give them the same benefits 
as a Premier League club. Hence a Premier League club is more conspicuous type of ‘conspicuous 
consumption’.   
 
3.2.3 Positional Good  
 
Although the conspicuous consumption theory identified how purchasing habits could reflect 
status, the theory of positional goods displayed how particular goods have certain positional 
attributes which made them desirable, which also enabled the enhancement of status (Hirsch, 
1976).  
 
Hirsch argued there were two divisions in an economy, firstly the material economy, which 
enables the per capita consumption of a material good to increase over a time, and secondly, 
the positional economy. The latter considers goods, services, relationships, and work positions 
that are scarce or subject to congestion due to more extensive use.  The nature of the positional 
good suggests that value is created through the desirability of the good. For example, a ‘high 
status job’ is a form of positional good. These goods are scarce in terms of supply, so satisfaction 
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can only be obtained by a minority of individuals (Hirsch, 1976). This creates an intense level of 
competition for these goods. Power and status can be obtained through the acquisition of 
strategically-scare goods, and this is linked to the sporting context. Sport can be considered as a 
zero-sum game, with rival teams often spending significant amounts in order to achieve marginal 
differences in outcomes. Therefore, the success on the field of play can at least be partially 
considered as a positional good.   
 
While Dymski (2006) has argued that sport is a form of positional good, the competing clubs can 
also be viewed as ‘positional’. For example, only thirty-two clubs across Europe will qualify for 
the Champions League, and only ten to twelve teams will compete in Formula One. Below this 
level are hundreds of other teams who compete at lower levels, but do not have access to such 
competitions. Furthermore, at a national level, in European football leagues only eighteen to 
twenty clubs can compete in the top division at any one time. Hence these clubs are particularly 
scarce in terms of their supply. These clubs will be desirable due to the shortage of supply, and 
the additional benefits in terms of enhanced prestige.  
 
3.2.4 Political Motives 
 
A further aspect to consider relates to political influences behind investment.  Political economy 
is considered as the process of interaction between government and organizations to be 
dynamic, complex, and interdependent (Luo et al, 2010). The government will set the regulatory 
framework for an economy, while the competing organizations seem to influence this 
regulation. Examples of studies which have considered the political economy of FDI flows 
included Luo et al (2010), Ederington & McCalman (2010), and Tumen & Emmert (2004). Of 
these studies, Luo et al (2010) focused on the political economy of outward FDI from an 
emerging market perspective. In relation to emerging economies, it was argued that as these 
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nations are engaged in intense global competition as a result, organizations from these countries 
have a particular importance to their home government as they are used to promote their home 
government’s social and economic wellbeing.   
 
Since the 1990’s there has been an increase in the volume of outward FDI undertaken by firms 
from emerging markets. Part of this relates to their economic development, and the desire to 
purchase specific production inputs for use in their own economy.  However, such trends were 
highlighted much earlier in the political economy literature. Several decades ago Bergsten et al 
(1975) considered the growing importance of oil producing nations and Japan. The development 
of the post-war global economic system was to the direct benefit of the United States, Canada, 
and Western Europe, and indirectly for Latin America. However, the development of Japan, and 
more recently, the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has changed the structure of this 
group. Even by 1975, Bergsten et al (1975) noted the rise in importance of economies from the 
third world. These nations were considered as new actors in the global economy. The later work 
of Luo et al (2010) concerning outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and China further 
discusses the growing importance of the market in the global economy. 
 
The increase in OFDI from emerging markets has seen the pursuit of certain “Western symbols”, 
whether they were particular companies, brands, or technologies. Therefore, an element of 
reverse colonisation can be considered as taking place as the symbols fall into the hands of 
organizations from less-developed countries. Moreover, these organisations are often, either, 
heavily state influenced, or under complete state control. This aspect raises further issues 
surrounding the security of such investment, and raises concerns surrounding the “true” 
motivation of such investors, for example, are political motives strictly non-economic? The 
desire to obtain certain resources implies an economic motivation (to enhance growth), even as   
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access to certain companies or brands can also provide non-economic benefits in terms of status 
or position.  
 
Having discussed the range of possible motives behind FDI, there is now a need to consider how 
FDI takes place and what form of entry modes are used.  
 
3.3 Entry Modes  
 
One method with which FDI entry can be defined related to types of investment, and whether 
this was new, expansionary, or merger and acquisition (M&A). For the United Kingdom, Table 3.4 
shows the number of FDI projects undertaken through new, expansionary and M&A.  
 
Table 3.4 Number of Projects by FDI Type from 2010 to 2013 (by number) 
Year New Expansionary M&A Total 
2010/2011 724 544 166 1,434 
2011/2012 752 506 148 1,406 
2012/2013 777 577 205 1,559 
 (Source: UK Inward Investment Report 2013)  
 
From Table 3.4, it is apparent that the greater proportion of FDI projects in the UK come in the 
form of new projects rather than expansionary investment or M&A activity. In the literature 
entry modes have been described more widely. Possible methods of entry include greenfield, 
brownfield, merger-acquisition, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and franchising. In contrast, 
the vast majority of FDI entering the Premier League has come in the form of M&A.  
 
The entry mode into football is prescribed through the nature of the football pyramid system. In 
other industries, transaction costs efficiency, and regulation (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007, Brouthers, 
2002, Dunning & Lundan, 2008) have all been shown to influence the type of entry mode chosen 
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by a firm. In football, the only practical method of FDI entry is through merger and acquisition. A 
greenfield investment is possible, but the club would have to start at the very bottom of the 
football pyramid, and this would be outside the Football League structure (Noll, 2002). This 
would not be attractive as the club would have to find and develop its own support base from 
scratch, and such a process is difficult due to the reluctance of some supporters to switch clubs 
(Giulianotti, 2002). Other entry modes such as the joint venture or the strategic alliance are not 
possible as a football club in another country would have to share resources with one in the 
Premier League. Football clubs are standalone investments (King, 1997).   
 
3.4 Consequences of FDI  
 
When FDI enters a country it is said to benefit the national income of the selected host nation 
through economic growth, jobs, and technology (Gorg & Greenaway, 2004). An MNE can also 
provide positive benefits in terms of technology transfer. However, do domestically owned firms 
benefit from the presence of MNE’s? Can they make use of any technology transfers? And if 
there are benefits from FDI, then who are these benefits for? Also, can the investing firm’s home 
market benefit from outward FDI? This section will now investigate the potential spillover effects 
arising from FDI.  
 
3.4.1 Productivity Effects  
 
One of the most investigated spillover effects concerns productivity. The literature surrounding 
the effect of FDI on productivity is not conclusive in terms of direction. Firstly, there are those 
such as Haskel et al (2007), Liu et al (2000), Keller & Yeaple (2003) and Ruane & Ugur (2005) who 
had identified FDI to have positive effects on productivity. An increase in foreign presence of 
10% will lead to a 0.5% increase in total factor productivity (Haskel et al, 2007). In their study, 
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Keller & Yeaple (2003) suggested that the presence of FDI in North America, led to substantial 
gains in productivity for domestically owned firms as high as 11%. Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign owned firms often forced domestically owned firms to make more efficient use of their 
resources, leading to enhanced productivity (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998). But is the link between 
increased productivity and FDI sector specific? Foreign firms have often entered the more 
productive sectors or plants (Javorcik, 2004, Aitken & Harrison, 1999). The result of this 
particular strategy is that the relationship between productivity and FDI might be exaggerated 
(Javorcik, 2004).  
 
The second perspective of FDI and productivity is that the overall effect is neutral. In 
investigating the UK manufacturing sector, Girma et al (2001) found some host economy firms 
positively benefitted from the presence of FDI, whilst other domestically owned firms did not, so 
any positive effects were cancelled out by negative ones. Additionally, no clear pattern existed in 
terms of the industries which have received positive spillover effects (Harris & Robinson, 2004).   
 
The third perspective suggests that FDI has had a negative impact on productivity, and 
specifically, has not benefitted domestically owned firms (Mullen & Williams, 2007, Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999, Konings, 2001). This possibility arises from a number of reasons. The presence of 
foreign firms in a sector can reduce the productivity of domestically owned firms in the same 
sector. This was particularly evident when there were high fixed costs and imperfect 
competition. In addition, foreign owned firms will take demand away from domestically owned 
firms (Mullen & Williams, 2007). A reduction in productivity and demand, alongside high costs 
provides a situation where domestically owned firms were might be effectively forced to exit the 
market. A similar argument was made by Konings (2001), in relation to Eastern European 
economies.  It was argued that foreign owned firms will take market share away from the 
domestically owned firms due to improved technologies. This will then force the domestically 
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owned firms to exit market as they were replaced by stronger performing firms under foreign 
control. Furthermore, any benefits which are brought about by FDI, such as improved 
technology are outweighed by the negative effect on domestic competition (Konings, 2001). 
Finally, Aitken & Harrison (1999) suggested the choice of higher productivity sectors and firms by 
foreign owned firms, is harmful to other domestically owned firms in the host economy. It is also 
possible that negative productivity spillovers can also be created by the ability of a multinational 
to withhold their technology. If the multinational can internalise technology or firm-specific 
advantages then no spillovers can occur (Gorg & Greenaway, 2004). Domestically owned firms 
also face challenges in terms of being “crowded” out by foreign owned rivals (Driffield, 2004).  
 
Where productivity effects are positive or negative, to what extent are they static “one-off” 
effects or dynamic? Domestically owned firms may not able to immediately use the technology 
brought into a sector by foreign owned firms, and this will restrict their ability to generate 
productivity spillovers in the short-term (Gorg & Greenaway, 2004).  Moreover, there are 
differences in the short and long-term. In the short-run, domestically owned firms will see a 
decline in productivity prior to an increase in the long-run (Liu, 2008). In contrast, Jin et al (2013) 
argue productivity will capture short-run improvements in technical and allocative efficiency. 
However, such effects can be classed as “catch-up”, as local firms adopt the more efficient 
techniques used by foreign firms. However, productivity in the long-run can also be enhanced as 
domestically owned firms are able to assimilate the new technology brought into the market 
(Liu, 2008).  Despite the potential existence of productivity benefits, FDI was shown to a short-
term benefit by Jin et al (2013). Using the Spanish economy as evidence, the number of patents 
applied for by domestic firms decreased, as did the number of new products introduced into the 
market. So whilst there may have been some benefits in terms of productivity, FDI did not 
enhance the innovation ability of local firms.  
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3.4.2 Competitiveness Effects  
 
Even if productivity effects are difficult to assess at the sector or industry level, FDI could alter 
the competitiveness of host economies (Markusen & Venables, 1999, Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998, 
Gugler & Brunner, 2007). FDI can act as a catalyst for the development of domestic industry, 
which in the long-term could lead to the erosion of the advantages possessed by multinational 
firms (Markusen & Venables, 1999). A key feature was multinational firms bringing 
complementary assets, enabling domestically owned firms to grow more effectively. FDI also 
brings assets such as technology, and management skills which were not present within a 
domestic economy. The presence of these new skills and know-how further enhances the 
competitiveness of a host economy (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998). This was supported by Gugler & 
Brunner (2007), but they argued that enhanced competitiveness was related to high added value 
investment.  
 
In what other ways can FDI enhance the competitiveness of a host economy? Dunning (1994) 
argued there were five ways. Firstly, FDI allows firms in the host economy to produce more 
efficiently through the reduction of costs or increases in productivity. Secondly, FDI enables 
innovation in production processes, improving existing products, and organisational structures. 
Thirdly, FDI brings about the reallocation of resources and capabilities which were more in-line 
with the country’s comparative advantage. Fourthly, FDI enables the development and capture 
of new foreign markets, and finally, FDI reduces the costs of any structural adjustment that 
followed from changes in global demand and supply conditions. Furthermore, Dunning (1994) 
suggested FDI provided resources and capabilities, which would otherwise be unobtainable, 
would boost research and development, stimulate the efficiency of suppliers, raise quality 
standards, and allows economies to tap into the competitive advantages held by other nations.   
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Another means of increasing country competitiveness is provided through foreign owned firms 
being able to enter sectors where the barriers to entry are high. A foreign owned firm will have 
the resources which enables it to break-up an existing domestically owned monopoly. However, 
competitiveness in the host economy might not be enhanced. But both, Konings (2001) and 
Javorcik (2004) have argued that foreign firms can also force weaker domestically owned firms 
out of a particular market. Thus any positive benefits which multinationals have brought might 
be outweighed by these effects (Konings, 2001).    
 
3.4.3 Technology  
 
The importance of absorptive capacity in influencing technological spillovers is also an issue  (i.e. 
Gugler & Brunner,2007,  Marcin, 2008, Girma, 2005, Kinoshita, 2000) and  the importance of 
technological gaps was brought out by Girma et al (2001), Blomstrom et al (1999), Dimelis 
(2005), and Blomstrom & Kokko (1998). The technological capability of domestically owned firms 
is crucial in influencing the type and level of spillover effect which will be present. These studies 
argue that those firms with small technological gaps viz-a-viz the multinational firm have been 
better equipped to take advantage of the technology brought into an economy by a 
multinational firm. In particular, those firms which resemble foreign owned rivals are more likely 
to take advantage of any technology brought into an economy (Dimelis, 2005). In contrast those 
firms which have had large technological gaps are not able to take advantage of the technology 
brought into the market and as a result cannot generate the same level of positive effects. 
Indeed, the firms which have had large technological gaps (and low skills) are damaged by the 
presence of foreign owned firms in their sector (Girma et al, 2001).  
 
However, the role of technology in sport is unique.  The technology of football is the game itself, 
and the game can never become obsolete due to technological change (Kuper & Szymanski, 
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2012). Issues surrounding technological gaps and absorptive capacity for instance are of less 
relevance. A football club cannot become obsolete because a rival has access to better 
technology. Likewise, on the field of play, football players cannot be replaced by automated 
systems.  
 
3.4.4 Wage Effects  
 
Within the literature there is a debate as to how the total level of wage spending should be 
analysed. There are two measures which have been used: total wage spending, or wage 
spending as total compensation per worker. The literature tends not to distinguish between 
different types of workers and the wages which they earn (Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2005). These two 
elements present a challenge in considering the findings of those studies which investigate wage 
spending of the multinational, and its impact on other firms. For example, do different groups of 
employees receive the same benefits or costs from the entrance of FDI into a sector? The study 
by Driffield & Girma (2003) did make some attempt to address this issue, through looking at the 
UK electronics industry. They found wage spillovers only existed for skilled workers within this 
sector. For unskilled workers, there were no wage benefits, hence the distribution of benefits 
arising from FDI were uneven. This difference was determined by the increased demand for 
skilled labour, which was driven by new technologies being imported into the host economy by 
the MNE. For unskilled labour, such technology was considered to be “unskilled labour 
augmenting”, hence the demand for unskilled labour declines as a result. Furthermore, Driffield 
& Girma (2003) also argued that there was no guarantee local labour would secure employment 
at an MNE due to different skill sets requirement.  
 
A substantial part of the literature suggests that foreign owned firms pay higher wages than 
their domestically owned rivals (Lipsey, 2004, Girma et al, 2001, Conyon et al, 2002, Driffield & 
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Girma, 2003, Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2005, and Driffield, 1996). However there are disagreements as 
to why foreign owned firms offer higher wages to employees. One suggestion is that foreign 
owned firms acquire firms who were already paying above average wages for the industry, 
hence this explains the difference. While this was acknowledged by Lipsey & Sjoholm (2005), 
they also suggested that the gap between the average wage for an industry and the wages paid 
by foreign owned firms is too small to explain the difference. So, could productivity differences 
play their part? This notion was rejected by Driffield (1999) and Girma et al (2001). Foreign 
owned firms were shown to pay higher wages irrespective of any differences in productivity. But 
FDI does not always generate higher wages, as FDI located in areas of high unemployment may 
not generate higher wages, although it may have positive benefits in terms of employment 
(Driffield & Girma, 2003).  
 
Having established that foreign owned firms will in most cases pay higher wages to the question 
is then to what extent does this wage effect spillover to domestically owned firms? Lipsey (2005) 
noted evidence of wage spillovers to domestically owned firms to be sparse but not conclusive. 
The study by Girma et al (2001) found no evidence of wage spillovers to domestically owned 
firms in the UK manufacturing sector. Likewise, Gorg & Greenaway (2001) did not find wholesale 
support for positive wage spillovers between foreign and domestically owned firms. If foreign 
owned affiliates offered higher wages than domestically owned firms, then this would be 
attractive to higher quality workers. Domestically owned firms paying lower wages will only 
attract lower skilled workers in this situation (Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2005). Domestically owned 
firms, may therefore, produce inferior products and this will then impact upon the demand for 
such products.  
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3.4.5 Regional Effects  
 
The final set of effects considered refer to the effects FDI has had on local regions. Regional 
spillovers exist in different forms. Firstly, there is the direct contact between a multinational firm 
and local suppliers. This benefits local firms through improved communication and transport 
links, brought about by the presence of a multinational firm (Girma & Wakelin, 2009). Secondly, 
there are benefits in employment and skills (Haskel et al, 2007, Greenaway et al, 2000). If a 
foreign owned firm continues to increase its level of employment then the positive spillovers 
generated will be significant. However, if the foreign owned firm or plant stops increasing its 
employment levels, or reduces employment, then the same level of positive benefit cannot be 
generated (Haskel et al, 2007).  
 
The effect on skills has been an important consequence of MNE behaviour as they provide  
training programmes which can enhance the skills of employees from the local region. Where 
there is   restricted regional labour mobility, these effects are beneficial for local employees only 
(Greenaway et al, 2000). There are also imitation and demonstration effects to local firms 
(Blomstrom & Kokko, 1996). The arrival of a MNE enables local firms to copy technology, 
processes, inputs, or the final product which is produced by the foreign firm. Such benefits may 
not be accrued by those firms which operate outside of the local region. For example, if a 
domestically owned firm operates in the same sector as a MNE, but in a different geographical 
location, they do not generate positive benefits from the arrival of FDI. The most prominent 
benefits go to those firms which operate in the same sector and region as the MNE. Finally, the 
level of spillover activity is also influenced by the development of the local region FDI has taken 
place in. For instance, those regions with lower economic development did not generate the 
same level of benefit from FDI as more developed locations (Girma & Wakelin, 2009).  
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3.4.6 Reverse Spillovers 
 
The final form of spillover effect does not relate to the effect on domestic firms, but considers 
the effect on the foreign firm’s home economy. This area has received much less attention in the 
literature when compared to the other spillovers identified. Investment which has been defined 
asset seeking could secure access to new technologies, which can then be used in the home 
market of the foreign firm. The activities of MNE’s can provide a benefit to domestic firms within 
the home economy, as they could be able to get access to technologies which would otherwise 
not be available (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Furthermore, Driffield & Love (2003) find evidence in 
the UK manufacturing sector of reverse spillovers being generated through the technologies 
used by domestic firms ‘spilling over’ to foreign firms. The focus of the reverse spillover 
literature concerns technology, but the arrival of better technology in the home market could 
also influence productivity and wage improvements in the home economy.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has concentrated on the theories, motives, forms and consequences of FDI. FDI can 
be driven by a range of motives, with profit underlying these economic motives, which include 
market, strategic asset, efficiency, and resource seeking factors. Whilst traditional FDI literature 
is very much economic in nature, this chapter has also identified a range of potential non-
economic motives behind FDI, such as the positional good, conspicuous consumption, political 
factors and further institutional issues. Furthermore, this chapter has found a range of different 
consequences potentially present due to the arrival of FDI into an economy. These 
consequences exist through effects on productivity, competitiveness, wages, and regional 
factors. Also, there could be the presence of reverse spillover to the investing firm’s home 
market.  
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The next chapter considers how FDI theory, reviewed in its wider context in this chapter, can be 
applied to the specific context of sport and the case of Premier League football.  
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Chapter 4: The Economics of Sport 
 
With the literature available on FDI now established, this chapter will consider the literature 
from sports economics which is relevant to this thesis. The discussion will, therefore, focus on 
the objectives held by sports team owners and the role of profit in sport before surveying the 
more limited literature on FDI and football. This will include an identification of both the motives 
and consequences so far considered in this literature.  
 
4.1 Ownership Objectives: Profit and Sport  
 
From a conventional economic perspective the most prominent economic objective of team 
ownership is profit, and specifically, profit maximisation. Profit Maximisation is well established 
as an assumption in economics but less well demonstrated as behaviour (Garcia-del-Barrio & 
Szymanski, 2009).  Arguments surrounding other objectives such as growth maximisation 
(Baumol, 1959) and sales revenue maximisation (Marris, 1963) have been proposed as 
alternatives.  Famously, Baumol (1959) found that managerial salaries were more closely related 
to sales revenue than profits. Hence, the manager would seek to maximise sales revenue rather 
than profits in their self-interest.  
 
The varying, and sometimes conflicting, objectives are prominent too in the sports economics 
literature where debates surrounding the validity of the profit maximisation objective soon 
emerged. While some suggested that profit maximisation was the objective of team owners, 
others have suggested utility maximisation and win maximisation as alternative objectives. The 
application of profit maximisation to sport was mostly driven by the North American literature 
(Sloane, 2006) but even in this North American literature this was not the universal view.    
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The seminal works of Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964), both focusing on North American 
sport, considered profit maximisation to be the implicit objective of sports team owners. These 
studies had a critical underpinning, as they both argued that greater sporting competition was 
more beneficial than less competition, since greater competition generated more revenues. In 
addition, for sports teams, it was important to have an even distribution of playing talent as this 
created a more even contest. When making talent choices, if a team sought to secure all of the 
best available playing talent at some stage diminishing returns would set-in. Using a specific 
example of this, Rottenberg (1956) argued that a star player at a poor team would be worth 
more to that team than a lower star player at a rich team. Thus, talent choices made in the 
market should lead to a more or less even distribution of talent across all teams. This would in-
effect be the market, placing players where they would have their most productive use if the 
competing teams were rational profit maximisers.  
 
Despite acknowledging that profit maximisation was not the most prominent objective in 
leagues where the satisfaction gained from winning was particularly important, Quirk & Fort 
(1995) still supported the notion that sports teams were profit maximisers. Further support for 
the profit maximisation hypothesis came from Ferguson et al (1991). It was found that in the 
NHL (National Hockey League), teams made decisions on ticket pricing which were consistent 
with the profit maximisation hypothesis. As a result, the notion of sports teams having similar 
motivations to other types of economic agent could not be dismissed (Ferguson et al, 1991). 
Others such as Quirk & Fort (1992) and Zimbalist (1992) have also supported the profit 
maximisation hypothesis from the North American sports perspective.  
 
However, when considering the European literature, there has been less support for profit 
maximisation, though several studies have suggested that sports team owners held profit 
seeking objectives, particularly after the transformation of English football in the late 1980’s and 
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throughout the 1990’s. During this period, ‘new’ directors had entered the game with differing 
attitudes towards club ownership (King, 1997). Rather than football clubs being run as a form of 
public amenity, such as a library, the new directors were changing the thinking present at 
football clubs, and enhancing the free-market reforms the game was undertaking (i.e. changes 
to broadcasting regulations and club stadia). These new directors were not motivated by non-
profit objectives, and instead they were focused on generating profit from the investment which 
treated football as a business opportunity (King, 1997).  
 
For King (1997), profit could be gained in two areas. Firstly, there was the direct profit, where 
the club itself generated profit, and secondly, the football club was used to support other 
business owned by the directors. This would be a form of indirect profit, as profit for other 
business interests was enhanced by the ownership of a football club (Fort, 2000).  
 
A similar theme was noted by Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski (2009) in relation to Spanish 
football club presidents who owned construction companies. Essentially, the football club was 
used as a vehicle to promote other business interests. There were also examples from North 
American sport where team owners have used sports investment to benefit their other 
businesses (Zimbalist, 2003). Additionally, some investors have been willing to cover the direct 
financial losses made by their club in order to promote the local region to potential foreign 
investors, which may benefit their other business operations (King, 1997).  
 
While not using the term new directors, Andreff & Staudohar (2000) stated that football 
investors in the 1990’s were no-longer the financially disinterested businessmen of the past. 
Instead these investors were seeking to enhance financial performance through ownership and 
control. As a result, improvements were made to the commercial operations of the football 
clubs under their control. Furthermore, football clubs sought to maximise revenue streams from 
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ticketing, merchandise, television, and capital markets (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). Additionally, 
as a number of English clubs were listed on the stock exchange in the 1990s, Szymanski & 
Kuypers (1999) argued that the English Premier League was the European league which most 
closely resembled the North American profit maximisation model.  
 
Finally, the potential for club owners to generate returns in terms of capital gains needs to be 
considered (Zimbalist, 2003). The increased value of a team might enable future profits to be 
made through selling a club onto another investor. The issue for this objective (which is not 
raised by Zimbalist directly) is whether the growth in value would be sufficient to cover any 
financial losses which might have been made by the club in the past. If the losses are greater 
than the change in value then it is fair to assume the investor did not benefit, so once again 
issues of ownership rationality are present. Zimbalist (2003) also pointed to a possible further 
economic benefit in terms of taxation reduction. However, this advantage was explained in 
reference to North American sport only, as 50% of the franchise value to player contracts can be 
amortised over 5 years.  
 
4.2 The Weakness of Profit in Football  
 
Although the literature has some compelling arguments to support the link between football 
club ownership and profit seeking motives, it has been apparent that non-profit objectives are 
also pursued by club owners. The first study to question the ability of football clubs to generate 
profits was Sloane (1971). Sloane argued that the profit maximisation hypothesis was not 
applicable to football. In contrast to North American sport where profits were almost standard, 
English football did not have the same record of making profits.  More recently, a similar claim 
was made  by Zimbalist (2003) who argued  that North American sports teams are business-type 
institutions, whereas the aim of most European clubs (including English clubs) is to simply be 
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successful on the field of play.  This implies that European football clubs might not even be 
businesses in the formal sense.  
 
Why have European and English football teams been viewed as being less profitable?   European 
and English football has operated an open league structure in which promotion and relegation is 
permitted between divisions. In both cases revenues can change dramatically, offering a 
substantial increase or loss to a football club.  As there is no promotion or relegation in North 
American sports leagues there is no threat of losing revenue so maximising profits is easier 
within this context (Fort, 2000). The threat of losing (or gaining) revenues through divisional 
change means that a different competitive environment exists and a  situation in which the 
owners in European sport are forced into maximising wins rather than profits (Haugen & 
Solberg, 2010). As a result, English football has been classed as a ‘loss making’ industry 
(Szymanski, 2012).   
 
Furthermore, running a football club on the basis of seeking profit was not rational according to 
Hamil & Walters (2010). If a club refused to compete with the wages offered by rival clubs (in 
order to maximise profits) then sporting performance would suffer. In football this is a 
particularly important issue, as the labour market for players is highly competitive, due to the 
strong link between wage spending and performance (Szymanski & Smith, 1997). If the 
performance of the team suffers due to lower wage spending, then both match attendance and, 
as a result, revenues will decline. If performance declines to such an extent, then the club can be 
relegated. It will then suffer an even more significant loss of revenue. The only way of averting 
this scenario is for the owner to invest in team strengthening, which will erode profitability, but 
not to the same extent, as would relegation.  
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Although, North American sport is seen as profit seeking, sport there has been described as 
being “a sort of island of regulated quasi-socialist economy in the middle of a liberal American 
market capitalism” (Andreff, 2011). Institutional restraints on competition help to generate the 
conditions where profit can be derived from a sporting investment. North American sports 
operate a system whereby revenues are highly equalized in terms of their distribution, and the 
player labour market is highly regulated (Hamil & Walters, 2010). The restraints placed on 
players including a salary cap and a draft system, has helped to equalize talent across the 
competing teams and to increase uncertainty, raising interest and revenues   In contrast, the 
regulations present in European football constrain profits (Lago et al, 2006), and also restrict the 
threat of takeover which has allowed non-profit objectives to be pursued by club owners.  
 
Another cause of unprofitability at European football clubs has been an increase in income 
inequality between clubs.  A study by Lago et al (2006) explained a situation, where, if income 
increased by the same percentage for each club in a league, the income gap in absolute terms 
would grow. For a small club to compete it would have to try and bridge the financial gap 
between itself and the larger clubs, which might lead to greater losses. Financial inequality is not 
a new phenomenon in English football, as Platts & Smith (2010) found significant inequalities in 
the pre-1945 era.  But the early inequalities were driven by differences in the size of 
attendances, which influenced the level of revenue a club could generate and some measures 
were introduced to help alleviate this problem (see chapter two). Despite the withdrawal of such 
measures, inequality still exists in English football, as larger market clubs (with access to larger 
populations) generate supporter benefits from these aspects (Buraimo et al, 2007).  
 
Finally, the arrival of greater revenues in the game paradoxically contributed to increase 
financial losses. Greater revenue caused inflation both in wages and transfer fees (Storm & 
Nielsen, 2012). The expectation of greater revenues has enabled football clubs to increase 
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spending. But where there has been evidence of underperformance, revenues have also been 
lower than expected, hence losses greater (Lago et al, 2006). Indeed this further highlighted the 
difficulties facing football club owners in generating profits. Therefore, club owners have 
traditionally been considered to hold other objectives and motives related to the non-economic 
aspects of owning a club.   
 
4.3 Ownership Objectives: Non-Economic   
 
Sports team owners might be “sportsmen” (or showmen) who will sacrifice profit in order to 
achieve sporting success. At the upper limit these owners sought to win at all costs, subject to 
winning being constrained by a minimum profit, or maximum subsidy, constraint (Vrooman, 
2007). Within this range several different objectives such as utility maximisation, win 
maximisation, and prestige have been discussed in the literature as motives for club ownership.  
 
The concept of utility maximisation was first applied to the objectives of a business by 
Williamson (1963). A manager’s utility depended upon the level of staff expenditure, level of 
output, and the ratio of reported profits to total profits. Therefore, the greater the discretionary 
investment a manager has control over the greater the utility derived. In order to generate this 
discretionary spending, a minimum level of profit must be achieved initially (Williamson, 1963). 
This approach was first applied to the case of professional sport by Sloane (1971), as he sought 
to treat the ownership of a football club as a consumption activity. In Sloane’s study, non-
economic objectives were identified which reflected the growth in the non-profit maximising 
model literature at that time (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). A similar argument was made by 
Zimbalist (2003), who suggested it was beneficial to view team owners as maximising their total 
return in relation to both consumption and investment, not just financial profit 
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Despite rejecting profit maximisation, Sloane (1971) did include profit as part of his model, 
although this was not considered as the most important objective. Significant weight was given 
to playing success, and this was highlighted as the most important factor in his work. Security, 
attendance or revenue, and health of the league were other key factors. Security was considered 
as highly important for some clubs who had to sell players to survive, whilst attendance was 
viewed as a form of success. The health of the league factor, recognised the mutual 
interdependence of football clubs, and influenced performance. Finally, this model implied a 
financial solvency constraint, suggesting a minimum after tax profit must be recorded.  Some 
evidence in support of utility maximisation was also found in relation to North American sport 
(Atkinson et al, 1988). They found that the talent choices of NFL teams did not relate to those 
which are present in the profit maximisation hypothesis. This was due to wage rates for players 
exceeding the estimate of their marginal revenue products. Hence, NFL owners sought both 
profit and private non-monetary benefits associated with winning (Atkinson et al, 1988).  
 
With the introduction of other objectives into the analysis of sports team ownership, questions 
were raised as to the relative importance of these wider objectives.  For instance, Kesenne (1996 
& 2007) proposed the notion of win maximisation as the objective of sports team ownership 
subject to a minimum profit constraint. A league where win maximisation is the prevailing 
objective will have weaker competitive balance, larger spending on playing talent and larger 
wages for playing talent, compared to a league where profit maximisation was the objective for 
member clubs. Total revenue was lower in this type of league (Kesenne, 1996). Lower revenues 
were driven by lower demand (due to a reduced competitive balance), with the net result for 
this type of league being lower profits. In support of these arguments, Samagaio et al (2009) 
found that despite football’s increasing revenues, there has been a failure to enhance the wealth 
of shareholders. They found, in support of Lago et al (2006), that as revenues have increased so 
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have costs, concluding football clubs have sought to maximise sporting performance subject to 
achieving a minimum profit. 
 
The notion of owners favouring sporting success is not a new construct. As we have seen local 
businessman in the past had taken control of local clubs because of their sporting enthusiasm 
(Sloane, 1971). But, the greater commercialisation of sport in general, and football in particular 
was supposed to weaken this.  In their study of more recent English and Spanish football, Garcia-
del-Barrio & Szymanski (2009) found support in both leagues for the objective of win 
maximisation subject to a zero profit budget constraint. 
 
The ownership of a football club seems, therefore, to involve a more nuanced range of potential 
non-economic objectives. The notions of the sportsmen owner and the pursuit of success were 
driven by a club owner being a football fan (Hamil & Walters, 2010). The idea of a fan owner was 
also used by Zimbalist (2003) who suggested that a motive of sports team ownership might even 
be ‘fun’.   Furthermore, the ownership of a team, particularly if it is successful, might also benefit 
an owners’ ego (Zimbalist, 2003). In these terms, there might be a strong element of self-
satisficing behaviour in team ownership. Aside from these psychological benefits, team 
ownership might also be influenced by a desire to enhance personal and social prestige. While 
this was initially viewed as being an enhancement of prestige in the local region (Sloane, 1971), 
more recently the ownership of a sports team has been viewed as a trophy asset (Hamil & 
Walters, 2010), with benefits of celebrity and vanity to be accrued by a team owner, even at the 
expense of profits (Hamil & Walters, 2010).  
 
Traditionally, some local businessmen invested in a football club through a sense of civic duty, 
providing a particular benefit in the case of a financial crisis (Sloane, 1971, Hamil & Walters, 
2010). This localised element has now been extended by Zimbalist (2003) who suggested owners 
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sought to maximise global long-term returns. These approaches implied that a range of potential 
objectives are held by team owners but they also raise consideration of the extent to which 
these objectives are inter-linked.  
 
However, how can the exact objectives of team owners be identified? It has been common to 
deduce these ‘after the event’ (ex-post).  The analysis of club balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts to symbolise club objectives has been common practice. For example, the early yearly 
losses made by Roman Abramovich at Chelsea clearly suggested that he followed non-profit 
objectives (Sloane, 2006). However, Fort (2000) and Fort & Quirk (2004), questioned the 
effectiveness of this method, while Moorhouse (1999) raised questions about the nature of the 
data used. Their primary concern related to the nature of profit and differences in economic and 
accounting profit. Both Fort (2000) and Fort & Quirk (2004) argued that economic profit should 
be considered as the object of analysis, as accounting profit was easily manipulated to avoid tax 
payments. However, there was no evidence presented which suggested economic profit would 
be positive in these arguments (Sloane, 2006).       
 
4.4 The Motivation for FDI in Football  
 
These problems of analysing motivation grow when we turn to the more limited discussion of 
FDI and football. The literature here is very underdeveloped, with few existing studies 
concerning this phenomenon. Some of the studies which have included a reference to foreign 
ownership, such as Kelly et al (2012), and Hamil & Walters (2010) identified FDI as part of a 
wider narrative concerning English football.  The first studies to make reference, more 
specifically, to foreign ownership of English football clubs were Buraimo et al (2006) and Barros 
& Leach (2006). Both of these used Chelsea as an example, but the main focus of these studies 
was not on foreign ownership itself. The work of Buraimo et al (2006) identified that Chelsea had 
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been bankrolled to success by Abramovich, thus highlighting that a successful ‘benefactor’ 
strategy, used by some domestic owners, might also apply to foreign ones. But Barros & Leach 
(2006) also found that the arrival of Abramovich had acted as an exogenous shock on the 
Premier League.  It shook-up the competitive order of the Premier League, which had been 
dominated by Manchester United and Arsenal. However, these studies did not make reference 
to other takeovers, or specific motives in the Chelsea case. Nonetheless, the arrival of 
Abramovich, and his perceived success encouraged the desire of other foreign investors to enter 
the Premier League (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010).     
 
When investigating potential economic motives, the discussion of profit is rather limited, with 
profit not being the main goal behind the FDI activity. Nonetheless, there was an implicit profit 
seeking underpinning in Nauright & Ramfjord (2010) and Williams & Hopkins (2011). In their 
study, Williams & Hopkins (2011) referred to Liverpool’s first North American owners (Tom Hicks 
and George Gillett) as “global sports capitalists” (Williams & Hopkins, 2011, p25), and they 
argued  they had made no secret of their financial motives. Another perspective on profit was 
the notion of longer-term returns, with some foreign owners allegedly hoping to grow the value 
of the club in order to generate a profit should they sell in the future. In this strategy, profit 
arises via capital gains. But this might be most strongly associated with the purchasing of clubs in 
the Football League, which can then be sold on for significant profit, if promoted to the Premier 
League (Millward, 2013).  
 
While the explicit discussion of profit has been fairly limited, a discussion surrounding revenues 
does exist. One of the attractive features of the Premier League was considered by Nauright & 
Ramfjord (2010) and Williams & Hopkins (2011) to be the value of television rights contracts and 
the  international element to the television rights contracts (Millward, 2013, Nauright & 
Ramfjord, 2010). This international coverage not only offers a greater level of revenue from this 
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stream, but it also generated a further market for the selling of licensed club products (Nauright 
& Ramfjord, 2010). Television revenues and contracts might also be beneficial for other 
businesses controlled by a foreign investor, which opened up the international context. This was 
particularly the case for investors who have held interests in television markets (Millward, 2013, 
Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). In developing this argument further, the ownership of a football 
club extended benefits to non-sport global businesses controlled by the investor. This was 
primarily through cross-promotion of the business with the football club (Millward, 2013). 
 
Further economic influences in foreign ownership have been suggested in relation to the size of 
the football club, and its competitors. Ideally, foreign investors might seek to purchase a club 
which had a transnational profile, a large, affluent, match attending fan base, where the 
acquisition is the only football club in the town/city, and where it has a modern stadium 
(Millward, 2013). For example, Buraimo et al (2007) identified the benefits football clubs with 
larger market catchments held over clubs from smaller regions. However, rather than club size, 
club availability has also been highlighted as a motive for the purchase of some clubs. In some 
instances clubs have been placed up for sale in an attempt to attract additional investment. 
Although an available club might have been cheaper for a foreign investor to purchase, it may 
not have held advantages in terms of market size or profile, compared with other clubs (Williams 
& Hopkins, 2011).  
 
When considering the North American investment into Premier League clubs, Nauright & 
Ramfjord (2010) argued that the increasing similarity of English football and North American 
sport was a motivating factor. One of the ways these two sets of sport were allegedly becoming 
similar was through changes in the business model of football clubs, which has shifted towards 
the North American model. This included the generation of revenues from sources such as 
merchandising and hospitality (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). These changes might have  reflected 
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an increasing level of cultural closeness between the business of the Premier League and North 
American sport, nonetheless, the context of sport has remained different (i.e. open versus 
closed leagues). Despite these contextual differences, some investors may have sought to 
operate their football clubs as if they were an NFL franchise (Williams & Hopkins, 2011).  
 
The literature on FDI and football has also identified regulatory aspects to be of importance in 
influencing football FDI. For example, Kelly et al (2012) mentioned the openness of Britain to FDI, 
and they argued that the volume of FDI entering the Premier League was simply part of this 
culture as was regulatory openness according to Williams & Hopkins (2011). The latter argued 
there were no restraints placed on foreign investment by the British government or the FA. In 
contrast, the framework of football club ownership was considered as being more complex in 
other European countries (Williams & Hopkins, 2011, Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). FDI was less 
welcome or in some cases not possible. For instance, Spanish regulations required club 
presidents to be of Spanish origin (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006).  
 
But does being ‘open’ towards FDI imply that English football regulation is weaker than in other 
European nations? Two perspectives have emerged in the literature.  Lago et al (2006) stated 
football regulation in England (as well as Italy and Scotland) was weak, and this weakness 
enabled clubs to run-up large debts. But Kelly et al (2012) cited an argument by the former chief 
executive of the FA, Brian Barwick, who argued that football in England is strongly regulated as 
football clubs are subject to different regulations from company law, stock market controls, and 
football specific regulations. But these arguments involved no consideration about the relative 
importance of regulation or institutional factors.  Barwick suggested that the different layers of 
regulation, made English football unique when compared to other businesses. However, the 
general openness of the industry indicated football could be viewed as any other form of 
business, with only limited additional controls.  
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Finally, as with investment as a whole, there has been some reference to social and pyscho-
social motivation.  Some FDI entering football was stated to be an indirect investment, as it was 
used not to generate profits, but enhanced the reputation and goodwill of the owner (Storm & 
Nielsen, 2012). One aspect of ‘goodwill’ was political influence (Hamil & Walters 2010). 
Ownership of a football club might be used to enhance the political ambitions of the particular 
foreign investor involved.  Furthermore, Kelly et al (2012) argued that football clubs were used 
as a vehicle for the personal ambition of both a domestic or foreign owner.  Perhaps the closest 
to argument for this aspect was from Dobson & Goddard (2011) in their analysis of the takeover 
of Chelsea by Roman Abramovich.  
 
4.5 Consequences of FDI in Football  
 
The second part of this chapter will now consider the no less limited literature that has 
addressed some of the potential consequences of FDI entering English football. This literature 
refers to both economic and non-economic effects. Nonetheless, it has not been cast within a 
clear framework, nor on the basis of a clear typology or model drawn from the wider FDI 
literature.  
 
In terms of profits, Wilson et al (2013) have argued that foreign- owned clubs do not generate 
the same level of profits as those clubs which have stock market listings. Mostly, this was due to 
the cost levels and behaviours at these clubs, but the literature is quite limited in relation to this 
issue. In contrast, some foreign owned clubs may have been able to access specific ownership 
advantages which could have enabled them to generate greater revenues. This might be in the 
form of business acumen and commercial expertise passed on by foreign owners to their 
respective clubs (Kelly et al, 2012). However, there has been no discussion as to whether these 
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direct effects will ‘spillover’ to domestically owned clubs. Imitation advantages or internalisation 
issues in football have not yet been discussed in this literature. 
 
In terms of debt, or increasing losses, the consequence of this, and for whom is uncertain. The 
literature does not provide an extensive narrative for these consequences from football FDI. The 
discussion around debt and financial performance in the wider football literature suggests that 
these elements might be of critical importance, but in academic terms the effect of FDI on these 
issues has not been evaluated in any detail.  
 
Some domestically owned clubs were shown by Kelly et al (2012) to have been negatively 
affected by the arrival of new capital into other clubs. The negative effects were mostly in 
relation to higher costs and weaker profits. Essentially, foreign capital might have enabled 
foreign owned clubs to increase their spending in the transfer market creating direct and in-
direct cost effects for both foreign owned clubs and domestically owned clubs. For players and 
agents, such changes might be positive, but for club owners these changes would likely be 
negative. This particular aspect too has not been explored fully, as there has only been a limited 
attempt to investigate yearly changes in wage and transfer spending across the Premier League. 
There has also been no analysis surrounding infrastructure development (such as training and 
stadium facilities) and whether the improvement of facilities was a potential benefit of FDI (at 
both the direct and in-direct level).  
 
 FDI has also been said to have increased the globalisation of the Premier League (Kelly et al, 
2012, Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). Here, globalisation refers to the league’s participants - 
owners, players, managers, and coaches. But, globalisation also relates to the support base and 
coverage of the Premier League in other countries. In the sense, there has been a particular 
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importance given to global television contracts (Millward, 2013). But Kelly et al (2012) have 
suggested that FDI has not accelerated this process.    
 
The enhancement of league stature was another potential consequence of football FDI, although 
this was not directly stated within the current literature. In football terms, as investment 
increases, higher profile (and quality) players are attracted to a league due to the prospect of 
higher wages. This in-turn may further enhance revenues (via television or merchandise) and can 
be associated with “superstar effects” (Lucifora & Simmons, 2003). The addition of “superstars” 
to a league will further enhance the appeal of a competition at both the national and 
international level. Hence, the arrival of FDI can have an influential impact on the ‘stature’ 
aspect, particularly if it is associated with significant investment.  
 
In the previous chapter, competitiveness changes were found to be a potential effect of FDI 
entering an economy.  This literature applied some concepts which were not wholly relevant to 
the football case (i.e. the use of Porter’s Diamond by Gugler & Brunner, 2007). Furthermore, in 
the economic sense, competitiveness within an industry is mostly analysed through market 
share data. Such an approach is impossible in the football context, as football clubs are not 
competing for market share. Instead, in sporting terms, they are competing for their share of 
points on the field of play. In the sports economics literature some of the techniques used to 
measure competitiveness in other industries have been adjusted to fit the sporting context.  The 
most important of these has been that of competitive balance in sporting terms. 
 
The changes in competitive balance across a range of European leagues have been considered by 
Pawlowski et al (2010), Ramchandani (2012) and Gossens (2006). However, only Ramchandani 
(2012) made reference to the particular effect of FDI on this construct so the literature on FDI 
and competitiveness (in the football context) is rather underdeveloped in comparison to the 
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general FDI literature and competitiveness. The vast majority of football studies suggested 
competitive balance to have declined across various European leagues due to increases in 
income inequality. This was prominent through domestic television revenue imbalances (Michie 
& Oughton, 2004), as well as supra-national revenue streams associated with the Champions 
League (Pawlowski et al, 2010, Gossens, 2006, Michie & Oughton, 2004, Lee & Fort, 2012). For 
example, Pawlowski et al (2010) found the Champions League to have a negative impact on 
competitive balance across Europe due to the payment system of the Champions League. This 
created a vicious (or virtuous) cycle, as the most successful clubs were able to obtain the 
revenues from Champions League qualification, and were then able to use this revenue to 
dominate domestic competitions. Furthermore, Gossens (2006) noted this effect was greater in 
the Premier League than in other European leagues, as there has often been little variance in the 
teams who reached the top four league positions (thereby qualifying for the Champions League).  
 
The notion of increased income inequality leading to greater competitive imbalance was also 
considered by Szymanski (2001). In contrast to Michie & Oughton (2004) and Gossens (2006), 
this study suggested that increasing income inequality has not negatively affected competitive 
balance. Furthermore, Forrest et al (2005) stated there was no obvious competitive balance 
problem in the Premier League when it was compared to leagues in other sports, particularly 
those from North American sports. Indeed, the overall competitive balance of the Premier 
League may not be as important due to different sub-groups of clubs challenging for different 
targets like the Champions League, avoiding relegation, or finishing in the safety of the mid-table 
group (Borooah & Mangan, 2012).  
 
Again, these studies have not included the impact of FDI. The one study which focuses on this 
aspect was Ramchandani (2012). This proposed that FDI had negatively affected the competitive 
balance of the Premier League, but the study did not extensively cover the issue. At the league-
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wide level, if FDI has weakened competitive balance then this might not necessarily be a 
negative consequence.  The dominance by foreign owned clubs, would not automatically impact 
on the demand for matches within the Premier League, as supporters are sometimes motivated 
by winning rather than witnessing an even contest (Brandes & Franck, 2007). The uncertainty of 
these findings implied the need for further research into this aspect.  
 
Within the FDI literature, some of the most investigated spillover effects are those concerning 
productivity effects from the presence of foreign owned firms.   In chapter three it was 
established that FDI can affect productivity levels in both direct and in-direct ways. In the 
sporting context the analysis of productivity is different due to differences between sport and 
other types of industry. In a team sport contest (like football) competing with fewer players than 
an opponent does not present an advantage. Therefore, traditional measures of productivity 
surrounding output per-person are not as valid in the sporting sense. But productivity 
measurement in football also includes a range of factors, both economic and non-economic in 
nature. For example, Barros & Leach (2006) used a range of on-field and off-field performance 
measures such as points, attendances, and revenues to build a stochastic frontier model to 
analyse productivity in the Premier League. They found, Manchester United to be the most 
efficient club in the Premier League, with Chelsea the least efficient. However, the arrival of 
Roman Abramovich in 2003 would significantly improve Chelsea’s productivity, if measured by 
improvements in on-field performance.    
 
The study by Guzman & Morrow (2007) also considered the efficiency of football clubs in the 
2002/2003 season, using a ‘data envelopment approach’, which compared the levels of input 
and outputs made by each of the clubs. When looking at the 2002/2003 season, Chelsea was 
again highlighted as being inefficient, with weak efficiency scores also recorded at Leeds and 
Fulham.  The result for Fulham has a particular importance as Fulham were a foreign owned 
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club, and despite the financial advantages in this season it did not translate into strong 
efficiency. In terms of those clubs rated as efficient, Birmingham and West Bromwich Albion 
were the two clubs that scored the highest, despite weaknesses in on-field performance (West 
Bromwich  in particular) (Guzman & Morrow, 2007).   
 
The data envelopment approach was also used by Haas (2003) to measure productive efficiency. 
The inputs in this study included playing talent and coaching capabilities, with outputs identified 
as points gained and revenues received. Of the twenty teams in the 2000/2001 season, only two 
(Ipswich and Charlton) come out as efficient on all measures used in the analysis. In contrast, 
Arsenal, Chelsea, and Newcastle were highlighted as the most inefficient clubs on these 
measures. In all three cases, the clubs had squads of quality, but they did not translate into 
success on the field of play (Haas, 2003). This narrative surrounding under performance and over 
performance in relation to the resources clubs have available was also reflected by Guzman & 
Morrow (2007).  
 
These studies have not reflected the wider impact of FDI on the productivity. For example, there 
was no consideration of whether FDI had affected the productivity levels of those clubs which 
were not acquired by foreign investors (spillover effects). In reality, only Barros & Leach (2006) 
make any reference to foreign ownership in their analysis, and this reference to Chelsea was not 
statistically tested as the ‘event’ of Abramovich’s takeover took place outside of their data set 
period. From this literature, a judgement surrounding the effect of FDI on productivity in the 
Premier League cannot be completed due to the failure to address these aspects.  
 
There were also other consequences found in the existing literature which related to sporting 
aspects of the Premier League. In terms of the sporting aspects, one issue related to the 
competitive order of the Premier League. In this aspect, Wilson et al (2013) found foreign owned 
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clubs were likely to have stronger on-field performance compared to domestically owned clubs. 
Therefore, foreign owned clubs were able to achieve a greater level of success on the field of 
play when compared to those clubs in domestic control. Other studies on football FDI have not 
focused on this aspect in much detail, despite its apparent importance in terms of influencing 
the competitive order of the Premier League. Whilst some, like Kelly et al (2012) have explained 
why this difference existed, there has been only limited mention of these performance 
imbalances in the literature. As a result there is a need to explore this element in more detail.  
 
Medical services were a further area where foreign expertise has been brought in as a result of 
FDI (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). This implied that those foreign investors with other sporting 
interests were able to share their knowledge with those at the football club. Knowledge from 
this particular aspect could also have been transferred between the football club and the other 
sporting business owned by the investor. There was no explanation of whether these direct 
benefits for foreign owned clubs would translate into indirect benefits for domestically owned 
clubs. It was unclear whether any advancement in this field were internalised by the foreign 
owned clubs, or whether these effects “spilled-over” to domestically owned clubs. Other aspects 
(i.e. in relation to scouting) were not considered by Nauright & Ramfjord (2010).  
 
In-terms of the effect football FDI has had on local communities and supporters, the effects 
outlined are limited, and where they occur have been mostly negative (Kelly et al, 2012). The 
response to FDI from club supporters has not been uniform across all clubs or even within clubs 
(Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). At some clubs protest movements against foreign owners have 
existed from the beginning of the takeover process (Brown, 2007), whilst other protest 
movements began several months after a foreign takeover was completed (Williams & Hopkins, 
2011). Brown (2007) implied the wider break-up of football fan communities, with supporters 
split into different groups due to the presence of a foreign owner. Some supporters have sought 
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to protest, while others have accepted the position of the new foreign owner. But such 
community focused arguments have not been solely limited to foreign owners (Kelly et al, 2012). 
Beyond this there has been no real consideration of wider spillover effects relating to the local 
community. For instance, FDI in general has been shown to have both direct and in-direct 
impacts upon employment (i.e. Haskel et al, 2007). These impacts may well have been present in 
the Premier League, but the existing literature has neglected to analyse them.   
 
4.6 Summary  
 
This chapter has found the literature surrounding FDI motives and consequences in football to 
be relatively underdeveloped when compared to the wider literature surrounding ownership of 
sports teams.  Although competitiveness and productivity have been identified as consequences 
of FDI in chapter three, the work completed on these aspects in relation to football FDI is small. 
As a result, this study will seek to increase the knowledge base relating to foreign ownership and 
football. With the key literature now examined, the next chapter of this study will consider the 
methodological choices for the study.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
The previous chapters have presented a review of the literature surrounding FDI and sports 
economics.  This next chapter will set out the methodological approach to be used in the rest of 
the thesis. In order to do this, the methodological approaches used in the topic area will be 
discussed, prior to a justification of the chosen approach. This chosen approach will then be 
broken down into several areas, with the research process set out in detail.  
 
5.1 Research Methods in the Topic Area 
 
In the research on FDI in general, and in the more limited research on FDI in football, there has 
been a reticence to discuss methodological choices. Most studies assume a positivist approach. 
The majority of studies collect empirical data, which is then analysed using an econometric 
model.  This approach is noticeable too in the literature surrounding FDI spillovers  (e.g. Girma et 
al, 2001, Haskel et al, 2007, Aitken & Harrison, 1999).  A similar approach was found in the 
studies which have investigated productivity, competitive balance or finance, in the sports 
economics literature (i.e. Barros & Leach, 2006, Ramchandani, 2012, Szymanski & Smith, 1997). 
The reluctance to explain this methodological choice is evident in Szymanski & Smith (1997). 
While there was a justification of the particular econometric model used to evaluate financial 
performance, no alternative methods were suggested. Indeed, there was no attempt to suggest 
why this approach would have more relevance, than a study using an alternative methodological 
approach. It was seemingly and naturally assumed that the study will have a positivist approach 
and will be empirically and quantitatively based. Additionally, it is often also not clear   whether   
the research question under investigation has guided the choice of methodology, or whether the 
methodology guided the choice of research question (Birkenshaw et al, 2011). Such studies have 
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also tended to be deductive rather than inductive, seeking to test theory rather than to build 
theory.  
 
There are severe practical problems with an econometric approach in sports economics and not 
least to sample size.  In football there are a limited number of Premier League clubs, and an even 
smaller number of clubs which are foreign owned. This presents a much smaller sample size than 
some of the industries considered in the FDI literature. This raises a question about whether 
there are enough clubs within the sample to build and test a model reliably. Moreover, as 
questions have already been raised about the value of some of the secondary economic data, it 
is possible that an econometric model would not been wholly effective in this particular 
situation. Since FDI in the Premier League did not become prominent until the mid-2000’s this 
provides  a relatively short time frame, and as a result a longitudinally based study is more 
difficult as outcomes can be biased due to the lack of data available (Bitzenis et al, 2009).   
 
However, some studies do make use of primary data collection methods, and have also sought 
to qualitatively analyse the collected data.  In the sports economics literature, a rare example of 
a study using primary data was King (1997). This study used interview data from club directors of 
Premier League clubs, in order to establish a narrative surrounding the changing objectives held 
by club owners. So why has this approach not been common within football research? This is 
mainly due to the difficulty in accessing the elite level respondents required to complete the 
study. Moreover, due to the small number of interviewees who participated in the King study, 
data from documentary sources such as newspapers was used to make up the shortfall.   
 
Similarly, in the FDI literature, examples of studies using questionnaire or interview based 
studies are rare. However, Bitzenis (2001) used a case study approach which made use of both 
questionnaire and interview data. This approach was adopted as the interview data enabled the 
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collection of more detailed qualitative evidence. In the work on FDI and international business 
more generally which has been completed through qualitative methods, the case study and 
particularly the use of multiple-case studies has been a prominent method. However, the use of 
this method is constrained through a lack of rigour and methodological vagueness. As a result, a 
problem with generalizability has arisen with case studies focusing on an explanatory description 
of events (Pauwels & Matthysens, 2004). Additionally, in the FDI literature, Moran (2001) has 
shown how case studies can be applied to the investigation of FDI spillovers, with two sectors 
(electronics and automotive) analysed to understand the spillover effects generated by the 
presence of FDI.  
 
The case study approach has also been used within the sports economics literature. For instance, 
Hamil & Walters (2010), use a case study approach to explain financial behaviour in football.  
The use of case clubs is rather limited within the constraints of their study. The cases are only 
briefly used towards the end, and more detail could have been used to enhance the 
observations made from these cases. However, this study did use foreign owned clubs   to 
discuss both motives and effects. Unlike Bitzenis (2001), the data used in the case study was 
secondary rather than primary. An example of a single case study approach in the football 
literature is Coombs & Osborne (2012). They used Aston Villa to investigate the effect of foreign 
ownership on public relations. This study used a range of different research methods, including 
participant observation to assess the impact of foreign ownership.  
 
In terms of the use of documentary evidence, further examples of this particular approach are 
the studies by Morrow (2006), Millward (2013), Kelly et al (2012), Williams & Hopkins (2011), 
Nauright & Ramfjord (2010) and Buraimo et al (2006). In these studies, data was sourced from 
newspapers, club documentation, and other reports concerning the football business.   However 
this raises the issue of the accuracy of such sources.  
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5.2 The Search for Data: Strengths and Weaknesses of Secondary Data 
 
Documentary sources have been an important element of several studies, and will be drawn on 
here too. In football terms, documentary sources of data come from official club sources, 
newspapers, and other informed sources like the Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance. 
The use of documentary sources has provided some clear benefits. Club sources provide an 
opportunity for data to be accessed from owners who do not provide regular media interviews.  
In one such instance, Sheikh Mansour provided one formal interview to the British media, and 
this was conducted through Manchester City’s official website (Manchester City, 2009) rather 
than another source. But as this was a club source, the questions asked were not as challenging 
as those from other media sources. The materials presented through official club sources are 
also devised for consumption by club supporters, so there is an element of stating “what the 
fans want to hear”. Remarks have not always been fully accurate. One example was at Liverpool 
when, upon purchasing the club, Tom Hicks and George Gillett discussed the history of the club, 
but soon after in other non-club media they referred to Liverpool as a ‘franchise’. These 
comments with their connotations with North American sport led Liverpool supporters to argue 
that they had displayed their true profit seeking motivation (Williams & Hopkins, 2011) even 
though, at the time of purchase, they had made no explicit reference to profit through club 
sources. So while a useful source, official club comments need to be taken with care.  
 
The data from other informed sources and non-club media also has its drawbacks. Historically, it 
was argued that sports journalism did not constitute serious news (Salwen & Garrison, 1998), 
and working in a press sports team was akin to working in a “toy department” (Boyle, 2006).  
Sports journalism was not considered as rigorous as other forms of journalism despite the level 
of coverage given to sport in newspapers.  Sports journalists have been accused of acting as 
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“cheerleaders” for certain groups (Boyle, 2006, Anderson, 2001). In the football context it has 
been known for some journalists to favour certain managers, owners or clubs. This has led to 
questions surrounding bias in the reporting of sport though in reality, this may be no different to 
other forms of journalism, where reporters have been favourable to one particular political 
party, or business. Journalists too are often wary of criticising some individuals in case their 
access was withdrawn. In football it has been known for some managers to ban particular 
journalists from press conferences. In a recent case, the North East correspondent of the Daily 
Telegraph lost access to Newcastle United matches over a story surrounding dressing room 
unrest (Telegraph Sport, 2013).   
 
It is not only the relationships or bias that some of sports journalists hold which has caused 
concern. A further weakness concerns the nature of sports journalism when dealing with 
football finance. Broadsheet newspapers will often employ one individual (i.e. David Conn at The 
Guardian) who will comment specifically on sports business related issues. While other 
journalists may also comment on the sports business they tend to do so from a less informed 
viewpoint on the business aspects. There are   examples of business journalists being used to 
cover football finance matters. An example of this is Robert Peston who produced a blog on the 
“football bubble” for his BBC website blog. Here Peston compared the situation in English 
football to the wider economic concerns associated with the credit crisis, arguing that the 
situation in the Premier League “is a microcosm of the bubble that precipitated the credit 
crunch” (Peston, 2008).  This presented a difference in approach, and also suggested the nature 
of what business journalists are investigating. A sports journalist focuses on the record transfer 
fees and player wages, while the business journalist will investigate the strengths and 
weaknesses of football finance.    
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Although such data is useful and will help to address the questions this thesis discusses, it is not 
possible to base the entire study around secondary data. In order to answer the problems posed 
by this thesis, the collection of primary data is necessary to help to provide further insights and 
to extend the narrative being developed surrounding football club ownership by foreign 
investors  
 
5.3. The Methodological Approach to Primary Data 
 
In contrast to the majority of studies in the topic areas of FDI and sports economics, this thesis 
adds an additional focus by using a more qualitative approach. For areas such as spillover effects 
(concerning productivity), and competitive balance, empirical data will be collected and 
analysed, but for the discussion of motives and other effects the thesis will also use 
questionnaires and interviews to allow the themes and narratives emerging from the data to be 
reflected upon, rather than being reliant on deductive hypotheses to test (Saunders et al, 2007).  
 
A qualitative approach is helpful given the lack of completed research on the foreign ownership 
of football clubs. In business research more generally, qualitative research is used in order to 
complete exploratory studies where there is an absence of well-developed theory (Birkenshaw 
et al, 2011).  
 
This study will also use multiple data collection methods.   The thesis uses primary data to 
supplement the insights, drawn from secondary data to help to extend the discussion 
surrounding foreign ownership of Premier League clubs. Following a similar approach to King 
(1997) and Bitzenis (2001) we use questionnaire and interview data.  In the FDI literature, 
questionnaires have been used in studies by Bitzenis (2001, 2004, and 2006), Bitzenis et al 
(2009). These have been used to consider the determinants or motivations of investors when 
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engaging in FDI (e.g. Jiang, 2005 considers FDI entering the pharmaceuticals sector in China). 
Although not frequent, the questionnaire approach has proved useful in examining FDI motives, 
but in the relevant parts of the sports economics literature, questionnaire research is hardly 
used as a data collection tool. This study will therefore expand the range of methodologies used 
in this area of research.  
 
Alongside the use of these forms of data, the effects of foreign investment will be considered 
through the use of the case study approach. The use of case studies has been developed in the 
FDI and football literature, and is particularly helpful when faced with a shortage of knowledge 
in a topic area (Ghauri, 2004) and when the sample size is small (Chetty, 1996).    
 
Having established the broad methodological choices, the next part of the chapter will identify 
the respondents of interest for this thesis.  
 
5.4   Interest Groups and Access Challenges   
 
The first stage of the process was the selection of the respondents for the questionnaires and 
interviews. These are shown in Table 5.1 and 5.2.   
 
Table 5.1: Groups of Interest 
Club Management Supporters Regulatory Bodies Politicians 
Senior-Management, 
Board level.  
Supporters Trust, 
senior level.  
  
FA 
Premier League 
 
Interest in Sport  
Member of Culture, 
Media, and Sport 
Select Committee 
(CMS) 
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Table 5.2: Groups of no-interest 
Club Management Supporters Regulatory Bodies Politicians 
Football 
Management, Middle 
Management.   
Official 
Supporters/Members 
Clubs.  
Season-Ticket holders, 
Other supporters.   
Football League 
PFA  
Non-interest in 
sport/football   
 
To enhance the richness of this study, it was decided the research would target different types of 
respondent, accessing senior management (i.e. King, 1997), supporters (i.e. Coombs & Osborne, 
2012), as well as regulatory bodies and politicians interested in football.  
 
Given the concern to analyse the motives and effects of foreign investment, it was decided that 
information from senior club management would be essential to the development of this thesis. 
This is a similar approach to the one used by King (1997), but rather than using club chairman as 
respondents, the study targeted chief executives and other senior managers. Due to the changes 
in football ownership, club owners and chairman are not always located within the UK, so this 
provides a significant barrier to access.  The chief executives and other senior managers on the 
other hand will have day-to-day experience of running their club and they are able to articulate 
the effects of FDI on their club and the Premier League more generally. However, a potential 
drawback is that these individuals may not have been involved in the purchase decision made by 
the investor. Other types of managers, such as first-team managers, or non-football middle 
managers were not targeted as it is unlikely that these groups would be able to provide the 
same level of detail and richness in relation to FDI.  
 
On the other hand, supporters were selected to allow for a counter opinion to those formulated 
by the club management and permit different issues to be explored. The importance of 
supporters is reflected in the works by Giulianotti (2002) and Morrow (2003).  In this thesis, the 
use of first-hand accounts from supporters will draw out how they have been affected by the 
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entrance of FDI into their club or the Premier League. Within this group, Supporters Direct and 
the supporter trust movement became of interest to the themes discussed here. Supporter 
trusts are collectives, which enable supporters to influence behaviour and accountability within 
their club (Morrow, 2003), and in some cases they have achieved ownership of their respective 
club (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). These supporters are more engaged with the ownership 
position at their club when compared to other supporters who may be season-ticket holders or 
more casual attenders   In contrast, official supporters clubs (i.e. those promoted by the club) 
were ruled out, as the members of these groups may provide responses closer to the clubs 
‘official lines’, and not the more diverse range of responses that is presented through the trust 
movement.  
 
Regulatory bodies were selected as another group to investigate. The regulatory bodies, such as 
the Premier League and the Football Association provide an institutional perspective Meier 
(2008). The Football League was not considered, as the focus of the research is on the Premier 
League. However, access problems were prominent with this particular grouping due to the 
volume of requests they receive. The Premier League has a policy of non-response to 
student/research enquires (Premier League, 2012), while the Football Association did not 
respond to an interview request.  As the PFA (professional footballers association) only deals 
with issues surrounding football players, the decision was made to not contact them for an 
interview.  
 
The final interest group to be considered in this thesis was politicians; in particular interest was 
with MP’s who were either a member of the Culture, Media, and Sport (CMS) select committee 
or those who held an interest in football governance. In 2011, the CMS undertook their report 
on football governance (which dealt with issues of ownership amongst other factors), and as this 
was a ‘live topic’ within the committee the decision was taken to target politicians as this would 
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provide an informed perspective, but one which was external to football. Requests to five MP’s 
were sent, but only one response was returned, and he declined to participate in the study. 
Within this response the name of another MP to contact was recommended but there was a 
negative response from this individual too.  
  
5.4.1 Access Difficulties  
 
Having identified the groups of relevance for the study it was apparent that there were 
difficulties in gaining access to some respondents. This was particularly strong as this study was 
dealing with mostly elite respondents. These issues will now be explored.  
 
Elites can be defined as individuals who hold a senior or middle management position within an 
organisation, have functional responsibility, have considerable experience, and possess a wide 
range of personal relationships (Welch et al, 2002, Harvey, 2010). While this definition is 
considered in relation to international business, it also helps to describe the role of an elite 
respondent in the football industry. Furthermore, an elite individual is someone who exerts 
control or authority within society or organizations, through having control of decision making, 
capital, human, and knowledge resources (Desmond, 2004). However, an individual’s position in 
an organisation does not always equate to elite status. This is partly because elite status may 
relate to time and place, with certain people considered elites in one situation, but not in 
another. There may also be a consideration of a person’s place in a social network, which will 
help to define whether they have elite status or not. Additionally, a job title can have different 
meanings in different organisations and sectors.  
 
The use of elite interviewees presents a number of difficulties.  Elites will create barriers in order 
to set themselves apart from other groups (Hertz & Imber, 1993). For instance, researchers will 
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have to deal with intermediaries and that the process can be time consuming (Welch et al, 
2002). The problem of gaining access is also noted by Harvey (2010) who argues that gaining 
access into social networks of the elites can help to improve the level of access. The difficulty of 
gaining access is also highlighted by Smith (2006) who argued that social groups may present a 
greater challenge to access compared to those individuals who work for a large company. It is 
also argued that some elite respondents do not engage in a research process due to the “junior” 
nature of the researcher (Dexter, 1964). However, while this may have been a factor in some 
people declining the chance to be interviewed, Harvey (2010) argues that there is little support 
for this assertion in the elite interviewing literature.  
 
Another area in which elite interviewees will be different to other interviewees is the power they 
possess. This problem is evident at the access stage as elite respondents will simply make 
themselves difficult to access   (Welch et al, 2002). This places the researcher at an immediate 
disadvantage in terms of power distance.  Further to this, elite interviewees can dominate their 
interviewers through their superior communication skills (Fitz & Halpin, 1995).  
 
5.4.2 Access in Football 
  
For researchers, getting access to the right people in a football club is a difficult process with 
many clubs having specific policies which restrict access. Manchester United, for example, 
specify that information on the clubs business strategy, alongside  on-field information about 
players cannot be given to researchers due to the “highly competitive nature of the football 
industry” (Manchester United, 2012). There are other clubs who restrict researchers for slightly 
different reasons. Sunderland argues that the “sheer volume of requests” influences their 
decision to not allow access (Sunderland afc, 2012). In an email response from Arsenal it is 
stated that the “sensitivity of the issue” (i.e. foreign ownership) influenced their decision not to 
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respond.   However, firms in other highly competitive industries have allowed researchers 
access, so football takes a different approach to these industries. In football, there is more of an 
attempt made to try and restrict the flow of information out of an organisation.  On one level, 
clubs like publicity, but at another level they fear it when it becomes too intrusive: 
 
“It’s a very public business, your results are very evident to people. Newspapers and the media 
generally want to follow everything you do” (Respondent F) 
 
However, for researchers the same level of access is not granted. Indeed, in some cases, football 
clubs have not even been receptive to their own supporters:  
 
“The club is determined if it can to eradicate or completely side-line any independent fans body.  
Fulham’s method or desire is absolute control” (Respondent D) 
 
Media access is more straightforward because it helps to enhance the product offered, but while 
this promotes an image of openness, football is not open to other groups who cannot provide 
the same benefit for the club.   
 
5.5 Research Process for Primary Data 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the research process in four broad stages from the setting of a preliminary 
interview and questionnaire schedule. This was refined after a pilot interview; once this had 
been completed the questionnaire was revised and then posted to nineteen Premier League 
clubs. Alongside this process, there was also the arrangement of interviews with members of the 
supporter movement. 
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Figure 5.1: Research Schedule 
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5.5.1 Overview of Sample  
 
As stated earlier in the thesis, the focus of this study is the Premier League. Therefore, at any 
one time there are only twenty clubs which compete in the division. The research draws on 
responses from the clubs which were present in the division during the 2011/2012 season.  
These clubs playing in the Premier League for the 2011/2012 season are shown in Table 5.3: 
 
Table 5.3 Overview of Premier League clubs in 2011/2012 
Club Type of Ownership  
Arsenal PLC (Major foreign shareholders) 
Aston Villa Foreign  
Blackburn Rovers Foreign 
Bolton Wanderers Domestic  
Chelsea Foreign 
Everton Domestic 
Fulham  Foreign 
Liverpool Foreign 
Manchester City Foreign 
Manchester United Foreign 
Newcastle United Domestic 
Norwich City Domestic  
Queens Park Rangers Foreign 
Stoke City Domestic 
Sunderland Foreign 
Swansea City Domestic  
Tottenham Hotspur  PLC (Major domestic shareholder) 
West Bromwich Albion Domestic 
Wigan Athletic  Domestic 
Wolverhampton Wanderers Domestic  
 
In 2011/2012, ten clubs were either fully or partly owned by a foreign investor, and the 
remaining ten clubs were under the control of domestic investors. This split was fortunate as an 
equal number of requests could be sent out to domestic and foreign owned clubs. Alongside the 
Premier League clubs, contact was also made with supporter’s trusts. The timeline for the 
research process is shown in Table 5.4: 
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Table 5.4: Research Timeline 
April 2011 Pilot Interview at Wolves 
June-September 2011 Interviews with Supporters Direct and Supporters 
Trusts. Unsuccessful attempt made to contact 
politicians and regulators. 
September 2011 Questionnaires sent out to nineteen remaining PL 
clubs 
October 2011 Interview arranged at West Brom. Completed 
questionnaires received from Wigan, Blackburn, and 
Norwich. Negative Responses received from 
Sunderland and Arsenal 
November 2011 Questionnaires resent to clubs who did not return 
first questionnaire. 
November 2011 Interview arranged at Stoke. Completed 
questionnaire returned from Chelsea. Negative 
Response from Fulham. 
 
 
The first stage of the research involved the arranging of an interview with a senior manager at 
Wolverhampton Wanderers [then a Premier League team]. This interview was set-up via a 
mutual contact, and acted as a pilot study for both the questionnaire and later interviews.   After 
this interview was completed, it was hoped further respondents would be recommended and 
using snowball sampling the number of respondents would grow. However, the potential 
respondents recommended were either unable to contribute or not suitable as they were 
involved in the operation of Football League clubs.  
 
Following the pilot interview, both the questionnaires (domestic and foreign) were revised  in 
late summer 2011. One version was sent to the group of foreign owned clubs (Arsenal, Aston 
Villa, Blackburn Rovers, Chelsea, Fulham, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, 
Queens Park Rangers and Sunderland). The second version, for domestically owned clubs, was 
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sent to nine remaining clubs (Bolton Wanderers, Everton, Newcastle United, Norwich City, Stoke 
City, Swansea City, Tottenham Hotspur, West Bromwich Albion, and Wigan Athletic). All 
questionnaires were addressed to a member of the senior management team at each of the 
clubs whose details were obtained through club websites.  
 
Responses were returned from one foreign owned club (Blackburn) and two domestically owned 
clubs (Norwich and Wigan).  A positive response was also returned from West Bromwich Albion, 
although this was not with the named person on the covering letter.  This led to an interview 
which was conducted with a member of the clubs senior management team. Negative responses 
were received from Sunderland and Arsenal. For Sunderland, the negative response contained a 
letter explaining that the club receives many requests from students asking for questionnaires to 
be returned and due to this high volume of requests the club does not return them.  The 
response also suggested that details about the club and its ownership were available from the 
official website. The response from Arsenal stated that the club did not wish to contribute to the 
study due to the sensitivity of the issues. Like Sunderland, the response contained a link to the 
club website and also contained a link to a video where the club’s CEO (Ivan Gazidis) was 
discussing the club’s annual accounts for 2010. In total six clubs’ responded to the first batch of 
questionnaires sent out.  
 
With thirteen clubs having not responded to the questionnaire a reminder questionnaire was 
sent in November 2011. These reminder questionnaires generated a return from one foreign 
owned club (Chelsea) as well as an interview with a senior manager from Stoke City. A negative 
response was also received from Fulham who stated that they did not have time to complete the 
questionnaire.  
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Therefore, in total four clubs returned a completed questionnaire, with a split equally between 
two foreign owned clubs and two domestically owned clubs. The questionnaires from Blackburn 
and Wigan were returned by the person who it was addressed to, while the response from 
Chelsea was passed onto another member of the senior management team. The returned 
questionnaire from Norwich did not specify who had filled in the questionnaire. With two 
interviews also set-up, the response rate was 31.6% with this increasing to 35% when Wolves 
were included in the sample. In King (1997) interview data was generated from five 
chairman/directors plus two other senior managers at Manchester United. With seven clubs 
participating in this study alongside three members of the supporter movement this gives a 
comparable sample.  The full breakdown of the club responses is shown in Table 5.5 
 
Table 5.5: Questionnaire Responses 
Response Club Total 
Interview (Domestic) Wolves, West Brom, Stoke 3 
Questionnaire (Domestic) Wigan, Norwich 2 
Questionnaire (Foreign) Blackburn, Chelsea 2 
Negative Response Arsenal, Sunderland, Fulham 3 
No Response Aston Villa, Bolton, Everton, 
Liverpool, Man City, Man Utd, 
Newcastle, QPR, Swansea, 
Tottenham 
10 
 
In addition to the responses from the Premier League clubs, the thesis also gained access to 
members of the supporter movement. The sample is summarised in Table 5.6:  
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Table 5.6 Detail of Responses Received 
Completed 
Questionnaires 
Received (Clubs) 
Interview’s 
Conducted 
(Clubs) 
Negative/No 
Response (Clubs)  
Interviews with 
Supporter Trusts 
No Response 
(Trusts)  
Blackburn  Stoke Arsenal Supporters Direct Arsenal  
Chelsea West Brom Aston Villa Fulham  
Norwich Wolves Bolton Manchester 
United 
 
Wigan  Everton    
  Fulham    
  Liverpool   
  Man City   
  Man United    
  Newcastle   
  Q.P.R   
  Sunderland   
  Swansea    
  Tottenham   
 
Four questionnaires were returned from Premier League clubs, with two from foreign owned 
clubs (Blackburn and Chelsea) and two from domestically owned clubs (Norwich and Wigan).  
In addition to these questionnaires, a total of six interviews were conducted. Three of these 
interviews were with domestically owned Premier League clubs (Stoke, West Brom and Wolves), 
with the remaining three interviews taking place with members of the supporter movement.  
Of these interviews, one took place with a senior member of Supporters Direct, and the other 
two were with senior members of supporter’s trusts. These trusts were for clubs which were 
both foreign owned (Fulham and Manchester United).   
 
5.6 Questionnaire Design  
 
This part of the chapter will consider the design of the questionnaires. Each of the 
questionnaires was accompanied by a covering letter. Within this covering letter, details 
surrounding the nature of the research and the confidentiality processes were outlined. These 
were particularly important in explaining the research to the respondents and also in providing 
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confidence that results would be treated with care and anonymity. In order to increase the 
response rate, options were given to the respondent as who should complete and return the 
questionnaire. This was within the context of the senior management team, since it was decided 
that this approach would elicit a useful response chief executives are likely to be extremely busy 
in dealing with club matters. Two versions of the questionnaire were developed. The first version 
was sent to clubs who were domestically controlled, and the second version was sent to those 
clubs that were controlled by foreign investors. This allowed both core and different issues to be 
explored in the research.  
 
5.6.1 Question Design  
 
Both of the questionnaires were made up of closed questions and Likert 5-point scale questions. 
The use of open questions was rejected due to their time consuming nature. It is acknowledged 
that open-questions have an advantage in terms of the information generated from them 
(Maylor & Blackmon, 2005), but as football is a notoriously difficult industry into which to get 
access, designing a questionnaire with open questions would potentially negatively impact upon 
the response rate. Closed questions present an advantage in that the respondent can state 
results quickly (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). Likert scale responses also have additional benefits. 
Firstly, there is a benefit in terms of the reliability of the responses, and secondly, there is a 
benefit in that respondents can supply an answer which is more than simply an “agree” or 
“disagree” response (Kumar, 2008).  
 
The two questionnaires consisted largely of questions that have been designed specifically for 
this research. As the number of questionnaires within the FDI and football literature is restricted, 
it was not possible to select a pre-existing questionnaire and re-use the questions for this thesis 
although some guidance was taken from studies such as Bitzenis (2001). Since football is a 
 118 
business that has many unique aspects, the application of a questionnaire based on solely profit 
seeking FDI ventures is not applicable in the football context.  As this study combines elements 
of two literatures, it was decided that new questions would be designed based on the available 
theory in the literature. Also since this thesis deals with both the motives and spillover effects 
involved in football related FDI, this also necessitated the development of an original 
questionnaire. 
 
5.6.2 Foreign-Owned Questionnaire  
 
An example of this questionnaire is shown in appendix one. The first question on the foreign-
owned questionnaire dealt with the motives behind the investment. This was a question which 
proposed both economic and non-economic elements as potential motives, such as prestige 
(Hamil & Walters, 2010, Sloane, 1971) Buraimo et al, (2006) as well as growth and profit (King, 
1997, Andreff & Staudohar, 2000), and interest in football/sporting challenge (Sloane, 1971). The 
second question asked whether investment in another country had been considered. This was 
based on an approach used by Bitzenis et al (2009) who considered whether an investment in 
Greece would be extended to another country. The third question dealt with locational motives. 
Again, there was a mixture of sporting and non-sporting motives. The facilities response drew on 
the resources-capabilities and markets approach to FDI outlined in Dunning & Zhang (2008), 
while revenue generation and global appeal dealt with economic forces as per,  Andreff & 
Staudohar (2000). The club availability criteria was included due to the arguments put forward 
about PLC ownership (Buraimo et al, 2006, Szymanski, 2006), while history was also included as a 
non-economic criterion. The fourth question considered regulation, and was linked to Meier 
(2008) and Lago et al (2006) who both considered the nature of regulation in football. Market-
seeking motives (Dunning, 1994) were addressed in question five in relation to the market size 
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of English football, while questions six and seven were general questions on the club ownership 
position.  
 
Question Eight focused on the determinants involved in club selection and was based up various 
economic and non-economic factors. This included location as in Dunning (1998), growth 
potential as in Andreff & Staudohar (2000) and fan base, club availability and history. History was 
considered by Dunning (1994) to be a factor which has influenced FDI flows. Fan base is linked to 
market size and competitive advantage (Buraimo et al, 2007). Question nine was based upon the 
capabilities outlined by Dunning & Zhang (2008) but they were applied to football. Hence factors 
such as coaching and youth development were drawn into the responses. Questions ten and 
eleven were general in nature, with question eleven exploring previous football investments. 
Question twelve considered the advantages of foreign investment in football. This question 
takes into consideration both on and off-field performance. Improved off-field management, 
image, and financial performance are taken from Nauright & Ramfjord (2010), while Dunning 
(1994) also provides support for the improvements in off-field management and infrastructure. 
The next set of questions dealt with the spillover effects of FDI entering English football. 
Question thirteen explored the effects of foreign investment on clubs who have not received 
such investment. The basis for this question was from Girma et al (2001) and Haskel et al (2007) 
who both considered the effect of FDI on domestic firms. Question fourteen considers some of 
the effects of foreign investment and how they have impacted on English football.  This includes 
both football and non-football related effects. Wage inflation was adapted from Girma et al 
(2001) and Lipsey & Sjoholm (2005), while transfer fees are a specific sport related issue that has 
a similarity with wage costs. League stature is noted by Sloane (1971) as league health so has 
been slightly amended. The two remaining potential responses dealt with management related 
effects as per Javorcik (2004), Konings (2001) and Mullen & Williams (2007).  
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Question fifteen and sixteen are also related to spillover effects, with question fifteen focusing 
on performance effects as per Haskel et al (2007) and Konings (2001), while question sixteen was 
a general question based upon the enhancement of the Premier League’s image. The next three 
questions dealt with club specific issues in terms of employment and management. The 
employment question was related to Haskel et al (2007) and Girma et al (2001) in exploring the 
employment effects, while questions eighteen and nineteen are based upon Kiessling & Harvey 
(2006) in identifying the use of foreign management and new management techniques. The final 
question (related to the work of Sloane 1971), explored the objectives of a football club. Sloane’s 
list of objectives was slightly adjusted to include youth development and community aspects 
rather than just league health or attendance. Profit and global growth are included as in Andreff 
& Staudohar (2000), King (1997), and Nauright & Ramfjord (2010), while on-field performance is 
also an objective also included in this question.  
 
5.6.3 Domestically-Owned Questionnaire  
 
With the approach behind the foreign owned questionnaire explained, a similar process was set 
out for the domestically owned questionnaire. There were some elements of similarity with the 
foreign owned questionnaire, but the domestically-owned questionnaire managed to draw out 
more of the spillover effects of the investment. An example of this questionnaire is shown in 
appendix two.  
 
The first two questions were the same as those on the foreign owned questionnaire, and they 
helped to generate an overview of the clubs ownership position. Question three was also a 
general question which considered how the domestically owned clubs perceived the impact of 
foreign investment entering English football. The next questions considered the potential 
spillover effects which emerged from foreign investment entering English football. Question four 
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dealt with the impact of foreign investment and was similar to question thirteen on the foreign 
owned questionnaire. The question is related to the work of Girma et al (2001) and Haskel et al 
(2007).  
 
The fifth question asked respondents to consider a range of different impacts that have resulted 
from FDI entering the Premier League. This is similar to question fourteen on the foreign owned 
questionnaire. Hence, responses such as transfer and wage costs are included in the question as 
per Girma et al (2001) and Lipsey & Sjoholm (2005). Another possible response to this question 
referred to profit (King, 1997, Andreff & Staudohar, 2000), but there was also the inclusion of 
off-field skills (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010) and standard of matches.   Question six considered 
the effect of foreign investment on the competitiveness of the Premier League. This question is 
considered in relation to the competitive balance literature, i.e. Michie & Oughton (2004, 
Ramchandani, 2012), and through the FDI literature via Gugler & Brunner (2007) and Markusen 
& Venables (1999). Question seven considered how domestically owned clubs have been 
affected by foreign investment. The basis for this question is from Girma et al (2001), Haskel et al 
(2007) and Javorcik (2004), who all considered the effects of FDI on domestic firms. Question 
eight develops the ideas of question seven by focusing specifically on how foreign investment 
has affected competitiveness. The difficulties for domestically owned firms in competing with 
foreign owned firms are drawn out by studies such as Konings (2001) and Javorcik (2004).  
 
Question nine referred to the specific impacts a club has faced. This focused on increasing wage 
costs as per Girma et al (2001) Mullen & Williams (2007) and Lipsey & Sjoholm (2005). Other 
responses included transfer costs which is adapted from the theory outlined by Girma et al 
(2001) in terms of wages, profitability which is considered from the sports economics side in King 
(1997) and Andreff & Staudohar (2000). This question can also be justified through the FDI 
literature, as Mullen & Williams (2007) and Girma et al (2001) both link labour quality to wages. 
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The final possible response to this question concerned commercial impacts of FDI, as outlined by 
Nauright & Ramfjord (2010). Question ten focused on potential ownership advantages as per 
Dunning (2001) and Lundan (2010). The focus was on the area of off-field advantages. Question 
eleven considered the advantages that FDI can generate for an acquired firm, so there was a 
focus on resources, management and growth (Dunning, 1994). Question twelve considered how 
the domestically owned clubs have responded to foreign investment entering other clubs. The 
responses invited included both on-field and off-field matters. This includes investment in 
players and non-playing staff, which indicates an increase in wages as per Mullen & Williams 
(2007). Other responses include exit (club placed up for sale) as per Javorcik (2004) and 
commercial expansion. Question thirteen focused on the benefits of foreign investment and 
draws on sporting and non-sporting factors. This includes league stature (adapted from Sloane, 
1971), increased revenues Nauright & Ramfjord (2010), more professional management via Gorg 
& Greenaway (2004) and global appeal Nauright & Ramfjord, (2010). Question fourteen dealt 
with the drawbacks of foreign investment. The responses outlined in this question included 
wage inflation (as per Girma et al, 2001), transfer inflation, effect on spectators (Duke, 2002), 
increased debt (Lago et al, 2006), and the effect on competitiveness of domestically owned firms 
(Konings, 2001).  
 
Question fifteen was a general question relating to the global appeal of the Premier League, 
while question sixteen is similar to question four on the foreign investment questionnaire. This 
question dealt with the effect of the regulatory environment as per Busse & Groizard (2008), 
Lago et al (2006) and Meier (2008). Question seventeen was the same as question three on the 
foreign owned questionnaire and allows a comparison to be obtained from the different 
ownership groups. Question eighteen was similar to question eight on the foreign owned 
questionnaire, although the responses are slightly different as financial impacts (King, 1997, 
Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) and image are considered as more appropriate responses. Question 
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nineteen was similar to question nine on the foreign investment questionnaire and dealt with 
capabilities of an organisation as per Dunning & Zhang (2008). Question twenty dealt with the 
motivations of the investments as per question one on the foreign owned questionnaire, while 
question twenty-one was a general question on the motivations of the investors. Question 
twenty-two was  the same as question twenty on the foreign owned questionnaire, and the final 
questionnaire was a general question about whether FDI should be encouraged or discouraged 
within the Premier League.  
 
5.7. Interview Respondents  
 
To supplement the club questionnaire data, as was explained, interviews were also sought.  
 
Having considered the participants from Premier League clubs the next step was to contact 
Supporters Direct. Unlike bodies such as the FA and the Premier League, Supporters Direct is 
more open to researchers than other groups and institutions involved in English football. A 
benefit of getting access to Supporters Direct was this facilitated access to two supporter trusts. 
These interviews were set-up through snowball sampling. The choice of the two trusts (Fulham 
and Manchester United) was driven by the desired case study choices (explained later in this 
chapter). A third request was sent to the Arsenal supporters trust but no response was 
forthcoming from this.   
 
The profiles of the club interview respondents are shown in Table 5.7: 
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Table 5.7: Club Management Respondents 
Participants Respondent A Respondent E Respondent F 
Club Wolves West Brom Stoke 
Position Senior Management 
(Board member) 
Senior Management 
(Board member) 
Senior Management 
(Board member) 
Length of Service 
(Current Club) 
14 12 7 
Justification for 
selection 
Experienced football 
administrator with 
experience at three 
different clubs over a 
twenty year period 
Experienced senior 
manager, who has 
performed different 
roles at the club over 
the last 12 years. 
Experienced senior 
manager who has 
worked at two clubs 
in a senior role. Was 
also involved at 
Stoke when club was 
run by Icelandic 
owners 
How Approached Through Mutual 
Contact. 
Conversation was 
initially conducted 
through email to 
arrange interview. 
Interview acted as 
pilot. 
Questionnaire was 
initially addressed to 
the club chairman 
but he was 
unavailable. 
Respondent E was 
willing to participate, 
and interview was 
arranged through his 
PA. 
Questionnaire was 
sent out to the 
participant and an 
interview was 
arranged through is 
P.A. 
Interview Location Molineux The Hawthorns Britannia Stadium 
 
Table 5.8 shows the nature of the successful interview approach for this group.   
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Table 5.8: Supporters Direct and Supporter Respondents. 
Participants Respondent B Respondent C Respondent D 
Trust None. Supporters 
Direct 
Manchester United Fulham 
Position Senior Team 
Member 
Director Committee Member 
Length of Service 3 Involved from 1990’s 
beginning with 
Shareholders 
association. 
From early 2000’s 
beginning with keep 
Fulham at the 
Cottage movement 
Justification for 
selection 
To gain access in the 
supporter movement 
and also to get a 
different perspective 
on the topic issues 
when compared to 
the clubs. Participant 
has dealt with 
supporters who wish 
to take control of 
their own club. 
The selection of 
Manchester United 
Supporters Trust 
(M.U.S.T) allowed the 
issues involved with 
the Manchester 
United takeover to 
be explored in detail. 
Participant has been 
strongly involved in 
the trusts activities. 
Allowed issues 
involved with the 
Fulham takeover to 
be explored. 
Participant has been 
involved with the 
Fulham trust since its 
formation and has 
experience of some 
of the positives and 
negatives of foreign 
ownership. 
How Approached Initial contact 
through media 
manager at 
Supporters Direct. 
Interview then 
arranged to take 
place at AFC Telford’s 
ground but then 
cancelled. Was then 
rearranged. 
Contact details were 
passed on as a result 
of the Supporters 
Direct interview. 
Interview was then 
arranged to take 
place at Respondent 
C’s workplace in 
Warrington. 
Contact details were 
passed on as a result 
of the Supporters 
Direct interview. 
Contact was then 
made with 
participant via email. 
Interview was 
arranged for a 
mutually convenient 
location. 
Interview Location Supporters Direct 
London 
Warrington 
(Participants work) 
Tamworth (Mutual 
Location) 
 
 
5.7.1 Interview Process  
 
The interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis. It was decided to choose this 
approach as some questions were related to a specific organizational context. A semi-structured 
approach also allows for the use of follow-up questions, and the order of questions also differed 
slightly due to the nature of the conversation with the respondent. For example, when dealing 
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with the supporter trusts, there were questions based on the trust movement, whilst when 
dealing with the clubs, some questions were asked about the club’s ownership position, but the 
key themes were the same across all of the interviews. If a fully structured interview method had 
been chosen then it would not have been possible to explore these issues, as it is inflexible 
(Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). By using a semi-structured method, variances in answers between 
trust and clubs could be allowed. A completely unstructured interview would have presented a 
greater challenge to analyse, so this was rejected as a method.  
 
To help comparability of the results, the questions asked in the interviews were similar to those 
specified in the questionnaire although some differences did emerge. The question format in the 
interviews at Wolverhampton Wanderers, West Bromwich Albion, and Stoke City used the 
questions from the domestically-owned questionnaire as the basis for the interview questions. 
However, the participants were free to choose their own responses, rather than be limited to 
the responses that were stated in the questionnaire. This allowed for a greater richness to be 
derived from the interviews which in-turn creates the basis for a better quality of analysis. The 
questions in both the questionnaires and the interviews were divided into broad themes. Initial 
questions were based on the background of the club, the determinants of foreign investment in 
football, effects of foreign investment (both in terms of spillover effects and also the effect on 
the clubs taken over), and finally questions on football as a business. The interviews began with 
an introduction and an explanation of the ethical procedures. All of the participants were asked 
if they had any objection to being tape recorded. None of the participants raised any concerns.  
 
The first questions in the interviews related to background information about the club or the 
participant involved. An example of the type of question used is shown below:  
 
“Just to get a bit of background, what’s the ownership position at Stoke City at present?” 
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Follow-on questions in the interviews were asked depending on the responses. For example, at 
West Bromwich Albion, questions were posed about the club’s decision to delist from the stock 
exchange, while at Stoke City questions were asked about the club’s previous ownership. This 
helped to add richness and depth to the earlier responses. For the supporter trusts, the 
following type of question was asked:  
 
“Just to start with to get an overview, what is the function of the Fulham Supporters Trust? “ 
 
 Additional follow-on questions to this concentrated on the objectives of the trust and its 
relationship with the club. This helped to explore the nature of the supporter trust in more detail 
and also provided an overview of the relationships supporters have with clubs that have been 
taken over by foreign investors. For the interview at Supporters Direct, questions were asked 
about the nature of Supporters Direct and its functions. Following on from this, Respondent B 
was asked about supporter participation and the nature of fan ownership. During the course of 
the interview, Respondent B stated some of the negative spillover effects so the discussion 
focused on some of these effects.  
 
In some of the earlier interviews, questions were asked about football as a business which were 
supplementary to those on the questionnaire. However, in the later interviews these questions 
were modified, and both Respondent D and Respondent F made their own comments about 
football as a business without being prompted. These issues were the explored as they occurred.  
 
The interviews generally lasted between forty-five minutes and one-hour. The shortest interview 
was thirty minutes. Having addressed the questionnaire and interview design, the next section of 
this chapter will consider the selection of the case studies.  
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5.8 Case Studies  
 
Case Study research is argued to be useful when investigating a topic area which is not 
particularly well known. This is because a case study can generate an enhanced knowledge of a 
particular phenomenon (Ghauri, 2004). Further to this, case studies are considered effective 
when dealing with “how or why” questions (Yin, 1994). Case studies can also be used to address 
“what” questions (Ghauri, 2004). There are several different types of case study approach. It has 
been argued by Yin (1994) that there are three types of case studies, exploratory, explanatory 
and descriptive. In addition to this, cases can also be instrumental, intrinsic or collective (Stake, 
1995).  
 
5.8.1 Single and Multiple Case Studies  
 
The number of case studies selected does not affect the quality of the case study research 
(Pauwels & Matthysens, 2004). Eisenhardt (1991) suggests that the number of chosen case 
studies depends on the topic being researched, and the amount of information that can be 
obtained from further case study research. It is also argued that there is no lower or upper limit 
to the number of cases that can be used in a study (Ghauri, 2004). This gives rise to two methods 
which are the single case and multiple case methods.  
 
The single case can be either a typical case or an atypical case it has been argued that the 
selection of an atypical case can help to provide the richest information (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Extreme and critical cases can refer to cases where a notable failure or success has occurred. 
Moreover, the selection of a critical case study can be used as the single case under observation, 
as this will meet all of the conditions required to extend, confirm or question a theory (Ghauri, 
2004). However when using a single case approach, problems can occur, such as over 
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generalizability and bias which can include misjudging the representativeness of a single event 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). If one case is used it may be more difficult to generalize the results of 
the case to the wider population.  
 
The multiple-case method has developed from the limitations of the single-case approach. A 
single-case cannot distinguish between events that are unique or common, and from this there 
is no clear guidance for generalisation (Achen & Snidal, 1989). A single case study is also limited 
through the inability to compare with other cases and weaknesses in the theoretical approach 
(Achen & Snidal, 1989). The use of the multiple-case approach can help to overcome these 
weaknesses. A multiple case study approach will investigate the same issue across a number of 
different organisations or groups (Ghauri, 2004). This approach can also be comparative and the 
results of one case study can be compared to the results generated from a case study in another 
organisation (Yin, 2003, Ghauri, 2004), while it is also argued that the results can be replicated 
across different organisations (Eisenhardt, 1989). The effect of this should be to improve the 
level of generalizability from the case study to the wider population and by using this method it 
becomes possible to address the common and unique features present in the different case 
studies (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). In terms of the selection of the multiple case studies, 
Pauwels & Matthysens (2004) argue that the multiple-case approach should be used to help 
generate more divergence in the data and more theory driven variances, and that a multiple-
case study should not simply “create more of the same”. In contrast, Yin (1984) argues that the 
cases should be selected if they can replicate the results of other cases, or the cases should be 
chosen if they obtain contrary results, and choosing either of these types of case will improve 
the generalizability process. So if answers are replicated across several cases more confidence in 
the results can be generated (Yin, 1989). Multiple-case studies can also benefit the research 
process by allowing common patterns to be identified and as result limit the chances of 
assertions being made by chance (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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5.8.2 Case Study Selection  
 
When selecting the cases it was decided to use the information orientation approach as outlined 
by Flyvbjerg (2006), rather than a random sample which can return an inadequate group of  case 
clubs (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). For example, foreign takeovers have occurred at Birmingham, 
Liverpool, and Blackburn since 2009. By selecting one of these cases, the secondary data 
generated would be deficient due to the short-time frame that the new owners have been in 
charge and   would not provide the richness of detail that could be generated from other clubs 
even though it might be argued that a random sample could improve generalizability (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). In terms of dealing with the case selection, Table 5.9 has a breakdown of all clubs that 
have competed in the Premier League from 1992 to 2011.  
 
Table 5.9 Breakdown of Clubs who have competed in the Premier League 1992-2011 
Number of Seasons Clubs Total 
Twenty Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Tottenham, 
Liverpool, Aston Villa, Everton 
7 
Nineteen  0 
Eighteen Newcastle United, Blackburn 2 
Seventeen  0 
Sixteen West Ham, 1 
Fifteen  0 
Fourteen Middlesbrough, Manchester City, 2 
Thirteen Bolton, Southampton, 2 
Twelve Leeds, 1 
Eleven Sunderland, Fulham 2 
Ten  0 
Nine Coventry 1 
Eight Leicester, Charlton, Wimbledon, Sheffield Wed, 4 
Seven Wigan, Derby, Birmingham, Portsmouth, 4 
Six W.B.A, 1 
Five Q.P.R, Ipswich, Norwich, Nottm Forest, 4 
Four Stoke, Wolves, Crystal Palace, 3 
Three Sheffield United, 1 
Two Oldham, Bradford, Watford, Reading, Hull, 5 
One Swindon, Barnsley, Burnley, Blackpool, Swansea 5 
(Source: Author Compilation)  
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As the case studies selected were to be from clubs with some form of foreign ownership, a 
number of clubs had to be discounted as potential case study targets as they have been 
controlled by domestic investors. The next stage was to eliminate those clubs which at the time 
of the research were under foreign control but not competing in the Premier League. This ruled 
out several clubs including Birmingham City, Sheffield Wednesday, and Hull City. All of these 
clubs were foreign owned, but at the time of the research they were competing in divisions 
outside of the Premier League. For clubs outside of the Premier League, the data which is 
available on both club performance and takeover motives is more limited. For example, the 
Deloitte annual review of football finance only covers the top two divisions (Premier League and 
Championship). It does not cover those clubs like Sheffield Wednesday, who at the time of this 
study, were playing in League One.  The amount of coverage given to Premier League clubs in 
the national press and media is far greater than those in lower divisions.   In the Premier League 
the analysis of the data is more straightforward as the increased availability of secondary data 
created a greater level of depth and richness to the analysis. This is a critical part of the 
qualitative research process (Chetty, 1996).  
 
The sample was reduced, therefore, to ten clubs which were Arsenal, Aston Villa, Blackburn, 
Chelsea, Fulham, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Queens Park Rangers, and 
Sunderland. All of these clubs have a form of foreign ownership and were current Premier 
League clubs as of 2011/2012. The details of these clubs are shown in Table 5.10:  
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Table 5.10 Foreign Owned EPL clubs in 2011/2012 
Club Ownership Date FDI from Investment 
Arsenal Part April 2007-April 
2011 
U.S.A/Russia Share Purchase 
only 
Aston Villa Full August 2006 U.S.A Extensive 
Blackburn Full November 2010 India Limited 
Chelsea Full July 2003 Russia Extensive 
Fulham Full May 1997 Egypt Extensive 
Liverpool Full October 2010 U.S.A Moderate 
Manchester City Full September 2008 Abu Dhabi Extensive 
Manchester Utd Full July 2005 U.S.A Limited 
Q.P.R Full August 2011 Malaysia Moderate 
Sunderland Full May 2009 U.S.A Extensive 
(Liverpool, Manchester City, Q.P.R, and Sunderland have all had more than one foreign 
takeover).  (Source: Author compilation)  
 
From this list of clubs, three were chosen as case studies. The maximum variation approach 
outlined by Flyvbjerg (2006) was used to select the case studies. In the football context, this 
approach highlighted the need for clubs of different sizes, with different investment levels and 
league positions to be selected as the chosen cases. The three clubs that finished in the 
Champions League places would not represent maximum variation. Another factor is that some 
clubs have been taken over by more than one foreign investor. This has occurred at four clubs, 
and the first case selection was a club that fitted this criterion. Queens Park Rangers were 
rejected as a case club on the basis that the acquisition of the club by Tony Fernandes did not 
take place until after the case study process had started, and this recent acquisition has 
produced little published data available to support a detailed analysis. Previously, Queens Park 
Rangers were part-foreign owned, but the club had also spent several seasons in the third tier of 
English football, which further impacts on the availability of data. Liverpool has been owned by 
two groups of North American investors from 2007 onwards, but the most recent takeover only 
took place in the autumn of 2010. At the time of research, there was little published data 
available on this second takeover. Hence this would not have been a good choice to consider the 
effects of a foreign takeover. Of the two remaining, clubs, Manchester City were selected ahead 
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of Sunderland because it provided an example of a case study where a club has received 
extremely significant investment from a benefactor (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). More data is 
also available on the effects of the takeovers at Manchester City when compared with 
Sunderland.   
 
This then leaves six clubs from which to choose the remaining two case studies. Blackburn was 
rejected on the basis of data availability. Blackburn had only been under foreign control from the 
autumn of 2010 and this represents too short a time period in which to analyse the effects of the 
takeover. Also at the time of the case study selection, no full season data was available to 
support the analysis. Of the remaining clubs, Arsenal was also rejected on the basis on data 
availability, and the recent period in which share acquisitions have taken place. The latest 
significant acquisition of shares in Arsenal only took place during April 2011, so there is a 
shortage of data on financial performance etc. Additionally, Arsenal is not fully controlled by one 
single investor, and the effects of this investment are more difficult to ascertain. Of the 
remaining four clubs, Manchester United and Fulham were then selected as case study clubs.  
 
This was motivated by several factors. Firstly, access was granted to the supporter trusts of both 
clubs, while no qualitative data was available for Aston Villa and Chelsea. Hence this gives a 
greater depth and richness for Fulham and Manchester United over the other two clubs.  
Secondly, the selection of Manchester United also gives an example of a large market club that 
had been taken control through the use of a leveraged buyout (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). As 
only two clubs have been taken over using this strategy (Liverpool are the second club), selecting 
both clubs would potentially bias the sample. Manchester United also provides evidence of a 
club owner seemingly motivated more by profit than sporting performance (Nauright & 
Ramfjord, 2010). This again helps to provide a different context to the other clubs selected. 
Fulham provides an example of a smaller club taken over by a foreign investor (who has 
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provided significant support to improve the standing of the club). Aston Villa and Chelsea are 
considered to be larger clubs than Fulham, so selecting Fulham will fit in with the maximum 
variation strategy. A further advantage of both Manchester City and Fulham is that they have 
been controlled by foreign investors for a significant period of time. Hence this means that 
additional secondary data is available to support the analysis. 
 
Fulham have been controlled by Mohamed Al-Fayed from 1997 onwards. They provide evidence 
of one of the early foreign takeovers in English football, and there is a large amount of data 
available on Fulham as a result.  With a large amount of data, the motives and consequences of 
the takeover can be analysed in detail, and this should also further limit conclusions being 
created by chance (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
For the second case study, Manchester United has been foreign controlled since 2005, so the 
ownership period has been more medium term. One of the benefits of Manchester United’s size 
is that there is a large amount of secondary data available which discusses the performance of 
the club and the drivers behind the takeover. Articles, such as that by Szymanski (1998), which 
discuss the performance of the club under domestic ownership, allow comparisons to be drawn 
between foreign and domestic ownership at the club. The use of a leveraged buyout is not 
common in English football club acquisitions, so using the Manchester United takeover as a case 
study can also show elements of an atypical takeover. Manchester City has been foreign owned 
since 2007, and the current owners, the Abu Dhabi United Group have been in control since 
2008. This is a shorter-term period than the other two clubs selected so this generates another 
benefit when considering the maximum variation of the cases, while still being able to access the 
required level of data. As both foreign takeovers at Manchester City were high profile, there is a 
range of secondary data available to provide sufficient evidence for the case study. This should 
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provide a contrast to the other cases and will fulfil the requirements for maximum variation 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
5.8.3 Case Study Approach  
 
Whilst the thesis will be using a case study approach to help address the consequences of FDI, 
the cases will not appear as distinct sections. Instead, this material will be integrated into the 
analysis of the consequences section in chapter seven. In practical terms, this will help to avoid 
any issues with repetition where there are similarities between the three case clubs. Also, this 
will enable any wider common data surrounding the consequences of FDI entering the Premier 
League to be brought into the analysis. Therefore, separate sections can be devised for issues 
concerning revenues, profits, and wages etc. In this case, it is more effective than to simply split 
the cases into distinct sections based on each of the clubs. For instance, comparisons on aspects 
like revenue can be made immediately between the clubs, rather than across different sections.  
 
5.9 Data Analysis  
 
With the data collection methods now established, the methods of data analysis used in this 
study will now be evaluated. As this study is qualitatively based, the chosen method for the 
analysis of the collected primary and secondary material is content analysis with a focus on 
themes. This particular method has been chosen as it enabled the identification of the key 
underlying themes from the collected data (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). In the wider literature 
there has long been a debate about the nature of the content analysis. Indeed some arguments 
have considered this approach to be quantitative in nature, whilst the level of reliability given to 
the results is enhanced (Seale & Silverman, 1997).  
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For both the secondary material and the interview responses, the data was coded in relation to 
particular themes, for example, where a particular motive was suggested, all responses were 
coded similarly. To understand the underlying factors behind a motive, this was then aligned into 
economic or non-economic factors. A third classification existed in terms of institutional and 
regulatory aspects. So if a respondent suggested profit as a motive, this was described under the 
heading of economic motive. In the secondary data, the statements issued following the 
takeover of a club were considered. The content analysis was conducted in a similar manner to 
that in the primary data with the splitting of motives into the different themes. For the effects of 
FDI, a similar procedure was followed as the themes from this aspect were considered in terms 
of the various effects such as wage costs, competitive balance and so on. There was, however, 
no breakdown of these effects into economic or non-economic aspects. Once these groups had 
been established and ordered, the meaning surrounding these statements was explored.  
 
As the study is qualitatively based, issues can arise with regards to reliability and validity, and the 
choice of a content analysis as the data analysis technique overcomes some of these issues 
(Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). Some of these biases are evident in the collected data. A 
respondent from a Premier League club was less likely to criticise the league than those from 
outside. The consequences of such issues are commented on in the analysis chapters.  
 
When investigating some of the consequences of FDI, we need to distinguish between the 
analysis of the economic impact and the narrower on field sporting impact. In this latter case we 
do encounter a data rich environment at least in terms of win, lose, draw, points gained, goals, 
and league position etc. This does allow for a more quantitative analysis and especially of the 
question of competitive balance.  As identified in chapter four, in the sporting sphere, 
competitiveness is analysed through the idea of competitive balance. There are two broad 
approaches used in the literature. The Analysing Competitive Balance (ACB) approach 
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investigates how competitive balance has changed over time, and considers how business 
practice changes have affected competitive balance (Fort & Maxcy, 2003). The second part of 
the competitive balance literature concerns the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH), 
which analyses the effect of competitive balance changes on fans. This is used in studies by 
Forrest & Simmons (2002) and Forrest et al (2005) in relation to football. As this study is focused 
on a change in business practice (i.e. foreign ownership), and is concerned with changes over-
time, the ACB approach will be followed.  
 
Within the ACB literature, a range of approaches have been used. Firstly, studies such as 
Szymanski (2001) have used the standard deviation of win percentages (SDW) to calculate the 
competitive balance. Humphreys (2002) devised the competitive balance ratio (CBR) which built 
on this particular approach to more effectively consider seasonal changes. However, the use of 
wins only in football presents a difficulty due to the frequency of drawn matches (Michie & 
Oughton, 2004). Therefore, the SDW measure and the CBR are not wholly appropriate for use in 
this study as they do not present a full picture of the total points gained in a season.    
 
In relation to football, Michie & Oughton (2004) used a range of techniques including the 
Herfindahl index, Lorenz curve, and C5 Ratio and Index to calculate changes in competitive 
balance across English football. The use of these measures presented a detailed analysis of 
competitive balance, but according to Borooah & Mangan (2012) this study whilst factual did not 
make analytical arguments. As a result they proposed the use of generalised entropy in order to 
investigate inequality within the Premier League. Not only did this approach measure inequality 
within the Premier League, but it was also linked to social welfare (or league welfare) which is 
measured based on the point’s distribution. However, Pawlowski et al (2010) use a similar range 
of measures to Michie & Oughton (2004), although they make use of the CBR (adapted from 
Humphreys, 2002) in their study. Additionally, Ramchandani (2012) also used the Herfindahl 
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Index, whilst concentration ratios were used for the top four and top ten clubs. In contrast, to 
Pawlowski et al (2010) and Michie & Oughton (2004), inter-quartile ranges were also used to 
evaluate points’ distribution, whilst the strength of the relationships was shown through 
correlation calculations.  
 
Competitive balance has also been measured through a time series approach using various break 
points at times of change (i.e. a break point existed due to the expansion of the Champions 
League) (Lee & Fort, 2012). Within this method, Lee & Fort (2012) made use of the Konings 
concentration ratio, which is calculated on a similar basis to the C5 Ratio. However, Konings 
approach has more flexibility as three or four teams points can be compared to the rest of the 
division. Furthermore, Gossens (2006) has effectively used a ‘C3’ Ratio, but the number of “top” 
teams is now considered as being larger than three. The Lee & Fort (2012) study also uses the 
Scully-Noll ratio in order to find the overall dispersion of wins or points. A weakness of this 
second ratio is the bias towards wins, and the application of the Scully-Noll ratio has traditionally 
been focused on North American sport (where drawn matches are uncommon). As with the SDW 
index such a measure is not wholly relevant for football.  
 
In considering the possibility of a narrow sports related impact for FDI this study will follow the 
approach used by Michie & Oughton (2004). This study analyses competitive balance across 
English football using the Herfindahl Index, C5 Ratio and Index, as well as the Lorenz Curve. 
These measures have wider applications, as the Herfindahl Index and C5 Ratio are both used to 
evaluate the concentration of an industry, whilst the Lorenz Curve is used to determine income 
distributions. The Herfindahl Index takes into consideration all competitors in a league or 
market, which enables inequalities between firms to be found. In contrast the C5 Ratio will 
compare the points gained by the top five clubs against the rest of a division. This measure is 
limited as it only looks at the top five clubs, but this is still wider than the approach used by 
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Gossens (2006) where he took three clubs (Michie & Oughton, 2004). However, the C5 Ratio will 
be modified in order to investigate the points gained by the bottom five clubs verses the rest of 
the division. This takes into consideration the work of those such as Borooah & Mangan (2012) 
and Ramchandani (2012) who investigate different groups of clubs (not only the top five). The C5 
Index will not be used as there is no need to adjust the C5 ratio for changes in league size. The 
most critical part of the focus in this study concerns the last decade where the league has 
remained constant in size. In the 1995 the Premier League was reduced from twenty-two teams 
to twenty. Such a change has not occurred since this point. The Lorenz curve will be used as this 
will compare the point’s distribution across the Premier League with the ideal distribution 
(Michie & Oughton, 2004).  
 
In terms of productivity measurements, a significant amount of the literature has made use of 
various econometric models (i.e. Barros et al, 2009, Barros & Leach, 2006, Haas, 2003, Barros & 
Garcia-del-Barrio, 2010 and Espita-Escuer & Garcia-Cebrian, 2004). These models combined 
elements of on-field and off-field performance, but for the purpose of this study productivity will 
be considered in light of on-field aspects. Within the football literature, total wage spending has 
been related strongly to performance (Szymanski & Smith, 1997). As a result, those clubs which 
spend the most amount of money on wages should achieve greater success than those who 
spend a smaller amount.  
 
However, in contrast to other forms of business, traditional economic approaches to 
productivity are not wholly applicable. Measures surrounding output per person do not fit the 
sporting context due to the removal of a player not often benefitting teams. Additionally, the 
total output is constrained by the number of matches and number of points available in a 
season. Moreover, this indicates those measures used in the productivity and FDI literature are 
not wholly applicable. In order to consider productivity, this study will use the approach 
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developed by Jones & Cook (2014). This study measures output through the total points gained, 
and instead of considering this by person or hour, in the footballing context total wage spend is 
used. This will cover the total wage spending in relation to the entire playing squad. By using this 
method it becomes apparent whether a club has under or over performed. This approach is in 
contrast to Tomkins et al (2010) who make use of transfer costs rather than wages. Whilst these 
costs are adjusted for inflation, transfer costs do not cover the whole costs of a squad as some 
players may arrive on free transfers, or through the youth system. The comparison of wages to 
points was conducted by Deloitte (2012), although they did not invert the calculation to show 
productivity. In addition, league position will also be related to wage spending (as shown by 
Deloitte, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012). This process will help to further identify whether clubs are 
under or over performing in relation to their wage spending. Through finding these differences, 
productivity improvements or weaknesses can be found.  
 
5.10 Summary  
 
This chapter has summarised the methodological processes   used in this thesis. There has been 
an identification of the methods used in the topic areas of FDI and sports economics to be used 
in this thesis. The choices made in this thesis have then been explained in light of the research 
questions and the existing literature. The multi-method approach used in this thesis is unique 
within the topic areas. Having established the chosen methodology, the next chapter begins the 
analysis process with the consideration of the motives behind football FDI. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Motives of Football FDI 
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Having addressed the various methodological approaches for undertaking research in the 
previous chapter, this chapter considers the motives behind inbound FDI to the Premier League 
football clubs. It does so through using a combination of the qualitative survey data from 
stakeholders in the Premier League and some secondary data where relevant.  
 
Since we are concerned with the motivation to explore what factors might have influenced the 
decision making process before the investment was made. If the investment did subsequently 
yield a profit this does not mean investors might not have thought it might make a profit. But we 
can raise questions about the realism of a profit expectation before the investment.  
 
The motives behind FDI are generally economic, but other factors may also be present, and in 
the case of sport and football particularly, these non-economic factors are even more important 
to consider. Here the data is reviewed in terms of economic and non-economic factors, such as 
business acumen, financial factors, club availability, the attractiveness of English football, 
promotion (of image or company), status enhancement, political considerations, sporting 
interest, and regulatory factors. These will now be explored in-turn.   
 
6.1 Business Acumen 
 
The first motive to be considered, and which is evident in the qualitative data concerns the 
general area of business acumen. Foreign investors in the football sector might possess 
particular ownership interests and advantages which might explain an FDI decision. One noted 
by Respondent A was that of  
 
“The “cute businessman” angle” 
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Here it is suggested that the foreign owner, seeking an economic return on their investment, 
might have sensed an opportunity to benefit from, and improve, the financial performance of 
their club.  Those investors from North America, specifically, were believed to have held 
ownership advantages in these terms:  
 
    “Well I think that they [North American investors] will be more savvy and experienced to the 
global marketing opportunities of sport” (Respondent A) 
 
This group of owners were considered to have access to particular knowledge and expertise 
which investors from other regions did not possess. The nature of the North American sport 
market was considered as particularly relevant:   
 
“Although American sports don’t travel particularly outside America, the size of America is 
almost a global entity in itself isn’t it?” (Respondent A) 
 
“they understand sport, they understand the sporting model; it’s a different model in the US but 
nevertheless there are similarities in the fundamentals of what a sports club is” (Respondent F) 
 
The advantages in the US sports market were considered, therefore, to be globally transferable.  
 
An example of where business acumen appears to have influenced a takeover has been noted at 
Manchester United:  
 
Prior to the takeover of the club by the Glazer family in 2005, Malcolm Glazer had argued that 
the then management were guilty of under exploiting the clubs brand. Such an argument was 
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based on the observation that Glazer was a ‘businessman’ first and foremost. This was different 
to other team owners who were more interested in sporting results (Pratley, 2005).  
 
At this time, Manchester United’s commercial revenues were £49m (Swiss Ramble, 2011). 
However, this situation was to change dramatically under foreign ownership:  
 
“I think if you spoke to David Gill he would say that they’ve benefitted from the American 
ownership. Not through direct investment but through the expertise and marketing, because 
their commercial revenue is now over £100 million, which is staggering” (Respondent E) 
 
The increase in commercial revenues suggested that the Glazer family might have brought with 
them some advantages which were transferred into Manchester United. As Panja (2011) noted, 
there has been an increase in size of the clubs marketing and commercial department.  
 
But was the growth at Manchester United really due to the Glazer family or to a natural 
evolution? Respondent A was less certain:  
 
  “Will an organisation that was mature and as good as Manchester United have learnt any new 
tricks from the Glazers? I Doubt it personally” (Respondent A) 
 
This raises doubts about the actual significance of the business acumen held by foreign 
investors. But would a foreign investor have elected to invest in a Premier League club if they did 
not believe that they held advantages over other investors? The notion of business acumen 
indicates that foreign investors might seek to improve commercial performance, but what were 
the more direct financial motives behind purchases?  
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6.2 Financial Motives  
 
More specific than business acumen is the expectation of direct reward. Some foreign investors 
might have purchased a club due to straight forward financial motivations:  
 
“The other camp of foreign investor [i.e. Glazer family] is in it for the return that can be made” 
(Respondent A) 
 
Business acumen is related to FDI, specifically to enhance financial performance. This narrative 
does automatically mean profits, it implies that investors might enter the Premier League 
specifically in order to generate profits or in the expectation of generating profits.  But it is 
important to distinguish here between revenue and profit.  Revenue expectations for the 
Premier League might be high. 
 
In 1995/1996, the Premier League generated €501m of revenue compared to €452m for the 
second highest league which was Serie A (Deloitte, 2007). Over time, this gap in revenues 
between the Premier League and other European leagues steadily increased, reaching €1bn in 
2007/2008, with the Premier League generating €2.4bn compared to €1.4bn for La Liga, 
Bundesliga, and Serie A (Deloitte, 2010). In 2010/2011, total revenues in the Premier League 
were €2.5bn, compared to €1.7bn for each of the Bundesliga and La Liga, and €1.6bn for Serie A 
(Deloitte, 2013).Hence, for those investors seeking financial returns, the Premier League offered 
a more lucrative market than other European leagues. Indeed, revenue generation in English 
football was viewed as an important factor in influencing football FDI according to the 
questionnaire responses from foreign owned clubs.  
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From the secondary data it was apparent that television revenues have been an important 
source of revenues in the Premier League. This is highlighted in Table 6.1 
 
Table 6.1 Annual value of Premier League broadcasting deals 1992/93 to 2012/13 
Contract Domestic (£m) International (£m) Total (£m) 
92/93 to 96/97 43 9 52 
97/98 to 00/01 186 25 211 
01/02 to 03/04 476 59 535 
04/05 to 06/07 440 107 547 
07/08 to 09/10 710 225 935 
10/11 to 12/13 717 480 1,197 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2012) 
 
Over the history of the Premier League, television revenues have risen from £52m per season to 
approximately £1.2bn. In 2010/2011, 54% of the total revenues for the Premier League came 
from television. By comparison, in 1992/1993, 25% of the Premier Leagues revenue was 
generated from television rights contracts (Deloitte, 2012).  
 
A further impact of the rise in value of television contracts concerned the potential for even 
larger future increases. A number of takeovers, including those at Portsmouth, Aston Villa, West 
Ham, Liverpool, Manchester City (twice), and Derby took place between the 2006 and 2008. 
During this time, there was either the expectation of greater revenues from television or the 
realisation of these revenues (due to the new television rights contract beginning in the summer 
of 2007). Hence, this may have been perceived to be an ideal time to invest in a Premier League 
club due to the extra revenues, as well as the expectation of even higher future revenues. 
Alongside the expectation of greater revenues was also an expectation that these revenues 
would lead to greater profits (Deloitte, 2007).  
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This aspect of television rights as a driver of FDI within the Premier League was stated by a 
number of respondents.  
 
 “The investment from what I can see comes after the year-on-year increase in the quality of the 
deals that are being struck between the clubs and the television companies for the broadcast 
rights” (Respondent D). 
 
The ‘quality of the deals’ is likely to refer to higher revenues generated from television, but a 
greater quantity of Premier League football was also shown as a result of these deals.  
 
When purchasing Liverpool in 2007, Tom Hicks and George Gillett made reference to television 
rights contracts: 
 
“The new TV contracts are outstanding and we are proud to be a part of it” (BBC, 2007) 
 
Hicks & Gillett did not suggest specifically why the contracts were outstanding, but the 
implication is that this was also due to the level of revenues associated with the new contracts. 
The use of the phrase “proud to be a part of it” is interesting in its ambiguity since it might refer 
to the Club, the status of the Premier League more generally, the link to the television contracts, 
and perhaps the potential enhancement of their own profits.  
 
Television rights contracts were also stated as a motive in the takeover of Manchester United by 
the Glazer’s. However, there is some evidence from the secondary data suggesting that the 
Glazer family were seeking to break-up the Premier League’s collective deal in order to generate 
more revenue for Manchester United through an individual rights system (Fraser, 2005). While 
the Glazer family have not elected to force through such a break-up of the collective deal, the 
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value of new television contracts signed from 2007 was beneficial for Manchester United as they 
generated £60.4m in television rights revenue in 2010/2011 (Deloitte, 2012) compared to 
£30.6m in 2005/2006 (Deloitte, 2007). An insider also provided support for the claims 
surrounding the break-up of the collective system:   
 
“One thing that some of them are probably thinking of at the moment is that we have got this 
collective TV deal, but it’s under pressure. If that was to be blown apart, and you went down the 
Spanish model, where Barcelona and Real Madrid are able to do their own TV deals, then…” 
(Respondent A) 
 
Although any move to break up the collective system of television rights contracts would face 
opposition from smaller Premier League clubs, for an insider to be speculating on its potential 
break-up is of particular significance. Such a move would benefit a minority of clubs such as 
Manchester United and Liverpool, as they would be able to negotiate a greater level of income 
from television companies due to their size and popularity.  
 
The influence on FDI of the other two sources of income (commercial and matchday), in 
determining the motives for FDI was less apparent. In commercial revenues, the Premier League 
lags behind the German Bundesliga. For instance, in 2010/2011, total commercial and 
sponsorship income in the Bundesliga was €816m compared to €600m in the Premier League 
(Deloitte, 2012). Furthermore, this gap had increased from 2005/2006 where €568m was 
generated in commercial revenues by the Bundesliga and €500m by the Premier League 
(Deloitte, 2007).  
 
The third area of revenue generation was income generated from matchday sources. The 
Premier League has held an advantage over other leagues in this particular aspect. Premier 
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League clubs steadily increased their flow of income from this source, with total matchday 
revenues for the Premier League reaching £551m in 2010/2011, peaking at £573m in 2008/2009 
(Deloitte, 2012). However, in proportionate terms, the importance of matchday income is 
declining, comprising only 24% of the total income in the Premier League during 2010/2011 
(Deloitte, 2012). Matchday income may not be as critical as television revenue in motivating 
foreign investors to enter the Premier League, but unquestionably a larger stadium and support 
base is desirable (as well as the ability to charge higher prices).  
 
Whilst revenues can be shown to be a motivating factor for some foreign investors, the financial 
factor of key importance is profit. There was no consistent narrative surrounding profit and 
football FDI. First we should note that an explicit endorsement of expected profit was rare in the 
qualitative (and other data). From the questionnaires, only two responses indicated profit was a 
motive influencing FDI, but other respondents questioned whether profit was really a motive 
influencing foreign takeovers. Nothing was said as to whether this profit was long-term, short-
term, direct, or in-direct.  
 
However, in contrast, those in the interview responses were more willing to discuss profits. In-
terms of short-term profit, yearly income profits were noted as a motivating factor in the 
takeover of Manchester United by the Glazer family:  
 
“We [Manchester United] were the most profitable club” (Respondent C) 
 
“Basically when they [Glazer Family] came in, they were buying shares and they had ended up 
with around 24%, which they could then sell, get rid make a nice profit on because United were 
turning good profits then and get out” (Respondent C) 
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“The Glazers appears to be more about we’re not exploiting the value but let’s go in and do that 
and generate profits from it” (Respondent F) 
 
However, another contradiction emerged. As Manchester United was purchased through the use 
of a significant amount of borrowed funds, the ability to generate profits in the short-term was 
affected by the cost of financing these debts over the longer-term. So perhaps in reality, the 
profit that was being sought was more on a long-term basis. Long-term profits were more of an 
objective with the sale of a club though:  
 
  “I don’t think you would look at it as profit from an income profit, perhaps as a capital one in 
selling the business on” (Respondent E) 
 
 “So some of them are looking for a profit, some of them I think are potentially looking to make a 
profit of taking on a club and then selling it on” (Respondent B) 
 
   “I think people are moving into the Premier League in the misguided hope, that they can make 
a very rapid killing in three-to-five years, this may well be the move of say for example, Venky’s” 
(Respondent D) 
 
But the purchase of a football might generate a longer-term return. This was further driven by 
the perception that some clubs might have been undervalued, and as a result these clubs might 
be especially attractive to foreign investors.  
 
  “you’ve got the value play if its undervalued buy it, turn it round, couple of years later sell it 
make a big profit” (Respondent F) 
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“I think they recognised in Premier League clubs that fundamentally some of them were 
undervalued” (Respondent F) 
 
Respondent F went further, 
 
 “The best example was Hicks and Gillett perhaps and it didn’t work out for them. But I think they 
bought Liverpool Football Club thinking they could make a quick profit on it over a couple of 
years” 
 
In one sense this was a rational strategy, but using the case of Tom Hicks and George Gillett at 
Liverpool, the expected returns from the sale of the club did not materialise due to financial 
problems driven by the acquisition debt placed onto the club.  
 
In any industry there is always a gap between what might be expected and what is achieved. The 
size of the gap between profit expectations and the realisation of actual profit, as is shown, is a 
major problem in evaluating the motives of FDI in football. In football there was no guarantee of 
this strategy generating profits for a foreign investor. This raises concerns about this type of 
strategy:  
 
  “I think people are moving into the Premier League in the hope….the misguided hope, that they 
can make a very rapid killing in three-to-five years. This may well be the move of say for example, 
Venky’s, and the costs and everything else are catching up on them very rapidly” (Respondent D) 
 
In other industries, firms may attempt to reduce costs in order to generate profits, but such a 
strategy in football often leads to a decline in performance due to the competitive nature of the 
labour market for players. So, even if an asset has been perceived to be undervalued the costs of 
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operating a football club might erode the potential profits which can made by a foreign investor. 
The irrationality of seeking profits in football was considered further:  
 
“There’s the vanity of the turnover, but not the reality of the profit” (Respondent E) 
 
This reflects an important economic argument surrounding the nature of turnover and profit. 
Whilst, clubs in the Premier League can be argued to have been generating record revenues, 
these have not translated into record profits. For an investor this may have provided a benefit to 
their ‘ego’ but it did not benefit their finances. Thus, whilst some foreign investors 
unquestionably were motivated by profits, if this was their main motive then the realism of such 
motives is questionable in light of the economic environment of English football.  
 
There is a third dimension to the financial aspect of owning a Premier League club and that is for 
the diversification of revenues (for a foreign investor). This particular strategy was related to 
those investors from oil rich countries in the Middle East (i.e. Abu Dhabi and Qatar). Ownership 
of football clubs could be part of a wider strategy to diversify revenue streams:  
 
  “When the oil runs out what are they going to do? Because they have got no money so they 
have got to start bringing in other income lines” (Respondent C) 
 
Diversification can also exist for other foreign investors, but in a slightly different way. In this 
sense, the diversification relates to the business organisations controlled by the foreign investor:  
 
   “I can’t imagine that Stan Kroenke is doing it for any other reason, than a business opportunity 
to add something else to his sports empire” (Respondent A) 
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Through part ownership of Arsenal, Stan Kroenke would be able to extend his business interests, 
and therefore, was able to generate an opportunity for other parts of his business empire.  
 
6.3 Club Availability  
 
Alongside the financial motives, football club purchases have been motivated by club availability. 
The results from the questionnaire suggested club availability was believed to be a factor which 
motivated FDI, but why were clubs available? Table 6.2 shows some of the clubs sold to foreign 
investors, with a common feature being their financial problems (for an existing owner or club).  
 
Table 6.2 Takeovers Motivated by Financial Problems or owners inability to invest 
 Club and Purchaser 
In Administration Portsmouth (MM), Portsmouth (BC), 
Southampton (ML) 
Financial Problems Chelsea (RA), Liverpool (FSG), 
Owner unable to continue to invest Man City (SM), Portsmouth (SAF), Portsmouth 
(AAF), Sunderland (ES), West Ham (CBH) 
*= Initials represent buying group/owner. See Appendix three for full details.   
 
It is apparent from this table that the third group (owner unable to continue to invest) was solely 
made up of clubs in foreign ownership. In these cases, the impact of the global financial crisis of 
2008 was a significant driver in forcing the sale of these clubs (i.e. West Ham, Portsmouth and 
Sunderland). At Manchester City, the personal situation of Thaksin Shinawatra forced the sale of 
the club (Conn, 2012).  
 
The importance of club availability was also highly influential in the choice of Chelsea. Roman 
Abramovich had the choice of several clubs, but one of the deciding factors in favour of Chelsea 
was that the club was up for sale (Randall, 2003).  
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Other clubs (such as Tottenham or Manchester United) had better financial management, but 
they were not as openly available compared with Chelsea in 2003 (Randall, 2003). Hence, the 
takeover of Chelsea was completed more quickly than was possible with these two clubs, 
satisfying desire for a ‘quick’ takeover (Scott, 2005).  
 
Clubs have also been made available due to the unwillingness of an owner to continue investing 
in a club. Examples of these are shown in Table 6.3  
 
Table 6.3: Sales of clubs motivated by existing owners being unwilling to invest 
 Clubs and Purchasers 
Unwilling to continue to invest Aston Villa (RL), Birmingham (CY), Blackburn 
(V), Derby (GSE), Fulham (MAF), Liverpool (TH 
& GG), Man City (TS), Q.P.R (TF), Portsmouth 
(AG), Reading (AZ), Sunderland (D), 
*= Initials represent buying group/owner. See Appendix three for full details.   
 
In contrast to Table 6.2, the majority of clubs in Table 6.3 had domestic owners. In the case of 
Fulham, Mohamed Al-Fayed’s interest in purchasing the club was driven by Fulham being made 
available for sale (Al-Fayed.com, no date). Indeed, this suggested a wider argument about club 
availability:  
 
 
 
“In the nineties probably as a consequence of the many problems that English football had faced 
during the 1980’s, clubs in general were up for grabs, investment levels were relatively low, 
Fulham were one of the best examples of this, we were I wouldn’t say a sitting target, but we 
were there” (Respondent D) 
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The weakness of Fulham in terms of league performance, infrastructure, and finances, meant 
that they were open to additional investment. With other takeovers the same intense financial 
position was not present, but domestic owners were unwilling invest due to costs from player 
wages and transfers. An example of this was Blackburn, where the club’s last domestic owners 
(The Walker Trust) were unwilling to fund the clubs operations due to increasing costs, and as a 
result the club was placed up for sale (Conn, 2008).  
 
However, some foreign owners have also been unwilling to invest in their club. Queens Park 
Rangers (with part foreign ownership) is an example. The club was sold to new foreign owners 
shortly after promotion was gained in the summer of 2011. The club was subsequently sold onto 
another set of foreign investors.  
 
6.4 Attractiveness  
 
If profit, revenues, diversification, and the availability of clubs are all factors which have 
motivated foreign investors to become involved in Premier League football alongside these 
factors, there are also the historical roots of football. For some insiders there is the view that   
English football is unique when compared to other European nations.  
 
  “If people were genuinely interested in football then you would say it’s the place of birth of 
football in the world, it’s got all of the history, it’s got the fan culture that goes with it” 
(Respondent B) 
 
“I think it enhances the product, the atmosphere that our crowds generate” (Respondent A) 
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Therefore, there are intangible attractiveness factors surrounding English football.  These 
elements, alongside the historical factors outlined above, provide some locational advantages 
over other nations, but there is a question as to how important these elements are. For 
example, the criterion of ‘history’ recorded a mostly significant response from the 
questionnaires; with the majority of insiders suggesting that the historical nature of English 
football was important to foreign investors. However this view is not universal.  
 
This discourse of uniqueness was further enhanced within the Premier League context:  
 
  “The biggest football league and best football league in the world is arguably the Premier 
League” (Respondent A) 
 
“It’s by far and away the most popular league in the world” (Respondent E) 
 
When developing these arguments surrounding the Premier League, the insiders (rather 
unsurprisingly) presented a strongly positive picture concerning the appeal of the league:  
 
“The profile of the English football, it’s as far as a media-savvy product, the Premier League are 
extremely good at marketing it (Respondent E) 
 
  “It’s by far and away the most popular league in the world, even if we look at our own UK, I 
think we forget how big the market is over in the Far East, in India, in the Middle East, and in 
America. It’s just huge. And obviously that’s why they’re interested in it” (Respondent E) 
 
 “Premier League goes out to 212 countries, 700 million homes, 2 billion individuals and the 
media value of that is huge, absolutely huge” (Respondent F) 
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These arguments reflect the ‘locational’ advantages associated with the Premier League, and its 
global coverage, and in particular these features were attractive to those investors who held 
economic motives. But as such statements were made by the insiders, this might reflect the 
desire to promote the image of the Premier League in a positive manner and to protect their 
own position.  
 
Another unique element of the appeal of the Premier League referred to its competitiveness.  
 
“The appeal of the Premier League is the competitiveness of it in many ways” (Respondent A) 
 
This reflects a number of arguments also made in the media by club insiders and football pundits 
in suggesting the Premier League was highly competitive. While these issues will be explored 
further in chapter seven, in terms of the consequences of FDI, there was no reference as to why 
the Premier League was considered as competitive, and whether or not FDI has impacted on the 
Premier League in this aspect.  
 
Aside from the aspects of uniqueness surrounding English football and the Premier League 
outlined above, there were also attractiveness features for particular clubs which might have 
influenced the choice made by a foreign investor. These included club history, image, support 
base, growth potential as well as location. Table 6.4 claims fourteen instances of a clubs history 
influencing the selection of a club for takeover. This table was generated by gathering data from 
the various statements released after a takeover has taken place, although, again there may be 
an element of good public relations presentation here.  
 
Table 6.4 Takeovers influenced by history or image of a club 
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History 14 Aston Villa (RL), Portsmouth (SAF), Liverpool 
(TH & GG), Man Utd (G), Man City (SM), West 
Ham (BG), Southampton (ML), QPR (FB), 
Wimbledon (AKER),  Sunderland (D), 
Sunderland (ES),  Liverpool (NESV), QPR (TF), 
Blackburn (V) 
*= Initials represent buying group/owner. See Appendix three for full details.   
  
The results from the questionnaires also supported the notion of club history being an important 
factor. Three of the four questionnaire responses suggested club history was influential in the 
selection of clubs purchased. However, ironically the one response which did not suggest history 
to be important was from a club which underwent a foreign takeover.  
 
However, some foreign owners had used phrases surrounding a clubs history or image as a 
method of appealing to sceptical club supporters who were unsure of a foreign investor’s motive 
for purchasing a club. By showing they are aware of such issues; at least foreign owners were 
creating empathy with supporters, but of course, saying and meaning are different things as 
shown in the case of Liverpool (Williams & Hopkins, 2011).  
 
References to supporters being a determining influence have been recorded in ten takeovers. 
Again this data was also taken from statements made following a takeover:  
 
 
Table 6.5 Takeovers influenced by club support 
Support 10 Aston Villa (RL), Portsmouth (SAF), Liverpool 
(TH & GG), Man City (SM), Man Utd (G), 
Southampton (ML), QPR (TF), Sunderland (D) 
, Sunderland (ES), Liverpool (NESV) 
*= Initials represent buying group/owner. See Appendix three for full details.   
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The importance of club support is both an economic and non-economic element to the 
operation of a football club. One of the insiders highlighted the economic impact:  
 
  “Yeah, obviously because of larger fan base means a greater possibility of selling products to 
fans, the greater chance of getting them more locally involved as season ticket holders…the very 
large clubs with an international support, Liverpool and Manchester United in particular, and 
Arsenal can always count on a strong base of foreign fans” (Respondent D) 
 
There was no reference to the nature of support (i.e. loyalty), or other non-economic narratives 
in this statement. However, in reference to Manchester City the nature of support was drawn 
out as a factor influencing the takeover. According to Sheikh Mansour, Manchester City had a 
‘loyal’ and ‘passionate’ fan base which made the club attractive (mcfc.co.uk, 2009).  
 
Alongside history and support, the location of a football club was considered to be an important 
factor in influencing the choices made by foreign investors. This was noted by both the foreign 
and domestic ally owned respondents. Such importance was suggested in the case of Chelsea:  
 
  “I’ve [Roman Abramovich] got the money to have a team, I’ll have a team. A big benefit that it’s 
in London, one of the great cities of the world” (Respondent A) 
 
The importance of a London location to Abramovich is considered in the wider literature  to have 
influenced the selection of Chelsea over Manchester United (Scott, 2005). The importance of 
London was also thought to be relevant in the case of Fulham:  
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  “Fulham were targeted by Al-Fayed because it was physically proximal to Harrods in 
Knightsbridge, and obviously our location by the river is absolutely unique in football” 
(Respondent D) 
 
This might suggest that non-economic (closeness to the river) and economic factors explained 
the locational benefits of Fulham. This location provided further benefits:  
 
“If you have an intention of buying a club to realize its property development level or potential 
then somewhere like Fulham is absolutely ideal. It’s debatable whether there’s any better clubs 
to do it” (Respondent D) 
 
In reality, Al-Fayed did not seek to redevelop Craven Cottage for housing purposes or other 
purposes. Whether or not this was an actual initial motive behind the takeover was not clear. 
The appeal of London as a location was also reflected by Tony Fernandes as one of the factors 
influencing his takeover of Queens Park Rangers (Q.P.R) (BBC, 2011). Location might also 
important for non-London based clubs. But the argument might be more nuanced. The takeover 
of Blackburn by Venky’s can be considered less important in terms of market catchment than a 
London club. Its appeal was perhaps more due to the large Asian population in the Blackburn 
area which presented a market for the Venky’s to exploit. Therefore, attractiveness of a market 
is not solely related to the size of the market or the amount of local competition (which in the 
case of the latter was a considered to have a detrimental effect in their takeovers).  
 
6.5 Promotion of Individuals and Organisations 
 
As England has shown to be an attractive destination for foreign investors, a further factor 
influencing FDI entering the Premier League might be the desire of some investors to promote 
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themselves, a company, or even at country level. This highlights the importance of both internal 
and external forms of promotion. Both could lead to the creation of indirect profits. In terms of 
internal promotion, some owners purchased a club for publicity reasons:  
 
“You’ve got people that are looking for publicity” (Respondent B) 
 
It was not stated whether foreign owners were seeking publicity for themselves or for their 
company, but through the attractiveness of the Premier League and the television rights 
contracts, a foreign owner is able to achieve greater publicity. This was developed further:  
 
 “Therefore, English football became an attractive prospect because better broadcasting rights 
meant better transmission of the owner’s image” (Respondent D) 
 
While the publicity aspect in one sense can be viewed as non-economic, there was also an 
economic element.  
 
  “Others will see that there is a huge amount of money to be made by either marketing 
themselves or the company that they represent, or that they own through the football club” 
(Respondent D) 
 
“It can be a media play. The Premier League goes out to 212 countries, 700 million homes, 2 
billion individuals and the media value of that is huge, absolutely huge. There is a case to argue 
that the best value for money in terms of that is to buy the club. So one or two from where I’m 
sat anyway look like they’ve done it for the media play, and the marketing advantage to their 
company or whatever it is” (Respondent F) 
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These quotations suggest that publicity was also economic in nature, as foreign investors have 
used football clubs to generate business for elements of the other organisations which they 
control, and further enhanced indirect profits. As the Premier League had unique advantages in 
terms of television coverage and global appeal, the league will provided an ideal platform for 
this:  
 
“But it goes back to the profile of a UK football club” (Respondent E) 
 
The global popularity of the Premier League has also been used by foreign investors to promote 
their business further in their own home market:  
 
  “So I think there’s certainly an element that they’re coming in to just increase brand awareness 
even in their own countries” (Respondent C) 
 
  “Blackburn was a classic example; the company that has bought them produce eggs. Now 
they’re not going to be able to sell them all over the world, so that’s only going to increase their 
brand “we own a Premiership club in England” That’s for brand awareness in their own country” 
(Respondent C) 
 
However, there was also a global element to the Venky’s takeover. The chairperson of the 
Venky’s Group [Anuradha J Desai] stated that part of the reason behind purchasing Blackburn 
was to promote Venky’s image overseas (Hunter, 2010).  
Therefore a difference does exist between these two narratives, but it is evident that the 
Venky’s Group have used Blackburn to promote their company in India through the use of 
friendly matches and cross-promotions. The importance of global elements was also outlined 
further   
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“But a lot of the owners I would say are not really interested in football anyway. So for them it’s 
probably about the global brand” (Respondent B) 
 
The nature of the global brand can be interpreted in two ways, firstly, the purchase of a Premier 
League club can be viewed as accessing a global brand, and secondly, foreign investors have 
sought to build a global brand for themselves or their company through the purchase of a club.  
 
A further element to the promotional aspect is the use of shirt sponsorship to promote a specific 
company:  
 
“Getting the name on the shirt” (Respondent A) 
 
“Manchester City is promoting themselves on the club shirt” (Respondent D) 
 
This narrative highlights a particular method of promotion, and these comments were made in 
relation to Manchester City. However, very few foreign owners have sought to use this 
mechanism to promote companies they control, with the vast majority using shirt sponsorship as 
a method of generating additional income for the club itself.  
 
The external aspect of promotion refers to the promotion of a country or region through 
ownership of a Premier League club. Two examples existed in the Premier League context, with 
the first concerning an attempted takeover of Liverpool by Thaksin Shinawatra in 2004. 
Shinawatra felt the acquisition of a ‘global’ brand as powerful as Liverpool would represent the 
‘crowning glory’ of Thailand’s makeover under his control. Indeed, going further, Shinawatra also 
argued that other developing nations would seek to build a more wide ranging appeal through 
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the purchase of Western brands. This suggested the importance of ‘brand association’, and also 
implied Thailand were taking a quicker approach in this aspect compared to other nations 
(Aglionby, 2004).  
 
This presents a wider economic argument. A Western symbol might have been considered for 
purchase by the government of an emerging market. This essentially replicates a familiar pattern 
of emerging market FDI where a desire to seek symbols as a form of credibility and promotion 
has been noted. It implies that some clubs are more useful due to the strength of their brand 
image.  
 
The second example of country promotion related to Abu Dhabi. The emirate wanted to place 
itself as a ‘global sports hub’, and through ownership of a major Premier League football club, 
such a process could in-effect be ‘fast tracked’ (Montague, 2008).  
 
Again, a familiar emerging market FDI approach was apparent in the case of Manchester City. An 
individual from an emerging market has purchased a Premier League club in order to promote 
their home country. The purchase of Manchester City was part of a wider strategy in Abu Dhabi. 
The extent of the strategy with Manchester City is outlined further:  
 
To those involved in the takeover, one of the influential motives was that the takeover was 
essentially about telling the world about Abu Dhabi. Ownership of Manchester City, which in 
2008 was on the brink of financial crisis, would be about enhancing the image of Abu Dhabi and 
not damaging it. As a result, this would be similar to other investments conducted by Abu Dhabi 
(Conn, 2012).  
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The benefits to Abu Dhabi of the takeover have also been identified elsewhere. The authorities 
in Abu Dhabi soon realised that Manchester City, which had been a personal investment by 
Sheikh Mansour, was the most effective way of shaping the image of Abu Dhabi on an 
international scale. Indeed, the exposure given to individuals involved in the operation of 
Manchester City was far greater than other more lucrative investments undertaken by the Abu 
Dhabi ruling elite (Conn, 2012).  
 
Although Manchester City was purchased by a member of the Abu Dhabi ruling elite, the 
takeover was completed as a personal investment rather than part of a government supported 
investment. As a personal investment it could be argued the enhancement of image for Abu 
Dhabi could be less important, but from the above narrative it was apparent the club was being 
used to promote Abu Dhabi.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Status  
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The motivation of FDI in football for promotional reasons, whereby a foreign investor will seek to 
promote themselves, a company, or a country leads, to a consideration of how FDI could be 
argued to enhance status in a less economic sense. Here we look at the   enhancement of status   
broken down into gaining profile, kudos, gaining prestige, and purchase of a football as a form of 
trophy asset. The first to be considered concerned ‘profile’ and ‘kudos’:  
 
“There’s more for profile and kudos really” [in football] (Respondent A) 
 
  “Abramovich and Sheikh Mansour are in the latter camp (Profile and Kudos), neither of them 
needs the investment to be a success. Abramovich presumably just a huge sports fan, a huge 
football fan” (Respondent A) 
 
  “Al-Fayed and probably with Abramovich, it’s more of getting the profile of themselves 
established in the UK” (Respondent E) 
 
Because of the wealth of investors such as Sheikh Mansour, Mohamed Al-Fayed, and Roman 
Abramovich, their investment into football does not need to generate an economic return for 
them. Hence, they are able to pursue other motives when owning a football club such as profile 
enhancement. Through club ownership, foreign investors become associated with a particular 
club and this enhances the awareness of these individuals.  
 
Status also refers to the prestige of club ownership. In the questionnaire, prestige of ownership 
was outlined as a strong reason behind the investment into the respondent clubs. These answers 
were supported by those from the domestically owned questionnaire, where both respondents 
suggested prestige was a strong motivation for foreign investors who become involved in English 
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football. Indeed, the ownership of a football club would then positively benefit their status in 
business:  
 
  “Owning a football club is a statement that you’re at a certain level as a businessman” (Dan 
Jones in Mainwaring, 2010) 
 
From the primary data there was no such reference to status in these terms. However, the 
rarities of such purchases were noted: 
 
“Owning a Premier League football club is one of those things that not many people can do” 
(Respondent F) 
 
Despite being framed in different terms, this indicates those investors who have control of a 
Premier League club will also have a strong status as businessmen. This then enables wealth and 
success to be displayed, which enhances the status of the investor.  
 
Another method of considering prestige of ownership might be to view the football club as a 
form of trophy asset:  
 
“For want of a better term the trophy asset” (Respondent F) 
 
The use of the word trophy in a sporting context is normally linked to success through the 
winning of leagues and cup competitions. That the club itself might be viewed as a form of 
trophy suggests that the acquisition of a football club might have to do with the enhanced the 
image of an owner: 
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“Owning a Premier League football club is one of those things that not many people can do. So 
you can argue that there are one or two people who have done if for trophy reasons” 
(Respondent F) 
 
This reflects elements of an intuitive understanding of scarcity and status with the limited 
availability of Premier League clubs and the extent to which the ownership of one of them 
provided a significant level of prestige to an owner.  
 
Although the clubs were viewed as a form of trophy, differences emerged. For instance greater 
trophy benefits were present in the purchase of some Premier League clubs than others:   
 
“I think for many of the clubs, it is a trophy club; some people want to say I’m the owner of 
Manchester United; I’m the owner of Arsenal” (Respondent D) 
 
The clubs with the strongest reputations and performance were more of a trophy than those 
clubs who do not reach the same performance levels, or have the same level of reputation. 
There was then a link back to the trophy as a form of success, as those clubs which generated 
the most success will generate the most prestige for an owner.  The notion of a club being a 
form of status symbol and trophy was taken further, with a notion of some mimetic behaviour:  
 
 “I think its trophy buying. It’s trophy hunting that’s all. And I mean five years ago it was all motor 
racing and they were trying to buy Formula One teams and stuff like that” (Respondent C) 
 
“I think it’s very much trophy buying. It’s seen as the new Rolex” (Respondent C) 
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Through such arguments surrounding status, the purchase of a football club might be viewed as 
a form of conspicuous consumption.  
 
A further element of status refers to football clubs as a form of ‘plaything’  
 
  “They were investing in them as playthings, as toys, as something to have as opposed to 
Ferrari’s and luxury yachts” (Respondent D) 
 
The use of the phrases such as ‘toy’ or ‘plaything’ suggests that the investment did not have to 
make a return, and the investments are driven by non-economic motives as a form of trophy and 
status.  
 
6.7 Political Motives 
 
Promotion and status have been shown to be motives held by some foreign investors who have 
entered the Premier League. Both of these elements generated additional benefits for a foreign 
investor in their other business operations. However, political motives might also be present in 
the acquisition of some football clubs. Purchasing a football club was a method of trying to 
secure greater political protection:  
 
“I think there’s political reasons why people get involved with football clubs” (Respondent B) 
 
“I don’t doubt there’s something there in Fulham” (Respondent B) 
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 “I think with Al-Fayed, I think probably with Abramovich it’s more of getting the profile of 
themselves established in the UK… they’re almost classed as UK citizens even if they’re not.  
Without saying too much, that’s what they want to do. They want to ring fence themselves” 
(Respondent E) 
 
To ‘ring fence’ suggests a protection of assets, but here the idea is phrased with an emphasis on 
the individual rather than on assets. The discourse surrounding citizenship and the link to 
Fulham is of particular relevance as Mohamed Al-Fayed had sought to secure British citizenship. 
Furthermore, ownership of Manchester City was intended to be a vehicle which enabled Thaksin 
Shinawatra to gain asylum in the United Kingdom. If asylum would have been granted this would 
have provided additional protection for Shinawatra in the event of extradition claims 
(Williamson, 2007). In the end, circumstances changed and asylum was not granted.  
 
A second political motive related to the use of a football club to promote political interests in the 
foreign investor’s home market. Just one instance of this has arisen, through Thaksin Shinawatra 
and his ownership of Manchester City. Manchester City were used by Shinawatra for “political 
grandstanding” in Thailand. This took advantage of the Premier League’s popularity in Thailand 
where millions of people regularly watch matches from the division. Furthermore, Shinawatra 
would regularly entertain crowds of Thai politicians and dignitaries at the City of Manchester 
Stadium (Conn, 2012).  
 
Through the ownership of Manchester City, Shinawatra tried to portray himself as a “wounded 
hero of democracy” (Marshall, 2007), presenting himself as a democratically elected leader 
overthrown in a military coup. Due to the significant interest in the Premier League, ownership 
of a Premier League club was a strategy used to promote this agenda.  
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A final element behind the political motives of FDI was the competition between Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai which influenced the takeover of Manchester City. They were competing to be global 
players, and this created a rivalry between the two emirates. The takeover of Manchester City 
was partly influenced by the move of DIC [Dubai Investment Capital], which is the investment 
arm of Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund, initially moving (unsuccessfully) to take a Premier League 
club over first  (Montague, 2008).  
 
The desire to promote Abu Dhabi was not to just improve the image of the Emirate, or to 
enhance tourism, instead there was a desire was to upstage Dubai. What was unclear from this 
narrative is whether the takeover would have taken place had DIC not elected to try and 
purchase a Premier League club first. There was also a sense Abu Dhabi would have been left 
behind if they were not able to purchase a Premier League club. Previously, Dubai had embarked 
on a number of projects (sport and non-sport related) before Abu Dhabi reacted with projects of 
its own (Montague, 2008). In a sense, the takeover of Manchester City by Sheikh Mansour 
reflects the importance of first-mover advantages in this particular instance.  
 
Within the questionnaires, political motives were not openly discussed by foreign investors 
when purchasing football clubs. Despite this, a wider discourse was present in some elements of 
the media and with some club insiders. However, foreign investors and some club insiders may 
not have been willing to discuss any political motives openly. This would generate doubts about 
the motives and interests held by the foreign investor, and their true intentions behind club 
ownership.  
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6.8 Sporting Motives  
 
The motives mentioned so far imply aspects that are mostly outside the field of play, but these 
motives can be influenced by the level of sporting success gained by a team. For instance, the 
winning of trophies will benefit a foreign investor’s profile, and also helped to generate greater 
revenues. As a result, the next group of motives to be considered relate to sporting aspects or 
sporting success. The first factor considered within this group will be those owners who 
purchased a club in order to pursue success:  
 
  “It’s the little boy in us” (Steve Morgan, 2012)  
 
Although Steve Morgan is a domestic club owner, his choice of phrase outlines an enthusiasm 
which motivates an investor to become involved in football, regardless of nationality.  
This narrative suggested some investors did not wish to give up on football even though they 
couldn’t play the game at a professional level. Later success in business has enabled them to 
purchase a football club, which was viewed as the next best choice to playing. Implicit in this 
statement, is the importance of sporting objectives to these types of owners. The nature of 
childhood enthusiasm was drawn out in relation to Mohamed Al-Fayed and Fulham. He noted 
that one of his favourite childhood pastimes was football, and that the played regularly on the 
beaches of Alexandria in Egypt. Additionally, Al-Fayed was also a follower of English football in 
particular (Al-Fayed.com, no date).  
 
Again, the attractiveness of English football was brought out in this narrative, but the suggestion 
of purchasing a club being the next best choice to playing was evident. A similar theme was 
present with Sheikh Mansour, although he had previous experience of being involved with 
professional football clubs.  
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Sheikh Mansour has argued that he had a “lifelong passion” for football, and that he had played 
football in the past. He also stated that he had become more involved with the running of the Al 
Jazeera football club which is based in Abu Dhabi (mcfc.co.uk, 2009).  
 
When considering the responses to the questionnaire, interest in football was considered as a 
very strong motivation in the purchase of both foreign owned clubs. In support of this, one of 
the domestically owned respondents also noted the importance of a passion for football in 
influencing the takeover of the club. This view was not unanimous, as another respondent from 
a domestically owned club did not consider a passion for football as influential in influencing 
football FDI.   
 
Further support for interest in football as a motive, was claimed in the case of Roman 
Abramovich and Chelsea:  
 
  “Abramovich does genuinely like football, and I genuinely think he wants to win things” 
(Respondent E) 
 
“Abramovich is presumably just a huge sports fan, a huge football fan” (Respondent A) 
 
This reflected an earlier argument made by Abramovich himself, which included a complete 
rejection of any profit motives: Abramovich stated his takeover of Chelsea was not about making 
money. Indeed, he also reflected that there are “less risky” ways of generating a return than a 
football investment. Of more importance was winning trophies, and having “fun” (Randall, 
2003).  
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So it was not only the interest in football, but the purchase of a football club was motivated by a 
desire to secure on-field success. The pursuit of success was noted in both of the domestically 
owned questionnaires as an influential motive behind football FDI. Further support for this 
narrative was outlined in the case of Sheikh Mansour at Manchester City. Sheikh Mansour 
argued that one of the reasons behind his love of football was “the feeling that success can 
bring” (mcfc.co.uk, 2009).  
 
This description highlights the different dimension behind FDI in the explanation when 
compared to the arguments surrounding ‘winning things’. However, success was not defined in 
the above statement, so it is not clear as to what is considered as “success”. Ultimately though 
what is termed as success will be dependent upon the size of club, availability of resources, and 
playing talent.  
 
Both of the responses from the foreign owned clubs indicated that the challenge of owning a 
club was highly important in influencing football FDI. In contrast, the responses from the 
domestically owned clubs ranked this aspect as being less important. In support of the responses 
from the foreign owned questionnaire, Sheikh Mansour stated the desire to improve 
Manchester City’s performance was a motive behind his takeover of the club. Stating 
Manchester City to be a “sleeping giant”, Sheikh Mansour suggested that waking the “giant” 
would generate a range of different rewards (mcfc.co.uk, 2009).  
 
The use of the term “sleeping giant” reflected a phrase that has been commonly used in English 
football. This describes “large” clubs who have failed to achieve playing success, or have not 
achieved the same level of success as in the past. As a result, those in football talk of 
“awakening” the sleeping giant and achieving success. To some this is a challenge, and if 
successful it represents a significant benefit to their image and status both within and outside of 
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football. However, “sleeping giants” also offer an economic motive, as the size of the club gives 
an owner the chance to generate economic benefits. Indeed, the growth potential, often 
associated with sleeping giants represented a motivation from some foreign investors, but the 
respondents to both the questionnaires did not have a unanimous view. Hence, other investors 
have sought to purchase an already successful “giant” like Manchester United.  
 
But was the industry of football really important? One of the responses from the domestically 
owned questionnaire implied an interest or passion for football was of less importance than 
other factors. A similar narrative was also present in the interviews:  
 
“But a lot of the owners I would say are not really interested in football anyway” (Respondent B) 
 
In contrast to other comments, this narrative implies other non-sport issues are more important 
to the foreign investor. This narrative was extended to include Manchester United:  
 
“I don’t think the Glazers are doing it for any altruistic supporter (Reasons)… they weren’t 
Manchester United fans since they were knee-high in Denver” (Respondent A) 
 
Whilst this did not completely reject the football/sporting motives, this statement suggested a 
greater importance was placed on economic objectives. To further highlight perspectives 
surrounding a lack of interest in football, Mohamed Al-Fayed was said to have shown no interest 
in Fulham prior to 1997:  
 
  “Al-Fayed had no interest in the history of Fulham, and prior to the takeover had shown no 
interest in the club” (Respondent D) 
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  “Some of Al-Fayed’s comments about the Manchester United of the South were just indicative 
of the fact that he was rather fanciful and didn’t know anything about football (Respondent D) 
 
This contradicts the comments on Al-Fayed’s official website. This states that to Al-Fayed, 
football is a passion, and after living in the Fulham area for a number of years, the gravitational 
pull of Fulham was too much to resist. As a result, Al-Fayed purchased the football club and the 
freehold of the clubs stadium, Craven Cottage (Fulham fc.com, no date).  
 
The implication from this statement is Al-Fayed held an interest in Fulham, hence the use of the 
term “gravitational pull”. However, the narrative concerning a lack of knowledge was not 
addressed by these comments. Interest in football does not equate to a vast understanding of 
the game and how to operate a club. As a result, there is some confusion surrounding sporting 
motives in this case.  
 
Therefore, two broad elements could exist. Firstly, there are those owners (such as Roman 
Abramovich or Sheikh Mansour) who treated their investment as a mostly non-economic entity, 
with interest in football an important motive which influenced the FDI decision. In contrast, the 
second element contains owners such as the Glazer family, where the pursuit of economic 
objectives was a critical factor in influencing the takeover.  
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6.9 Regulatory Factors  
 
With business acumen, financial motives, club availability, attractiveness of English football, 
promotion, status, political motives, and sporting motives having been considered as potential 
motives, the final group of potential motives behind FDI entering the Premier League to be 
discussed concerned regulation.   
 
Regulation could be divided in two broad areas. Firstly, there was the general regulatory 
framework and secondly there has been the influence of football specific regulation. 
Considering, the general regulation first:  
 
  “The other of course, at least in our opinion is the hopeless lack of financial regulation, and the 
ease with which England is used, as money can be siphoned out of England through straight 
forward tax evasion or tax avoidance” (Respondent D) 
 
Weaknesses in the regulatory framework of the UK as a whole have presented an opportunity 
for foreign investors to enter English football. The UK is open to FDI across a variety of sectors, 
and football is seemingly no different.  
 
Nonetheless, there has then been the influence of football specific regulations. This was noted in 
one of the responses from the domestically owned questionnaire to be a significant incentive in 
influencing the football FDI decisions. This explanation was taken further:  
 
“Well there’s no regulatory aspect that’s the whole problem” (Respondent C) 
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The implication was weak (football) regulation encouraged FDI to enter the Premier League. 
Using an analogy of the Metropolitan Police this was taken further:  
 
 “You know it’s exactly the same as the Met (Metropolitan Police). We make the rules so if we 
decide who doesn’t want to abide by them; we’ve made the rules so it doesn’t matter” 
(Respondent C) 
 
“At the moment you’ve got the kids running the sweetshop is the classic analogy of it. And they 
[Premier League clubs] also have four places on the FA (Football Association) board, so hang on a 
minute the people who are policing the policing of the police are actually the police” (Respondent 
C) 
 
To some degree this also highlighted how regulatory bodies have been captured by Premier 
League clubs, and by association the league itself. Thus, power held by the FA in relation to the 
ownership of football clubs is diluted by the presence of club directors who had an involvement 
in the Premier League. This places the balance of power with the Premier League clubs rather 
than the FA, and as a result, any decisions on ownership regulation will be biased towards the 
desires of the clubs themselves.  
 
A suggestion that regulation was weaker in England compared to other European nations was 
also drawn out:  
 
“[The regulation is] still a long way behind some of the other leagues” (Respondent B) 
 
“There are no caps on what money you can take out of football clubs in this country, which exist 
elsewhere” (Respondent D) 
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Those foreign investors who have sought to generate returns have been able to do so in some 
cases by taking money directly out of their club (i.e. the use of consultancy fees at Manchester 
United). FDI is less attractive in those countries where stronger regulations exist in this aspect. 
So strong regulation in other nations has helped to direct the flow of FDI:  
 
“Well Bundesliga wouldn’t give them control and influence that they want, so that’s out for a lot 
of them” (Respondent B) 
 
The vast majority of Bundesliga clubs (aside from the former ‘works’ teams), must allow 
supporters to hold a controlling share in the club. A foreign investor is not able to take a majority 
shareholding in a Bundesliga club, hence this option would not allow them to internalise all 
economic or non-economic benefits of club ownership. Other restraints to foreign investment 
existed in parts of Spanish football (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006).  
 
When specifically looking at the fit and proper persons test, a variety of respondents (whether 
club insiders or supporters) identified further weaknesses in this regulation. There have been 
only limited examples of individuals failing the test in the Premier League and Football League. 
There are some cases where investors passed the test despite concerns surrounding their 
motives:  
 
“ There have been far worse subsequently, Shinawatra being the main one, and the owners, 
mythical owners [Ali Al-Faraj] of Portsmouth being another, Syed at Blackburn even though he 
never got to take over the club, clearly he was a very dubious individual…the fit and proper 
person’s test does not work and again is there the will power within the FA to enforce this, and if 
need be to go court and do it, and I don’t think there is”(Respondent D) 
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 “People argue that the fit and proper persons test doesn’t have the teeth it should have and 
there’s perhaps an argument there” (Respondent F) 
 
 “Well from the wings you would have to say it could be improved wouldn’t you; it didn’t do a 
great job at Portsmouth…” (Respondent A) 
 
In two of the three arguments surrounding the weaknesses of the fit and proper persons test, 
specific examples of foreign investors purchasing a Premier League club (or attempting to) were 
drawn out. Although there was a clear narrative about the test not being of the required rigour, 
there is no suggestion made as to how the test could be improved. The non-insiders also strongly 
implied that the FA was a weak regulatory body.  
 
However, not all of the respondents in the questionnaire reflected regulation surrounding club 
ownership to be weak, or an incentive, as there was an argument which suggested the 
regulation to be stronger than in some other industries.  
 
“Well easy is a relative term isn’t it. I mean it’s harder to buy a football club than it is to buy any 
other UK company, limited or PLC. Because UK football clubs are not only subject to company 
law, but there’s also football regs involved as well” (Respondent F) 
 
“But there is a fit and proper persons test in football, and there isn’t in the vast majority of 
industries” (Respondent F) 
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This further draws out the multi-layered nature of regulation involved in football, and the 
difference between football and other industries in the nature of regulation. A further 
explanation was provided about the difficulty of purchasing a club:  
 
“It’s very, very difficult. I saw the chairman of the Football League [Greg Clarke] on that very 
programme [Dispatches], and you saw what his comments were. So it’s not easy. It’s not easy, 
who owns Marks and Spencer’s, who owns various companies, it’s very difficult to say. We live in 
a free market” (Respondent E) 
 
While the previous argument suggested a difference between football and other industry 
sectors, these comments suggested a similarity between football and other industries. The 
implication that “we live in a free market” further enhances the notion of football being similar 
to other industries. In these other industries the disclosure of shareholder identities has been 
more limited than in professional football.   
 
There was also a reticence by some club insiders to discuss regulation of Premier League clubs 
and how it affected the flow of FDI:  
 
 “I don’t know and probably wouldn’t want to comment on that. We run our club sensibly and 
that’s just the way it is. There’s been many, many TV documentaries on this, and there’s many 
ways to skin a cat, and many ways to obtain ownership of a football club” (Respondent E) 
 
This approach was also followed by some of the other questionnaire respondents, who elected 
to use the unsure response when completing the questionnaire. This does raise a further 
question around why these respondents have been unwilling to directly address the issue of 
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regulation. But for the foreign owned clubs, it might be due to the key decision maker not being 
able to respond to the questionnaire.  
 
Other comments suggested that regulation had become stronger due to failures identified in 
club ownership:  
 
“In terms of regulation well it’s catching up I think is one way to say it” (Respondent B) 
 
“I don’t doubt and I know from what I hear that the Premier League is more stringent when 
people approach them to takeover clubs because of the whole Portsmouth incident. (Respondent 
B) 
 
There is not complete agreement on this issue however:  
 
“I’ve not seen anything in writing to say they’ve changed the rules” (Respondent C) 
 
The difference in opinion held by these respondents is potentially driven by their different 
positions. Respondent B was a senior member of staff at Supporters Direct, he is more likely to 
be aware of changes to regulation than Respondent C who did not have access to the same 
channels of information.  
 
The insiders also suggested regulation in England was stronger than some other European 
nations.  
 
“It is easier than buying a football club in other European countries though that’s for sure. Not all 
of them but some of them” (Respondent F) 
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Those countries where it is easier to purchase a club were not identified in this comment. 
Moreover, it was not clear as to whether stronger regulation would make football clubs more 
difficult to purchase despite the obvious implication. Spain was suggested as being an example 
of where purchasing a club was easier:  
 
“Well I am not sure how much easier it is, because there is a bit of a whohar in Spain at the 
moment, in terms of, one of the people that was looking to buy Blackburn…” (Respondent A) 
 
“It’s not been that difficult for him, seemingly without any credible funds to buy into Spain. I’m 
not sure whether it easier or whether it just that much more appealing” (Respondent A) 
 
6.10 Summary  
 
This chapter has used the qualitative data generated in the research to identify and develop a 
range of potential motives which could have influenced the takeover of English Premier League 
clubs by foreign investors. These motives included economic factors such as the ability to apply 
business acumen, revenues, profits, and club availability. Alongside these non-economic factors 
such as profile, status, political, and promotional reasons were also of importance. Additionally, 
the institutional and regulatory frameworks of European football nations were shown to have 
some influence in directing the flow of FDI. Those countries with fewer restrictions on club 
ownership (like England) were shown to have benefitted from a greater inflow of FDI, when 
compared to those countries with more restrictive ownership regimes (like Germany). It has 
indicated that there is a strong sense among insiders that at least a range of non-economic and 
economic motives are involved but that is also difficult to separate these out neatly or weight 
them when considering FDI motivation. 
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The following chapter will address what the consequences on both the clubs and the Premier 
League have been from FDI entering the division.  
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Chapter 7: The Consequences of Football FDI 
 
The previous chapter analysed the motives behind inbound FDI in the Premier League. This 
chapter considers the effects of FDI entering the Premier League. The nature of these effects will 
be considered in three broad groups. The first relates to the sporting consequences of FDI for 
football clubs including the effect on the competitiveness, stature, league standard, and on-field 
productivity. The second group considers football as a business  in terms of revenue, transfer 
costs, wage costs, profits, and debt and  non-financial aspects related to club management 
(elements of both on and off-field), as well as infrastructure (i.e. stadia and training ground 
development). The third group investigates the wider consequences of the investment for local 
regions and supporters. The consequences within these groups will be considered as direct 
effects (on the acquired club), or wider spillover effects (on non-acquired clubs, the league, or 
the local region). These effects can also be expressed as a league effect (e.g. on competitiveness 
or stature).  
 
In order to explore the effects, three case study clubs (Fulham, Manchester City, and 
Manchester United) will be utilised. Alongside the case studies, the primary data will also be 
used to address the effects of FDI. Furthermore, secondary data has also been collected from 
across the Premier League. This data focuses on the period of 2001/2002 to 2010/2011. In this 
period, the vast majority of FDI inflows took place, and as a result, the Premier League was 
transformed from a league where the majority of clubs were domestically owned to where 
around half were controlled by foreign investors.  
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7.1 Sporting Consequences of FDI  
What are the consequences which have arisen from FDI in relation to the sporting aspect of a 
football club?  
 
7.1.1 Competitiveness of the Premier League 
In chapter’s four and five, we saw that sporting competitiveness can be more easily measured 
than many other sporting related economic indicators.  
 
FDI has been claimed to have a positive impact on the competitiveness of the Premier League. In 
contrast to the expected outcome, some have argued that foreign ownership has created a more 
competitive Premier League. However, such changes did not immediately occur (Dimond, 2009).  
 
Clubs under foreign control, who were classed as “mid table” Premier League clubs were able to 
vastly increase spending on wages and transfers as a result of foreign ownership. However, 
Dimond (2009) also suggested that problems encountered by the big four clubs (Manchester 
United, Chelsea, Liverpool, and Arsenal) helped to increase the level of competition at the top of 
the Premier League. Whilst these clubs were not performing as expected under foreign 
ownership, ironically, Dimond (2009) also stated that it was other clubs under foreign ownership 
who were flourishing.  
 
In the qualitative evidence some also suggested FDI has benefitted sporting competitiveness: 
 
“In terms of the competitiveness of the league that is one of its strengths….we used to talk about 
the big four but you’d argue four has perhaps become six now” (Respondent F) 
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“I think to have more competition in the Premier League is good. It’s [FDI] that has shaken up the 
Manchester United Arsenal domination [Chelsea]. Then it’s shaken up the Manchester United 
Chelsea domination” [Man City] (Respondent E) 
 
However, the creation of new duopolies through the entrance of FDI has not necessarily lead to 
greater competition. Instead, one duopoly has been simply replaced by another club. But for 
insiders, even when dominance was recognised, it tended to be treated in a more positive light:  
 
“I Know it’s a negative…. fourteen clubs avoiding something [relegation] but it still heightens 
tensions, makes it exiting, makes it a dynamic league” (Respondent F) 
 
This suggests the existence of sub groups within the Premier League, with fourteen of the 
twenty clubs evenly matched. To some degree this is what occurred in the 2010/2011 season, 
where Fulham in eighth place recorded ten more points than Birmingham who were relegated in 
eighteenth. However, in 2009/2010, the eighth placed club (Everton) scored thirty-one more 
points than the eighteenth placed club (Burnley). For some at least, the Premier League is 
considered as the most competitive in Europe:  
 
“Because it’s [Premier League] the most competitive league” (Respondent F) 
 
Responses from the questionnaire compiled by domestically owned clubs revealed more mixed 
feelings as to whether FDI had affected competitiveness with the Premier League. One 
respondent indicated FDI to have had some effect, but the other considered FDI to have had 
little effect. Nor was it clear whether effects had been positive or negative. Some outsiders 
offered a more critical view of FDI’s effect:  
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      “Somebody will say is there going to be anyone that is going to break into that top six and 
they will just chuck a few names up in the air, knowing full well that it’s not going to happen” 
(Respondent D) 
 
“foreign investment in the Premier League, has financially doped it to the extent that it will be 
the same clubs time and again” (Respondent D) 
 
The implication of this narrative is that it becomes more difficult for clubs outside of the elite to 
compete for top positions in the Premier League. As a result, it is unlikely that clubs from outside 
this group will achieve any sustained long-term success unless they are acquired by a foreign 
investor.   
 
Having established this mostly positive view of the relationship between competitive balance 
and FDI, the next phase of the chapter is to investigate some of the actual measures of sporting 
competitiveness (the Herfindahl Index, C5 Ratio, plus the Lorenz Curve identified in 5.9):  
 
The Herfindahl Index scores from the 1992/1993 to the 2010/2011 season are shown in Figure 
7.1, together with the average Herfindahl Index score over the nineteen seasons (indicated by 
the blue trend line).   
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Figure 7.1: Herfindahl Index 1992-2011 
 
(Source Author Calculations)  
 
The larger figures for the index indicate a decline in competitive balance. According to Michie & 
Oughton (2004) a perfectly balanced, twenty team league should generate a score of 0.05, whilst 
a perfectly unbalanced twenty team league would show a score of 0.07. In relation to the results 
in Figure 7.1, the first three seasons (1992/1993 to 1995/1996), show much lower results but 
this is a twenty-two team Premier League, which reduces the Herfindahl Index (Michie & 
Oughton, 2004).  
 
The period of interest for this study is from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011, when foreign ownership 
became more prominent. In this period, the competitive balance score has risen above from the 
0.05 perfectly balanced score. The scale of the decline between 2001/2002 and 2007/2008 was 
3.6%, a level which Michie & Oughton (2004) consider to be significant. In contrast, the 
2010/2011 season recorded a significant improvement in competitive balance, with the index 
dropping below the average. Indeed, this was a highly significant 8.8% improvement in 
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competitive balance on the 2007/2008 season. This result does not fit within the pattern of the 
other seasons, and is more likely to be an outlier, rather than an indication of a long-term trend 
of improved competitive balance.  
 
A further way we saw that competitive balance can be analysed is through the C5 Ratio. The C5 
Ratio compares total points gained by the top five clubs relative to points gained by the rest of 
the Premier League.  This is shown in Figure 7.2 for each season from 1992/1993 to 2010/2011:  
 
Figure 7.2 C5 Ratio from 1992 to 2011 
 
(Source: Author Calculations)  
 
Over the nineteen season period of the Premier League, the average C5 Ratio score was 0.35 
(highlighted by the blue trend line), but again, the key seasons under investigation are from 
2001/2002 onwards. In this period, the ratio has generally increased. As the volume of FDI 
increased during the mid-2000’s, this pushed the C5 Ratio to 0.37 (37%) in 2005/2006 and 
2009/2010, and 0.38 (38%) in both 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. Thus, 38% of the total points 
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scored in this season were received by the top five clubs who at this stage were mostly foreign 
owned. As with the Herfindahl Index, the C5 Ratio also declined in 2010/2011, and recorded a 
score of 0.34 (34%). This 4% decline from the peak seasons indicates that the top five clubs were 
receiving fewer points despite four of the five clubs being foreign owned. FDI, therefore, has 
impacted upon the total points gained by the top five clubs, but as FDI continued to flow to clubs  
outside of the top-five this did not radically improve the points distribution until 2010/2011 (as 
shown with the decline in the C5 Ratio).  
 
A further way to use the C5 Ratio is to calculate the number of points gained by the bottom five 
clubs.  
 
Figure 7.3: C5 Ratio for Bottom Five Clubs 1992-2011 
 
(Source: Author Calculations)  
 
The bottom five clubs have generally achieved a lower proportion of points over time. Many of 
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which affected their ability to compete with foreign owned clubs. The average over the nineteen 
seasons of the Premier League was 0.17 (17%). From 2005/2006 onwards there was only a single 
season (2010/2011), which recorded a result in excess of this figure.  
 
The C5 Ratio does not consider the spread of points across the division.  The spread of points can 
be investigated by using the Lorenz Curve, and the analysis of this in response to the Premier 
League is split into two sections. The first relates  to the period between 1995/1996 and 
2002/2003,  prior to the arrival of Roman Abramovich and when only two clubs (Fulham and 
Wimbledon) were foreign owned (this was also the period was when twenty teams per season 
were competing in the Premier League).  
 
Figure 7.4: Lorenz Curve 1995/1996 to 2002/2003 
 
 
The black trend line indicates the optimal level of points which should be gained by teams within 
a twenty team league. Those seasonal lines which are further away from this trend line have a 
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weaker competitive balance. For example, 2001/2002 has a weaker competitive balance than 
1997/1998 on this measure.  
 
Figure 7.5 shows the Lorenz Curve results from 2003/2004 to 2010/2011 when FDI became more 
prominent in the Premier League, and 2003/2004 marked the entrance of Roman Abramovich as 
the owner of Chelsea:  
 
Figure 7.5: Lorenz Curve 2003/2004 to 2010/2011 
 
 
Compared to Figure 7.4, the majority of the seasonal lines are further away from the black 
optimal point’s distribution line. Moreover, in Figure 7.4, the seasonal lines have a steeper shape 
than those in Figure 7.5 indicating a mostly better competitive balance than in Figure 7.5.   
 
From these three measures of competitive balance (Herfindahl Index, C5 Ratio, and Lorenz 
Curve) we see that contrary to the insider views, competitive balance is shown to have declined 
in the Premier League following the arrival of FDI. FDI has helped to create more of a ‘closed 
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shop’ at the top of the Premier League. The resource advantages held by these clubs meant that 
it was extremely unlikely that a club without such advantages would be able to mount a 
challenge for the top positions.  
 
7.1.2 League Sporting Stature  
 
The impact that FDI inflows have had on this factor is much more subjective, and is more difficult 
to measure than competitiveness.  Respondents from foreign owned clubs suggested   a positive 
relationship   between FDI and league stature. Conversely, the respondents from the 
domestically owned questionnaire suggested that   FDI had a limited effect.  
 
“I don’t think you could say that foreign investment particularly has helped, but [increased] 
investment has helped” (Respondent A) 
 
“That’s sort of a virtuous circle….where the money is allowing the foreign stars to come-in, to 
keep the product as good as it is to keep the money coming in” (Respondent A) 
 
“If you want to see the best players [come to the Premier League] (Respondent B) 
 
 “Obviously a chance for some of the fans to see some of the better players in the world perform 
in their league rather than ending up in Spain or Italy, which has been the traditional thing. I 
think it’s created a greater demand for the game” (Respondent D) 
 
The stature of the Premier League was also thought to be enhanced globally as a result of FDI:  
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  “..you want a football league and clubs that are known worldwide, then undoubtedly it’s [FDI] 
been a success” (Respondent B) 
 
  “There has been an increasing globalisation of the league in the last half a dozen years. It 
started prior to that. It’s a fair question to say has that been aided by foreign ownership? 
(Respondent F) 
 
“It is as we call it the global league” (Respondent F) 
 
“It’s [Premier League] purely the biggest league” (Respondent D) 
 
The increase in stature created a demand for what was termed   ‘tourist football’ by one 
respondent:  
 
  “Fulham has been able to increase its fanbase more I believe by word of mouth…I would say 
tourist football” (Respondent D) 
 
Although this latter comment dealt with a club-specific issue, the greater status of the Premier 
League has had a different impact across different clubs in the Premier League. Therefore, an 
increase in league driven by FDI will benefit different types of clubs in the division, although in 
the case of Fulham, the clubs London location would also have been a factor influencing football 
tourism.  
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7.1.3 League Standard of Play 
 
Another consequence of FDI might be its impact upon league standard. This again is hard to 
measure objectively.  The responses from both the foreign and domestically owned 
questionnaires suggested that FDI had positively affected the standard of Premier League 
matches  
 
 “On the whole yes….you go through the twenty teams, the standard of the squad of players on 
the whole is generally better than it was say ten years ago” (Respondent E) 
 
  “[An improvement in standard] at the top end probably, more than the bottom end, but a 
general improvement throughout” (Respondent E) 
 
A contrasting argument, suggesting that FDI had not benefitted the standard of play also existed:  
 
“I actually ask people to look at the standard of the Premier League, and say look at how many 
games we won last season to win the league compared with how many we had to win three 
years previously. That to me says the standard has gone down” (Respondent C) 
 
“I don’t think that it is the low ones getting better. I think it’s the top four, top five getting worse” 
(Respondent C) 
 
Such comments are not consistent with the evidence that competitive balance had weakened. 
However, other outsiders stated that FDI (and the associated increase in spending) had attracted 
better quality foreign players.  
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“If you want to see the best players [come to the Premier League] (Respondent B) 
 
“Obviously a chance for some of the fans to see some of the better players in the world perform 
in their league rather than ending up in Spain or Italy” (Respondent D) 
 
Such an impact has negative effects for domestic players. In some cases, “weaker” players from 
England will be forced out of the division, and whilst this is positive for the standard of the 
Premier League it lowers the number of English qualified players in the division. This is indicated 
by the number of English players in the top flight declining from 35.43% in 2007/2008 to 32.26% 
in 2013 (BBC, 2013). Moreover, at the formation of the Premier League in 1992, 76% of players 
were English qualified. This figure steadily declined, reaching 47% in 2006/2007, prior to 
dropping below 40% in 2007/2008 (Slater, 2007). However, this process began before the arrival 
of FDI into the Premier League. With the increasing wealth of the Premier League in the 1990’s, 
players such as Dennis Bergkamp, Gianfranco Zola, David Ginola, and Patrick Vieira were 
recruited by Premier League clubs. Indeed, in 1997/1998, Arsenal secured the Premier League 
title with around half of its regular first eleven being foreign players. FDI simply accelerated this 
process (due to the greater availability of resources), and domestically owned clubs have then 
sought to copy foreign owned clubs by signing more foreign players themselves.  
 
Additionally, younger players from youth academies have found their own path to a Premier 
League first-team blocked by the arrival of more foreign players. This raises longer-term 
concerns for the development of the English national team. With the lower percentage of 
English qualified players now playing in the Premier League, it may prove difficult in the future 
for the English national team to be competitive. Whilst the performance of the England team has 
been modest, it is not likely to improve due to the shortage of available players.  
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A further consequence is on other football leagues. Spillover effects are wider than just the 
English system. As the quality of the Premier League increases, the quality of other leagues will 
decline due to the movement of players into the Premier League. Whilst this seems a negative 
consequence, this does allow clubs in other leagues to generate more income. This is particularly 
beneficial for those leagues outside of Europe, or those in smaller European nations which have 
access to substantially lower income streams. It also provides an opportunity for clubs in these 
leagues to introduce younger players into their first-team squad which can then eventually 
benefit the national team.  Also during the early period of FDI entering the Premier League, the 
performance of English clubs in the Champions League improved. This reached a peak during the 
2004/2005-2008/2009 period, where at least one English club reached the final in each season.  
 
As a result of this ‘dominance’ major clubs in Europe reacted through improving their squads. 
The result of this investment, plus additional foreign investment in some other clubs (like Paris-
Saint Germain (PSG)), has changed the balance in the Champions League. So from being in a 
position of strength, the performance of English clubs has declined since 2009 (aside from 
Chelsea in 2012). Without FDI entering the Premier League and improving the standard of the 
top four teams, it is entirely possible that the elite foreign teams may have been slightly more 
restrained in some of their spending undertaken. Additionally, the arrival of FDI at PSG has also 
been replicated by foreign ownership of AS Monaco in the French First Division. So, rather than 
looking at the Premier League, foreign investors have begun (slowly) to purchase clubs in other 
European nations.  
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7.1.4 ‘Football Productivity’  
 
With FDI shown to have mostly positive effects on the status and standard of play in the Premier 
League, a further league wide consequence of FDI relates to productivity. In chapter five, 
productivity in football was defined as point per cost which relates to the economic definition 
surrounding output per person. In sport, output is defined as the number of points gained in a 
season, but the number of points available is a fixed amount constrained by the number of 
matches.  
 
The data for 2002/2003 (last season prior to Abramovich investment) is shown in Table 7.1  
 
Table 7.1: Points Per Cost in the Premier League 2002/2003 
Position  Clubs  Points Wages 
(£m) 
Point Per 
Cost 
Point Per 
Cost Rank 
1 Manchester United 83 79.5 1.04 18 
2 Arsenal 78 60.6 1.29 14 
3 Newcastle United 69 45.2 1.53 9 
4 Chelsea 67 54.6 1.23 16 
5 Liverpool 64 54.4 1.18 17 
6 Blackburn Rovers 60 35.5 1.92 6 
7 Everton 59 29.7 1.99 4 
8 Southampton 52 26.7 1.95 5 
9 Manchester City 51 35.4 1.44 10 
10 Tottenham 50 38 1.32 =12 
11 Middlesbrough 49 29.4 1.67 8 
12 Charlton Athletic 49 23.6 2.08 3 
13 Birmingham City 48 20 2.40 1 
14 Fulham* 48 36.4 1.32 =12 
15 Leeds United 47 56.6 0.83 19 
16 Aston Villa 45 32.3 1.39 11 
17 Bolton Wanderers 44 24.4 1.80 7 
18 West Ham United 42 33.3 1.26 15 
19 West Bromwich Albion 26 11.5 2.26 2 
20 Sunderland 19 34 0.56 20 
(Source: Deloitte, Annual of Football Finance, 2007 and author calculations)  
(* denotes foreign owned club)  
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In 2002/2003, Fulham were the only club owned by a foreign investor. In comparison to other 
clubs who finished above them in the table, Fulham had a much lower point per cost than clubs 
such as Birmingham, Charlton, Middlesbrough, and Everton. Fulham have advantages over these 
clubs through greater access to finance to spend on player wages. This showed Fulham to have 
underperformed relative to the teams around them. However, Sunderland and Leeds (both 
domestically owned) also had low point per cost scores, and had weak on-field productivity.  
 
Table 7.2 displays the point per cost from the 2006/2007 season where seven clubs were under 
foreign ownership.  
 
Table 7.2: Points Per Cost in Premier League 2006/2007 
League 
Position 
Clubs Points Wages in 
2003 prices 
(£m) 
Point Per 
Cost 
Point Per 
Cost Rank 
1 Manchester United* 89 81 1.10 15 
2 Chelsea* 83 116.5 0.71 20 
3 Liverpool* 68 68.1 1 17 
4 Arsenal 68 78.7 0.86 18= 
5 Tottenham 60 38.4 1.56 9 
6 Everton 58 33.7 1.72 5 
7 Bolton Wanderers 56 26.9 2.08 2 
8 Reading 55 26.2 2.10 1 
9 Portsmouth* 54 32.4 1.67 6 
10 Blackburn Rovers 52 32.2 1.61 7 
11 Aston Villa* 50 37.9 1.32 11= 
12 Middlesbrough 46 33.6 1.36 10 
13 Newcastle United 43 49.8 0.86 18= 
14 Manchester City 42 31.9 1.32 11= 
15 West Ham United* 41 38.8 1.06 16 
16 Fulham* 39 30.9 1.26 13 
17 Wigan Athletic 38 24.1 1.58 8 
18 Sheffield United 38 19.7 1.93 3 
19 Charlton Athletic 34 30.1 1.13 14 
20 Watford 28 15.4 1.82 4 
(Source: Deloitte, Annual of Football Finance, 2010 and author calculations)  
(* denotes foreign owned club)  
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In comparison to Table 7.2, the point per cost scores are lower due to the above inflation 
increases in the level of wage spending in this season compared to 2002/2003. However, some 
notable changes in productivity occurred. When considering the domestically owned clubs, it is 
evident from Table 7.2 that the measure of productivity for some clubs declined. One such 
example was Charlton, a club which had become renowned for performing above expectations 
(Haas, 2003). Despite increasing wage spending year-on-year, in 2006/2007, Charlton recorded a 
much lower point per cost score compared to 2002/2003. Whilst, some of this change can be put 
down to the increased wage spend, the fall in the point per cost table indicated a decline in on-
field productivity. Moreover, Charlton were also relegated from the Premier League during 
2006/2007, and this highlights an example of a team being relegated from the Premier League 
since the arrival of foreign investment at rival clubs (like West Ham and Fulham) requiring them 
to spend ever increasing amounts on wages.  
 
Likewise, a significant decline was also present at Newcastle and Manchester City when 
compared to the 2002/2003 season. But what of the foreign owned clubs? The top three league 
finishers in 2006/2007 were owned by foreign investors, but of these three clubs, Chelsea 
recorded a lower point per cost than both Liverpool and Manchester United. This implied 
Chelsea had inferior productivity to the two other finishers in the top three.  Also, using point 
per cost the most productive teams were domestically controlled (Reading, Bolton, Sheffield 
United, Watford, and Everton). Three of the clubs recorded top half finishes despite having 
resources much smaller than rival clubs who finished above and below them in the league table. 
However, Sheffield United and Watford were both relegated, but as newly promoted clubs such 
an event is highly possible due to the imbalance in resources and spending. In the case of 
Sheffield United, they were only five points behind Newcastle United, despite having a real 
terms wage spend which was £30m lower. Although the relegation does not equate to strong 
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on-field performance, Sheffield United were able to get more out of their limited resources than 
Newcastle.  
 
To further explore these issues a third season of data was investigated. This data was taken from 
the 2009/2010 season, where eleven clubs had some form of foreign ownership. These results 
are shown in Table 7.3 
 
Table 7.3: Points Per Cost in Premier League 2009/2010 
League 
Position 
Clubs  Points Wages in 
2003 prices 
(£m) 
Point Per 
Cost 
Point Per 
Cost Rank 
1 Chelsea* 86 141.1 0.61 19 
2 Manchester United* 85 106.8 0.80 =15 
3 Arsenal 75 89.8 0.84 14 
4 Tottenham 70 54.5 1.28 7 
5 Manchester City* 67 108.1 0.62 18 
6 Aston Villa* 64 64.9 0.99 12 
7 Liverpool* 63 98.2 0.64 17 
8 Everton 61 44 1.39 4 
9 Birmingham City* 50 29.8 1.68 1 
10 Blackburn Rovers 50 38.4 1.30 5 
11 Stoke City 47 36.3 1.29 6 
12 Fulham* 46 40 1.15 8 
13 Sunderland* 44 43.5 1.01 11 
14 Bolton Wanderers 39 37.6 1.04 10 
15 Wolverhampton 
Wanderers 
38 
24.1 
1.58 3 
16 Wigan Athletic 36 31.9 1.13 9 
17 West Ham United* 35 43.5 0.80 =15 
18 Burnley 30 18.2 1.65 2 
19 Hull City 30 31.1 0.96 13 
20 Portsmouth* (D) 19 N/A N/A N/A 
(Source: Deloitte, Annual of Football Finance, 2007 and author calculations)  
(* denotes foreign owned club.  D denotes Portsmouth deducted nine points, although wage 
data unavailable)  
 
As with 2006/2007, the first issue to note is that the point per cost ratio is becoming smaller 
across all clubs. This is due to the constant presence of wage inflation in the Premier League and 
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the constraint on total points available. Once again, the league was dominated by foreign owned 
clubs in the top positions, but foreign ownership also proved to be beneficial for some mid-table 
clubs. The most prominent example of this particular case was Birmingham who recorded the 
largest point per cost in the division, indicating a high level of productivity. In contrast the point 
per cost scores at West Ham and Sunderland were lower than clubs which finished in league 
positions around them. This indicated these foreign owned clubs did not make effective use of 
their resources. Some domestically owned clubs displayed strong productivity, such as 
Tottenham, Everton, Blackburn, Stoke, Wolves, and Burnley all had point per cost scores of 1.28 
or higher. On this measure, FDI has been shown to have had a mixed effect on productivity. 
Some clubs have clearly benefitted from foreign ownership, but others have not displayed the 
same benefits. For domestically owned clubs, some have been shown to have improved 
productivity on the field of play despite the presence of foreign owned clubs with greater 
resources, while others such as Charlton and Bolton have seen their productivity decline. Prior to 
FDI entering the Premier League, these two clubs were able to compete with rival clubs which 
had greater resources, but as FDI increased the level of resources available to other clubs, led to 
both Bolton and Charlton being unable to maintain the same level of performance.  
 
With the point per cost of each of the Premier League clubs considered in these three seasons, 
the second method of measuring productivity was to compare wage spending and league finish 
more explicitly.  The average league position is 10.5 (as there are 20 clubs in the division). Hence 
any club with a league position greater than this figure is classed as having higher sporting 
performance, whilst those with a league position below 10.5 were classed as having lower 
sporting performance. This is then compared to the level of wage spending, with the second line 
referring to the average wage costs in the Premier League during a particular season. Any club 
above this line was considered to have an above average wage costs, whilst any club below had 
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below average wage costs. The average wage bill, for 2005/2006 was £42.7m (Deloitte, 2007). 
The data for 2005/2006 is shown in Figure 7.6:  
 
Figure 7.6: Comparison of Total Wages with League Position 2005/2006 
 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007). For Initials see Appendix four.   
 
Figure 7.6 splits the combination of wage spend and league position into four quadrants. 
However, the quadrants are not fixed, as seasonal changes in the average total wage spend by 
clubs will impact on the position of these quadrants.  
 
The clubs with higher sporting performance and higher cost are shown in the bottom right of the 
diagram; clubs with lower sporting performance and higher cost are shown in the bottom left 
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shown in the upper right quarter of the diagram, and finally, those clubs with lower sporting 
performance and lower wage costs are shown in the upper left section of the diagram. From the 
2005/2006 data, five clubs (Blackburn (BR), Bolton (BW), West Ham (WH), Tottenham (TH), and 
Wigan (WA)), fit into the higher sporting performance and lower wage cost category. This 
highlights that these four clubs were outperforming their level of wage spending, and suggests 
strong levels of on-field productivity. The majority of the clubs in 2005/2006 fell into the lower 
sporting performance and lower cost quarter of Figure 8.9, with Aston Villa (AV) close to falling 
into the higher cost and lower sporting performance quarter. Figure 7.7 shows the comparison 
of wage spending to league position for the 2008/2009 season:  
 
Figure 7.7: Comparison of Total Wages to League Position in 2008/2009 
 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2010). For Initials see Appendix four.    
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Four of the five clubs identified as having lower wage costs and higher sporting performances in 
the 2005/2006 season are no longer in this quadrant of the diagram. Wigan, Bolton, and 
Blackburn all have below average wage bills, but they are no longer performing at an above 
average level in the Premier League. West Ham now had an above average wage spend. In this 
quadrant, Everton, Tottenham, and Fulham are now present. In the lower sporting and higher 
wage costs quarter (bottom of the quadrant) Newcastle is the only club, although two foreign 
owned clubs (Portsmouth and Manchester City) are close to entering this quarter. There were no 
clubs in this category in 2005/2006.  
 
Turning now to the 2010/2011 season when ten clubs were under foreign ownership (see Figure 
7.8), shows further developments.  
 
Figure 7.8: Comparison of Total Wages with League Position 2010/2011 
 
(Source: Deloitte, 2012 Annual Review of Football Finance).  For Initials see Appendix four.   
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The data from 2010/2011 displays three clubs (Everton (E), Fulham (F) and Sunderland (SU)) 
which all had above average league finishes and below average wage spend. These clubs are 
shown in the upper right quarter of the diagram. When comparing the data with 2005/2006, it is 
evident that clubs such as Blackburn (BR), Bolton (BW), Wigan (WA), and West Ham (WH) are all 
displaying lower levels of productivity on the field of play. These four clubs are now in the upper 
left quarter of Figure 7.8, which reflects lower sporting performance and lower wage costs. In 
contrast, Everton are a domestically owned club which have continued to perform above 
expectations, and they are shown to have a strong level of on-field productivity.  
 
The results from this data indicate that football productivity is dynamic, with seasonal variances 
in the level of on-field productivity at every club as well as long term effects. However, of those 
clubs which remained in the same quadrant, all of the clubs were in the high wage high 
performance group. These clubs were Chelsea, Manchester United, Arsenal, and Liverpool, and 
this reflects an ‘inbuilt’ advantage held by the largest clubs over the rest in the Premier League.  
 
As a result, the overall picture from this data implies mixed effects. Some domestically owned 
clubs (like Everton) have improved their on-field productivity despite holding resource 
disadvantages when compared to other clubs. However, other clubs (such as Charlton or Bolton) 
have not been able to sustain strong levels of productivity as FDI entered the Premier League has 
increased, further highlighting the dynamic effects. Not all foreign owned clubs have shown 
strong on-field productivity (i.e. West Ham under Icelandic ownership). Such a situation 
contradicts those in the wider FDI literature who have suggested foreign owned firms to have 
greater productivity than domestic firms.  
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7.1.5 Performance of foreign owned clubs-on field  
 
The final sporting aspect to be considered in this chapter is the effect FDI has had on the on-field 
performance of clubs in the Premier League. This considers the league finishes of clubs across 
the division.  
 
The Premier League title has been won by a foreign owned club in each season from 2004/2005 
onwards, with Arsenal the last domestically owned club to have won the Premier League title in 
2003/2004. Since that period, Chelsea have won three titles (2004/2005, 2005/2006, and 
2009/2010), and Manchester United have won four (2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2008/2009, and 
2010/2011). When considering the clubs finishing in the top four positions (thereby qualifying 
for the Champions League), this was dominated by foreign owned clubs from 2006/2007 
onwards. In 2006/2007, 2007/2008, and 2008/2009, three of the top four league finishers were 
foreign owned clubs with Arsenal the only exception. In 2009/2010, this was reduced to two 
clubs (Arsenal and Tottenham who were not foreign owned), but in 2010/2011 all four of the 
Champions League qualifiers were foreign owned clubs. Foreign ownership does not guarantee 
success but at the bottom end of the Premier League by 2010/2011, only Wimbledon 
(1999/2000), Derby (2007/2008), Portsmouth (2009/2010), and Birmingham (2010/2011) have 
been relegated while under foreign control.  
 
 At the three case clubs, FDI had a positive effect on sporting performance. The league finishes 
for the three case clubs (from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011) are shown in Table 7.4.  
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Table 7.4 Case Clubs League Finishes 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Season Fulham’s League 
Finishes 
Manchester City’s 
League Finishes 
Manchester 
United’s League 
Finishes 
2001/2002 13 1 (Division One) 3 
2002/2003 14 9 1 
2003/2004 9 16 3 
2004/2005 13 8 3 
2005/2006 12 15 2 
2006/2007 16 14 1 
2007/2008 17 9 1 
2008/2009 7 10 1 
2009/2010 12 5 2 
2010/2011 8 3 1 
 
At Fulham, improvements in on-field performance due to the arrival of FDI were noted:  
 
“They have improved; obviously the league form, getting to the Europa League final has been 
excellent, and that has been a major plus (Respondent D) 
 
“We’ve [Fulham Fans] not been angry in the sense that we’ve not got into the Champions 
League, getting into the Europa final is more than probably any post-war Fulham fan would ever 
have considered. What we would like to do, the only thing that really disappointed the fans prior 
to that was the feeble showing in the FA Cup semi-final” (Respondent D) 
 
In the period before Al-Fayed’s investment, Fulham had languished in the lower divisions of the 
Football League. However, since promotion to the Premier League in 2001/2002 they have not 
been relegated. In only two seasons (2006/2007 and 2007/2008) did Fulham face a serious 
threat of relegation. As a result, the performance of the club in foreign control was much 
improved compared to the final seasons of domestic ownership.  
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At Manchester City, performance also improved significantly under foreign control. Before the 
club’s takeover by Thaksin Shinawatra in 2007, Manchester City finished fifteenth and 
fourteenth in the Premier League. The lowest finish under foreign control has been tenth in 
2008/2009. In comparison, the highest finish under domestic control was eighth in 2004/2005.  
In contrast to the other two case clubs, Manchester United was already highly successful under 
domestic ownership. However, under foreign control, Manchester United has continued to 
generate success on the field of play. In the final two seasons of domestic ownership, 
Manchester United finished third in both seasons (2003/2004 and 2004/2005), but under foreign 
control the lowest league position was second. Alongside this league success, Manchester 
United also won the Champions League (2007/2008), and reached two further Champions 
League finals (2008/2009 and 2010/2011). Under domestic control from 2001/2002 to 
2004/2005, the best Champions League performance was a semi-final place in 2002/2003. 
However, as highlighted earlier in the chapter, the resources committed to transfer spending by 
the Glazer family were much lower than other foreign investors.  A wider argument about 
Manchester United’s ability to compete with other ‘elite’ clubs also existed:   
 
“Because we’ve [Manchester United] been taught a lesson twice by them [Barcelona] in the last 
three years” (Respondent C) 
 
But could Manchester United’s recent success be down to other factors?  
 
“I don’t disagree we’ve [Manchester United] done well. I actually ask people to look at the 
standard of the Premier League, and say look at how many games we [Manchester United] won 
last season to win the league compared to how many we had to win three years previously” 
(Respondent C) 
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 Other factors, external to the club obviously influence the on-field performance and the then 
strength of the clubs manager (Sir Alex Ferguson) possibly provided a benefit not supplied by any 
foreign investor.  
 
7.2 Football Business Consequences of FDI  
 
With the sporting context having been considered, the next phase of this chapter will evaluate 
the consequences FDI had on the business of football.   
 
7.2.1 Revenue  
 
The total revenue generated by all twenty member clubs from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 is 
shown in Figure 7.9 
 
Figure 7.9: Total Revenue in the Premier League 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
 
(Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
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From 2001/2002 to 2010/2011, the total revenue generated by all Premier League clubs 
increased by 100.6% from £1.1bn to £2.3bn. In 2001/2002, average revenue for each Premier 
League club was £55m, and by 2010/2011, this had risen to £115m. However revenue was 
unequally distributed. In 2010/2011, six clubs had a turnover greater than £115m. Indeed, these 
six clubs (Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Tottenham, and Manchester City) had 
combined revenue of £1.3bn, 56.5% of the total revenue generated by the twenty clubs. In 
2001/2002 the top six clubs by revenue generated 51.6% of the total revenue in the Premier 
League.  Revenue imbalances were present in the Premier League prior to the arrival of FDI, but 
its arrival has intensified revenue inequality in the Premier League.  
 
Revenue arises through three different aspects (matchday, commercial, and broadcast income). 
Of these three revenue streams, the largest cumulative increase was recorded in broadcast 
income. This increased by 148% from £475m in 2001/2002 to £1.178bn in 2010/2011. 
Commercial revenues increased by 61% from £335m to £542m, and matchday income by 69% 
from £322m to £551m (Deloitte, 2007, 2012).  
 
It was apparent the entry of FDI into the Premier League did not slow down the general pattern 
of revenue growth in the division. However, to what extent has FDI influenced the flow of 
revenue entering the Premier League?  “Openness” to foreign investment has been considered 
as being more beneficial to revenues by the league itself:  
 
 “We have a cosmopolitan approach to players and a cosmopolitan approach to ownership and 
that is paying off” (Richard Scudamore in BBC Business News, 2007) 
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This comment deals specifically with revenues generated from international broadcast deals.  
However, the increase in the value of the domestic rights deal beginning in summer of 2007 was 
influenced by the additional competition in the broadcast market. Previously, Sky Sports was the 
only broadcaster of live Premier League football, but the European Commission ruled this was a 
breach of competition rules (BBC Business News, 2005). The market was opened up to different 
organisations, and the Premier League was forced to sell different packages of matches. So 
rather than the arrival of Roman Abramovich or the Glazer family influencing these revenues, 
competition (by purchases of television rights) in the domestic market could have had a greater 
effect.  
 
Thus, a contradictory argument emerges. Some Premier League insiders suggest that FDI has had 
a positive effect on revenues (particularly in the global context), whilst others suggest that the 
benefits are much less apparent. Similarly, when looking at whether FDI entering the Premier 
League has increased demand or interest in football there is no clear picture available. In terms 
of the wider issue surrounding causality, the growth in revenues was attractive to foreign 
investors in the first instance (in terms of encouraging FDI). Then as the FDI has arrived, this 
made the Premier League even more attractive to broadcasting companies.  
 
 At the club level, commercial performance improvements were noted by one of the two clubs 
under foreign ownership from the questionnaire. But what has happened at the three case 
clubs?  
 
The revenue for the three case clubs (again from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011) is shown in Table 7.5.   
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Table 7.5 Revenues for the three case clubs from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Season Fulham’s Revenue (£m) Manchester City’s 
Revenue (£m) 
Manchester 
United’s Revenue 
(£m) 
2001/2002 32.7 28 148.1 
2002/2003 34.9 49 174.9 
2003/2004 42.9 61.9 171.5 
2004/2005 39.5 60.9 159.4 
2005/2006 37.5 61.8 167.8 
2006/2007 39.7 56.9 212.2 
2007/2008 53.8 82.3 257.1 
2008/2009 67 87 278.5 
2009/2010 77.1 125.1 286.4 
2010/2011 77.1 153.2 331.4 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, and 2012)  
 
At Fulham the period between 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 represented seasons where the club 
was under foreign ownership. Before the arrival of Mohamed Al-Fayed in 1997, Fulham were 
competing in the Football League, and as a consequence were generating much lower revenues 
than at any point in the last ten seasons. Indeed, in 1996/1997, Fulham had revenue of £2.1m, 
which increased to £8m by 2000/2001 (footballeconomy, 2009). This outlines the benefits of 
gaining promotion to the Premier League, but also reflects the importance of Al-Fayed’s 
ownership, as Premier League football would probably not have been possible without his 
investment.  
 
While Al-Fayed’s investment helped to increase revenues through on-field performance  Fulham 
also had increased revenue generated from commercial sources, but despite this, they were 
heavily reliant on broadcast income. In 2008/2009, 64% of the club’s income (£43m) came from 
broadcast rights. Only four clubs (Wigan, Blackburn, Portsmouth, and Stoke) had a higher 
dependency on broadcast income (Swiss Ramble, 2010). In 2010/2011, this figure was still 61.5% 
(Deloitte, 2012), implying a weakness in generating revenue from other sources of revenue.  
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As with Fulham, Manchester City’s revenues grew consistently over the ten seasons between 
2001 and 2011. Significant increases in income were recorded in 2002/2003 (following 
promotion), and 2003/2004 (due to the move to the City of Manchester Stadium).  However, in 
the final seasons of domestic ownership, revenue showed a 7.9% decline in 2006/2007. The data 
from 2007/2008 onwards highlights the period of foreign ownership. A significant increase in 
revenue of 44.6% was recorded in 2007/2008. However the change in revenue was driven by the 
new television deal starting in the summer of 2007. As a result, Manchester City became more 
reliant on this income stream, with 53% of revenue coming from broadcast sources in 
2007/2008, compared to 42% in 2006/2007 (Swiss Ramble, 2011).  
 
Manchester City’s second foreign owner, Sheikh Mansour, took control in September 2008, so 
this had limited impact on the revenues generated in 2008/2009. The impact of this ownership 
change (on revenues) was stronger in 2009/2010. In particular, the new ownership was able to 
increase the revenue generated from commercial sources, implying the ownership from Abu 
Dhabi held ownership advantages in this aspect. In 2010/2011, 42% of Manchester City’s 
revenue came from commercial sources, an increase of 11% compared with 2007/2008. The 
drivers of the additional commercial revenues were partnerships with a range of organisations 
from Abu Dhabi including Etihad Airways and the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority. Commercial 
income reached £65m in 2010/2011 (Swiss Ramble, 2011). These partnerships indicated that 
Abu Dhabi ownership was able to exploit backward linkages (reverse spillovers) to their home 
market, highlighting a set of unique advantages for Manchester City. In total, Manchester City’s 
revenues had increased by 169.2% while under foreign control, and this equates to an 86.1% 
increase from 2007/2008. Another feature of Manchester City’s revenues is they do not include 
any income generated from participation in the Champions League. Thus there is potential for an 
even greater enhancement in revenues.   
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As with Fulham and Manchester City, Manchester United’s revenues have consistently grown 
over the ten-year period identified. However, in the final seasons of domestic ownership 
(2003/2004 and 2004/2005), revenue growth slowed. Indeed, a decline in revenue was recorded 
in both the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 seasons. In contrast, since 2005/2006 (the period of 
foreign ownership), revenue has increased in each season. In total, revenue has increased by 
97.5% during the period of Glazer ownership.  
 
Whilst already being the strongest club (in terms of commercial performance) in the Premier 
League, in foreign ownership, Manchester United has continued to perform strongly in this 
aspect. Indeed, in 2005/2006, the total commercial revenue generated by Manchester United 
was £49m. By 2010/2011, this had increased to £103m (Swiss Ramble, 2012). Manchester 
United’s enhanced performance in their commercial operations is particularly, related to the 
expertise of the Glazer family:  
 
“if you spoke to David Gill [Manchester United CEO] he would say that they’ve benefitted from 
the American ownership. Not through direct investment but through the expertise and 
marketing” (Respondent E) 
 
Panja (2011) too has argued the Glazer family directed investment into the clubs commercial 
operations.   
 
 7.2.2 Wages and Transfer Costs 
 
Whilst in terms of revenue, FDI has been shown to have a positive impact, what about costs? For 
many football clubs the main costs are those relating to wages and transfers.  
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In terms of wages, Table 7.6 shows the total wage spending from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 in the 
Premier League. This table also indicates how the wages have grown over this period:  
 
Table 7.6 Total Wage Spending in the Premier League from 2001 to 2011 
Season Total Wage Spending 
(£m) 
Actual Change (£m) Percentage Change 
2001/2002 706 144 25.6 
2002/2003 761 55 7.8 
2003/2004 811 50 6.6 
2004/2005 785 -26 -3.2 
2005/2006 854 69 8.8 
2006/2007 969 115 13.5 
2007/2008 1,196 227 23.4 
2008/2009 1,325 129 10.8 
2009/2010 1,398 73 5.5 
2010/2011 1,599 201 14.3 
(Source Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2012)  
 
Across the ten seasons covered in Table 7.6, wage inflation has been a constant theme, with just 
a single season (2004/2005) displaying a reduction in wage spending compared with that of the 
previous season.  The largest increases in wage spending were recorded in those seasons where 
new television rights contracts have commenced (2001/2002, 2007/2008 and 2010/2011). The 
one exception to this was 2004/2005, where wage spending declined in comparison to the 
previous season. Therefore, broadcast revenues were influential in deciding how much money 
was spent on wages across the Premier League.  But has FDI also affected the level of wage 
spending?  
 
Some of the respondents from domestically owned clubs felt foreign owned clubs were able to 
fund wage spending to a greater extent than domestically owned clubs:  
 
“By them [foreign owned clubs] seemingly having more money to spend and being prepared to 
spend more money on transfers and salaries” (Respondent A) 
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This is confirmed by data using the case study clubs. The total wage spending for each case club 
is shown in Table 7.7  
 
Table 7.7 Case study clubs wage spending from 2001 to 2011 
Season Fulham’s 
wage 
spending 
(£m) 
% of 
turnover 
(Fulham) 
Manchester 
City’s wage 
spending 
(£m) 
% of 
turnover 
(Manchester 
City) 
Manchester 
United’s 
wage 
spending 
(£m) 
% of 
turnover 
(Manchester 
United) 
2001/2002 30.9 94.5 24.4 87.1 70.8 47.8 
2002/2003 36.4 104.3 35.4 72.2 79.5 45.5 
2003/2004 30.9 72 37.7 60.9 76.9 44.8 
2004/2005 33.9 85.9 37.7 61.9 77 48.3 
2005/2006 30.1 80.3 34.4 55.5 85.4 50.9 
2006/2007 35.2 88.7 36.4 64 92.3 43.5 
2007/2008 39.3 73.2 54.2 65.9 121.1 47.1 
2008/2009 46.2 69 82.6 94.9 123.1 44.2 
2009/2010 49.1 63.9 133.3 106.6 131.7 46 
2010/2011 57.7 74.8 174 113.6 153 46.2 
(Source Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
 
Wage spending at Fulham increased consistently from 2005/2006 onwards, having fluctuated in 
earlier seasons (see Table 7.7). During this early period, Fulham were spending a similar amount 
on player wages as Aston Villa and Everton, both of which were established Premier League 
clubs with larger revenue streams (Deloitte, 2007). Despite having revenue levels amongst the 
lowest in the division, Fulham were amongst the top ten clubs measured by wage spending in 
three out of their first four seasons in the Premier League. It was investment from Mohamed Al-
Fayed, rather than additional revenue which was fuelling much of this spending. The wage to 
turnover ratio was pushed to over 70% in all but two seasons. This 70% figure is of particular 
importance, as Deloitte consider wage spending above this level to require additional outside 
funding. Furthermore, UEFA use 70% as the threshold for the Financial Fair Play regulations. 
Thus, any clubs exceeding this level could face penalties (Deloitte, 2012).  
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At Manchester City, foreign ownership also influenced an increase in wage spending. Between 
2002/2003 and 2006/2007 the total amount spent on player wages was generally consistent 
with even a slight decline of 3.4% between 2004/2005 and 2006/2007. In this same period, 
Manchester City fell from being one of the top six clubs by wage spending to the thirteenth. 
However, the pattern under foreign control was very different. In 2007/2008, wages rose by 
48.9%, with a further increase of 52.4% in the following the season. Both foreign takeovers were 
shown to have major effects on the level of wage spending undertaken by the club. This pushed 
the wage turnover ratio to a level above 100% by 2009/2010, indicating Manchester City were 
wholly dependent on funding from the clubs ownership to fulfil some of their wage obligations.    
 
As with the other two case clubs, wage spending increased at Manchester United following the 
takeover of the club by a foreign investor in 2005. However Manchester United has maintained a 
wage to turnover ratio of below 50% across all but one season. This was due to the clubs ability 
to generate significant revenue from commercial sources. But in comparison to Manchester City, 
the rate of growth (in wages) has been more limited. Between 2004/2005 to 2010/2011, wage 
spending at Manchester United increased by 98.8%, but at Manchester City wage spending 
increased by 378% during the same period.    
 
Elsewhere foreign ownership had an impact upon the league wide changes in wage spending. 
For instance, at Chelsea, the investment from Roman Abramovich enabled wage spending to 
increase by £59.4m between 2002/2003 and 2003/2004. The actual change in wages for this 
season across the Premier League was £50m. Without the arrival of Abramovich, wage spending 
for the whole of the league would have been reduced in this season. Furthermore, of the 
increases between 2009/2010 and 2010/2011, £40.6m of the £201m increase in wage spending 
came from a single club (Manchester City). The combined increases in wage spending at Chelsea, 
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Manchester United, and Liverpool equalled £52m (in 2010/2011). In-fact 46.1% of the total 
increase in wage spending came from five foreign owned clubs.   
 
But what of the effect on domestically owned clubs? Does the entry of FDI affect the wage 
spending conducted by domestically owned clubs? Responses from the primary data suggest the 
arrival of FDI has impacted upon wage spending at domestically owned clubs too. Two 
respondents’ completing the domestically owned questionnaire highlighted a significant effect 
on their club’s wages from FDI entering other clubs.  
 
“The problem is that it can deflect the market…salaries in the UK have gone stupid, and we all 
agree with that” (Respondent C) 
 
“It’s forced clubs to increase their investment by owners who were benefactors and now have 
had to become generous benefactors, and this would apply to clubs domestically owned….This 
far greater pressure on them to match or at least get close to matching the sort of exorbitant 
sums that can be thrown at a problem by Manchester City in particular” (Respondent D) 
 
“The Manchester City effect, has driven wages up at the top end…inevitably it has. Has that 
impacted upon us a bit lower down the league? To a degree there’s always a flow through” 
(Respondent F) 
 
“The bigger effect on us, and again it’s a US investor, would be Sunderland and what they’ve 
done. I would say they’ve had a more inflationary effect on me and this club than Man City has” 
(Respondent F) 
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But what if domestically owned clubs cannot match the wages offered by foreign rivals? Some 
responses from the questionnaire noted the difficulty some domestically owned clubs have 
faced in attracting quality players. This can then impact on the competitive balance of the 
division.  
 
Table 7.8 compares the changes in wage spending across both foreign and domestically owned 
clubs who competed in both the 2001/2002 and 2010/2011 seasons.  
 
Table 7.8 Wage Changes at Premier League Clubs 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Club Actual Change (£m) Percentage Change 
Arsenal* 63 102.6 
Aston Villa* 63.9 206.8 
Blackburn* 20.2 68 
Bolton 37.7 204.9 
Chelsea* 135.3 242 
Everton 28.8 98.6 
Fulham* 26.8 86.7 
Liverpool* 78.8 140.7 
Manchester United* 82.1 116 
Newcastle 21.5 67 
Sunderland* 35.1 136 
Tottenham 54.6 149.2 
West Ham* 22.6 68.3 
(Sources Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
(* and grey shading denotes club had some foreign ownership between 2001 and 2011)  
 
Some domestically owned clubs (i.e. Bolton and Tottenham) had increased wage spending 
significantly over the ten season period suggesting evidence of wage spillover effects.   Such 
increases have led, in some cases, too greater losses and debt, so while the changes were 
positive for players (and for agents) in the Premier League (Jones & Cook, 2014) the same cannot 
be said for club owners operating the club as a business unit.   
 
 221 
With the effect on wages now established the next aspect to be explored concerns transfer fees. 
Table 7.9 shows the total level of transfer spending and the breakdown of this transfer spending 
between domestic and foreign clubs. These figures describe gross spending figures and included 
payments to player agents:  
 
Table 7.9 Total Transfer Spending 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
(Adapted from Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)   
 
In terms of gross spending, there has been a general upward trend over the ten seasons (column 
2), although the pattern was not continuously upward. The seasons where the most transfer 
spending occurred are post the increase of FDI (i.e. from 2005/2006 onwards). However, as with 
wages, other non-FDI related aspects such as broadcasting revenues also influenced the level of 
spending in the transfer market. This created its own inflationary impact.  
 
There have also been changes in the balance between the spending directed towards overseas 
and English clubs. From 2001/2002 to 2005/2006, the balance of spending directed towards 
overseas clubs rose. In 2001/2002, 58.5% of transfer expenditure was to overseas clubs, and by 
2005/2006, this had reached 66%. From 2006/2007 to 2009/2010, the level of expenditure 
directed towards overseas clubs gradually declined, as more spending was conducted within the 
English market. In 2006/2007, 63.1% of transfer expenditure went to overseas clubs, but by 
Season Overall Total 
(£m) 
Total to other 
English 
Total to non-
English 
Percentage 
Change 
01/02 407 169 238 -4% 
02/03 203 91 112 -50% 
03/04 414 151 263 +103% 
04/05 368 123 245 -11% 
05/06 483 164 319 +31% 
06/07 578 213 365 +20% 
07/08 779 328 451 +35% 
08/09 784 377 407 +1% 
09/10 627 313 314 -20% 
10/11 830 255 575 +32.4 
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2009/2010, there was a nearly a 50/50 split between English and non-English clubs in terms of 
transfer spending. This was driven by more spending being recycled within the Premier League. 
Foreign players brought into the Premier League were now being transferred to other Premier 
League clubs.  
 
However, by 2010/2011 the upward trend was re-established as 69.3% of total transfer 
expenditure went to overseas clubs.   
 
The data on transfers can also be evaluated through net spending, which covers both incoming 
and outgoing transfers. The difference between these two aspects is net transfer spending.  
 
Table 7.10 Total Net Spending in the Premier League 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Season Total Net Spending (£m) Percentage Change 
2001/2002 190 3.3 
2002/2003 81 -57.4 
2003/2004 259 219.8 
2004/2005 194 -25.1 
2005/2006 240 23.7 
2006/2007 277 15.4 
2007/2008 276 -0.4 
2008/2009 220 -20.3 
2009/2010 194 -11.8 
2010/2011 485 150 
(Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
 
These figures show greater fluctuations than the gross spending figures already shown. The two 
peak seasons in Table 7.10, were 2003/2004 (due to Abramovich’s arrival) and 2010/2011 (due 
to the new television deal). In 2003/2004, Chelsea generated a net spend of £131m, or 50.6% of 
the net transfer activity in that season. Likewise, in 2004/2005, Chelsea’s net spend was 
£126.7m which was 65.3% of the total net transfer activity. This suggests that foreign investors 
may have had a significant effect on the transfer strategy of acquired clubs.   
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“I suppose there has been a few years recently where almost one man’s money has run the 
transfer market for the summer or January window. It’s just basically been transferring 
Abramovich’s money around to different clubs. But that’s going to have knock-on effects for 
other clubs about what they are going to put on their players for prices” (Respondent B) 
 
This was further supported by Respondent C:  
 
“The problem is that it can deflect the market. Because I mean transfer fees….in the UK have 
gone stupid and we all agree with that” (Respondent C) 
 
Thus, it was not simply the arrival of FDI into certain clubs which had an inflationary effect on 
the transfer market, but the increased multiplier activity by these clubs on transfer prices across 
the Premier League. There may be distinct negative impacts of this transfer activity, since it 
creates higher costs, and greater inequalities. But for those clubs who focus on developing 
players through their youth system this effect could be positive if they can get more money due 
to the inflation in the transfer market.  
 
At Fulham, significant investment was needed for the club to reach the Premier League. The 
transfer spending for Fulham in the Football League is shown in Table 7.11 
 
Table 7.11 Fulham Investment in Player Transfers from 1997 to 2001 
Season League Purchases (£m) Sales (£m) Net (£m) 
1997/1998 Division Two 7.5 1.3 -6.2 
1998/1999 Division Two 3 0.1 -2.9 
1999/2000 Division One 7.6 0.5 -7 
2000/2001 Division One 9.8 2.3 -7.5 
(Source: There’s only one debt in Fulham, Swiss Ramble 2010)  
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Although the scale of this investment is small compared to the investment conducted while in 
the Premier League, for a Football League club, this investment was relatively high.   
 
“Well, the major investment occurred in players to really give Fulham a boost occurred when we 
were in the Second Division, and that was far greater money given to Jean Tigana than was given 
to say Kevin Keegan or Paul Bracewell, Ray Wilkins, and certainly Micky Adams” (Respondent B) 
 
“We bought Jean Tigana, and his whole methodology was far better, but he said I want good 
quality players, who I know will do the job for us, and hence Fulham required a large number of 
very, very high quality Francophile players” (Respondent D) 
 
Such investment would not have been possible without Al-Fayed’s ownership.  For the three 
case clubs the level of net transfer spending from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 are shown in Table 
7.12.  
 
Table 7.12: Net Transfer spending at three case clubs 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Season Fulham’s Net Transfer 
Activity (£m) 
Manchester City’s 
Net Transfer 
Activity (£m) 
Manchester 
United’s Net 
Transfer Activity 
(£m) 
2001/2002 -29.7 -10.9 -12.1 
2002/2003 3.4 -16 -7.9 
2003/2004 5.5 -10.2 -28.8 
2004/2005 -2.3 1.8 2.6 
2005/2006 -9.6 11.9 -32.6 
2006/2007 -4.6 -3.9 -10.6 
2007/2008 -21.4 -30.1 -26.5 
2008/2009 -13.6 -90.9 44 
2009/2010 -1.6 -122.3 -30.4 
2010/2011 -4.3 -143.7 -11.4 
Total -73.9 -414.3 -113.5 
(Sources: Deloitte & Touche, Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
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As with the early period of foreign ownership, Fulham continued to be active in the transfer 
market following promotion to the Premier League in 2001 (as shown in Table 7.12). Over the 
2001/2002 to 2010/2011 period, Fulham have a larger net transfer spend than clubs such as 
Arsenal, Everton, and Newcastle all of whom generate much larger revenue.   One respondent 
questioned the strategy used by Fulham in relation to transfer spending:  
 
“Given the fact that we’ve [Fulham] suddenly splashed out I think ten and half million for Bryan 
Ruiz, then it suggests that it’s very much on a whim” (Respondent D) 
 
At Manchester City, a clear distinction was drawn between the net transfer spending under 
domestic and foreign ownership. Between 2001/2002 and 2006/2007, whilst under domestic 
ownership, Manchester City’s total net spend was £27.3m. In contrast, between 2007/2008 and 
2010/2011 whilst under foreign ownership, the total net spend was £387m. In the final three 
seasons of domestic ownership, Manchester City’s transfer spending even declined compared 
with the 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 period. Domestic ownership was shown to have constrained 
transfer spending. However, under foreign control the financial power of Thaksin Shinawatra, 
and in particular Sheikh Mansour reversed this trend, and provided the club with a significant 
advantage over some rival clubs.  
 
Despite the advantages outlined in terms of revenue, Manchester United has had a significantly 
lower net spend than Manchester City over the same period. Transfer spending while under 
foreign control did not increase to the same extent as the other two case clubs but as a result of 
this activity, the club’s transfer strategy was questioned:  
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According to David Gill [Manchester United CEO], Manchester United were able to compete for 
“top players” in the transfer market. However, under the Glazer ownership, transfer spending 
was not as high as at other clubs (Andersred Blog, 2011) 
  
However, this view was contested. David Gill also suggested that over time, Manchester United 
have rarely purchased the major world star (Ashdown, 2011).  
 
Another perspective suggested that the lack of transfer activity at Manchester United compared 
to other clubs at the top of the Premier League, was driven by financial concerns and the form 
(leveraged buyout) of the Glazer takeover:  
 
“if you think about it they’ve been paying £65m a year in interest charges. How many Ronaldo’s 
would that have bought” (Respondent C) 
 
In the summer of 2011, there was an evolution in the clubs transfer strategy:  
 
“So the only thing you can do to get that valuation up is spend money, and the only reason you 
doing that then, if you want to increase the valuation is because you want to sell it, and you want 
to maximise your profit”(Respondent C) 
 
Of course the third strand to this argument was that Manchester United did not need the same 
level of investment as Manchester City as they were already an established force in the Premier 
League and Europe.  
 
At foreign owned clubs, transfer spending has (for the most part) been shown to have increased 
following the entrance of FDI. This has produced some resignation in other clubs:   
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“If you haven’t got the money that Chelsea and Manchester City have got, you’re never going to 
buy Fernando Torres. When somebody does buy Fernando Torres for £50 million all you can be is 
philosophical. But you then do also regret the knock-on effect that you know it will have” 
(Respondent A) 
 
Transfer market inflation has spread across the Premier League and, as with wages, this has 
created a negative impact on those clubs which did not have access to similar resources.    
 
“So if the club next to us receives an injection of funds, they spend wisely and they spend in a 
structured way, is that going to make it more difficult for us, then all other things being equal, it 
has too”  (Respondent F) 
 
“But would we want to enter into a scenario whereby we were losing £20 million a year in order 
to stand still then no I don’t think any of us would” (Respondent F) 
 
Finally in this section, Table 7.13 compares the transfer spending of those clubs who competed 
in both the 2001/2002 and 2010/2011 Premier League seasons.  
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Table 7.13 Total Net Spending at Premier League Clubs 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Club Total Net Spend (£m) 
Arsenal* -54.5 
Aston Villa* -83.8 
Blackburn* -34.2 
Bolton -47.9 
Chelsea* -510.2 
Everton -46.2 
Fulham* -78 
Liverpool* -234.8 
Manchester United* -113.5 
Newcastle -66.1 
Sunderland* -109.1 
Tottenham -161.3 
West Ham* -37.2 
 (Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012) 
(* and grey shade indicates club had some form of foreign ownership between 2001 and 2011) 
 
All of the clubs shown in Table 7.13 made a net loss on transfers. Other than Tottenham, the 
clubs which recorded the largest net spend were foreign owned for at least part of the ten 
seasons (i.e. Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester United etc.).  This implies domestically owned clubs 
had also increased net transfer spending in response to additional FDI entering the Premier 
League.  
 
The data from the Premier League and the case study clubs indicates transfer costs have 
increased over the ten-year period covered (2001 to 2011). But FDI is not the only factor which 
influences transfer prices, as television income and other revenues were also influential.   
 
7.2.3 Profit   
 
For the purpose of this chapter, profit will be considered in two ways. Firstly, declared profit is 
considered at the operating level. This does not include any costs relating to player activity (i.e. 
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transfer fees). After establishing the effect FDI had on operating profits, the second form of 
profit to be considered is that at the pre-tax level. This takes into consideration player transfer 
costs, plus other costs relating to interest payments. The twenty members of the Premier League 
have recorded an operating profit in each season from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 (as shown in 
Figure 7.10.).  
 
Figure 7.10 Operating Profit in the Premier League from 2001 to 2011 
 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2012)  
 
The mean level of declared operating profit over these ten seasons was £116.8m. The peak 
operating profit of £185m was recorded in 2007/2008, since then the combined operating profit 
in the Premier League has fallen below the average. Declared operating profits have declined 
across the Premier League since 2008/2009 due to the balance of spending by foreign owned 
clubs. For instance, in 2010/2011, three foreign owned clubs, Aston Villa, Chelsea, and 
Manchester City made combined operating losses of £164.5m, up from £113.2m in 2009/2010 
(Deloitte, 2012). These expanding losses have consequences for the Premier League. To 
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investigate this further, the total operating profit/loss made by foreign owned clubs is shown in 
Table 7.14 
 
Table 7.14 Total declared operating profit/loss made by foreign owned Premier League clubs 
2001-2011 
Season Number of foreign 
owned clubs 
Operating Profit/Loss 
(£m) 
Rest of the 
Premier League 
(£m) 
2001/2002 1 -10.2 94.2 
2002/2003 1 -13.9 137.9 
2003/2004 3 -14.2 163.2 
2004/2005 3 -17.5 179.5 
2005/2006 4 22.4 115.6 
2006/2007* 7 46.5 48.5 
2007/2008 10 81.5 103.5 
2008/2009 9 1.7 77.3 
2009/2010* 10 5.1 78.9 
2010/2011* 10 -25.5 98.8 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
*=Aston Villa data unavailable in 2006/2007, Portsmouth data unavailable in 2009/2010)  
 
From 2001/2002 to 2010/2011, domestically owned clubs have generated greater operating 
profits than clubs under foreign ownership.  This was despite three of the last four seasons, 
where there are an equal number of foreign and domestically owned clubs. Also, whilst 
domestically owned clubs have always generated combined operating profits, foreign owned 
clubs collectively generated operating losses in five of the ten seasons.  So at the operating level, 
foreign investors were more willing to sustain losses than domestically owned clubs.  
 
However, what about the declared operating profits at club level? These will now be considered 
for the three case clubs. Table 7.15 displays the information.  
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Table 7.15: Operating Profit/Loss (before player trading) at the three case clubs 2001/2002 to 
2010/2011 
(Sources: Deloitte 2007, 2012 Annual Review of football finance)  
 
Over the period of foreign ownership, Fulham’s declared operating profits gradually improved as 
revenue increased, and to some extent wages have been controlled. In the last three seasons, 
Fulham recorded operating profits, whereas between 2001/2002 and 2007/2008 there was only 
a single instance of Fulham generating a declared operating profit. Indeed, in the first two 
seasons of data, only one other Premier League club (Leeds United in 2002/2003) generated a 
greater level of operating loss.  
 
For Manchester City, declared operating profits reduced following the clubs takeover by Sheikh 
Mansour. In domestic control, Manchester City was able to generate declared operating profits 
from 2003/2004 to 2005/2006. This was partly explained by the clubs move to the City of 
Manchester Stadium in the summer of 2003. The arrival of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2007, and the 
new television deal, had only a limited effect of operating profits. In contrast, the additional 
spending of Sheikh Mansour pushed Manchester City into a level of operating loss which was 
matched only by Chelsea. The operating losses made by Manchester City were amongst the 
largest ever recorded in the Premier League.  
Season Fulham’s Profit/Loss 
before player trading 
(£m) 
Manchester City’s 
Profit/Loss before 
player trading (£m) 
Manchester 
United’s 
Profit/Loss before 
player trading (£m) 
2001/2002 -10.3 -5.9 34.5 
2002/2003 -13.8 1.7 47.8 
2003/2004 0.9 4 51.8 
2004/2005 -6.1 3.5 32.8 
2005/2006 -6.2 5 41.1 
2006/2007 -10.4 -1.4 66 
2007/2008 -2 -1.6 71.8 
2008/2009 5.8 -34.2 81 
2009/2010 6.4 -55.1 91 
2010/2011 2.6 -81.6 100.9 
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Despite the change in ownership, Manchester United continued to generate declared operating 
profits.  From 2001/2002 to 2004/2005, operating profits grew by just 5.2%. In foreign 
ownership, the level of operating profit rose by 52.8% from 2005/2006 to 2010/2011. The effect 
of Manchester United’s operating profit on the figures for the rest of the Premier League is 
important. The other nineteen clubs in the Premier League made a combined operating loss of 
£32.9m in 2010/2011. This raised a further question about the ability that clubs have to generate 
operating profits in the Premier League  
 
If transfer fees are now included, the combined pre-tax profit/loss for the Premier League 
between 2001/2002 and 2010/2011 is shown in Figure 7.11 
Figure 7.11 Combined Pre-Tax Profit/Loss in the Premier League 2001 to 2011 
 
(Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2012, Arthur & Chadwick, 2007)  
In the ten seasons of data shown in Figure 7.11, the twenty member clubs of the Premier League 
have made a combined loss in each season. The average loss per season was £235.5m. However, 
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this figure was significantly influenced by the increases in pre-tax losses recorded from 
2005/2006 onwards. Combined declared operating profits were eroded by the costs involved in 
transfer activity and interest payments. The effect of FDI on pre-tax profits has been influential.  
So as FDI increased in the Premier League pre-tax profits declined. For instance, in 2010/2011, 
£197.5m of the £380m loss was from Manchester City (Deloitte, 2012). As with operating profits, 
the activity of some foreign owned clubs (such as Manchester City) has impacted upon the 
overall profits generated in the division.  
 
What effects were present in the case clubs? The pre-tax profit/loss data for the case clubs is 
shown in Table 7.16 
 
Table 7.16: Pre-Tax Profit/Loss at the case clubs from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 
Season Fulham’s Pre-Tax 
Profit/Loss (£m) 
Manchester City’s 
Pre-Tax Profit/Loss 
(£m) 
Manchester 
United’s Pre-Tax 
Profit/Loss (£m) 
2001/2002 -33.5 -13.9 32.3 
2002/2003 -20.8 -14.1 39.3 
2003/2004 0.5 -13.7 27.9 
2004/2005 -12.9 -15.6 10.8 
2005/2006 -15.9 10.1 -137.7 
2006/2007 -15.9 -8 -62.5 
2007/2008 1.6 -32.6 -44.8 
2008/2009 -8.4 -92.6 21.6 
2009/2010 -18.9 -121.3 -108.4 
2010/2011 4.8 -197.5 12 
(Sources: Swiss Ramble, There’s only one debt in Fulham, United we stand divided we fall, 2010, 
Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, & footballeconomy, 2009)  
 
Due to the investment in player wages and transfers by Mohamed Al-Fayed, Fulham’s pre-taxes 
profits have been Inconsistent. In only three seasons from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 did Fulham 
record a pre-tax profit.  However, since the start of the 2007/2008 television deal the losses 
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have generally declined (with the exception of 2009/2010). Thus, extra revenues from television 
deals are enabling Fulham to better manage their finances.     
 
“What has happened is that Fulham’s losses [have declined] There is a suggestion that their year-
on-year losses have been managed better” (Respondent D) 
 
Like Fulham, Manchester City was mostly a loss making club in the earlier part of this 
millennium. However, in foreign ownership, the scale of pre-tax losses have been much greater 
than when the club was in domestic control. Between 2001/2002 and 2006/2007, the average 
pre-tax loss was £7.9m per season. In comparison, between 2007/2008 and 2010/2011, the 
average pre-tax loss per season was £111m. This difference reflected the scale of the investment 
in foreign ownership compared to the investment under domestic control.  
 
Despite being considered as profit seeking investors, the Glazer family were unable to 
consistently generate pre-tax profits from Manchester United. The 2008/2009 figures were 
skewed by the sale of Cristiano Ronaldo to Real Madrid for £80m. Had this £80m not been 
received, then Manchester United would have made a loss of £58.4m. Before the Glazer 
takeover, Manchester United were the most profitable club in the Premier League, and they 
were able to consistently record pre-tax profits (as shown between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005). 
The difference between the club in domestic and foreign control relates to the use of borrowed 
funds from banks and other financial institutions, and the resulting interest and debt servicing 
costs were responsible for the losses incurred after 2005/2006.  
 
This part of the chapter has found, both declared operating and pre-tax profits to have been 
negatively influenced by the arrival of FDI. This has been shown at both the league and club 
level. In all three case clubs, losses were larger whilst under foreign control, but this was for 
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varying reasons. At both Fulham, and Manchester City, the increased losses were caused by 
additional spending, but at Manchester United they were caused by debt servicing payments. 
The next stage of this chapter will explore the effect FDI has had on club debt.  
 
7.2.4 Debt 
 
The total net debt position of the Premier League is shown in Figure 7.4. This is the total net 
debt at each member club in each season from 2001/2002 to 2010/2011. Over this period, net 
debt has generally increased, particularly up to the 2008/2009 season.  
 
Figure 7.12 Net Debt in Premier League from 2001 to 2011 
 
(Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012) 
 
The level of net debt in the Premier League increased between 2004/2005 and 2008/2009. This 
coincided with the period where FDI activity in the Premier League was at its highest. In this 
period, the level of net debt increased from £674m to £3.3bn, a change of 389.8%. By 
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comparison, between 2001/2002 and 2005/2006, debt increased by 58%. The extent to which 
this debt was not equally distributed between all clubs is evident from Table 7.17:  
 
Table 7.17 Top Ten Clubs by Net Debt in Premier League 2006 
Club Net Debt (£m) 
Arsenal 262 
Chelsea* 180 
Fulham* 167 
Manchester City 94 
Blackburn Rovers 94 
Newcastle United 61 
Sunderland 35 
Bolton Wanderers 30 
Wigan Athletic 30 
Liverpool 26 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007).  
(* and grey shade indicates club was foreign owned)  
 
Of the top ten clubs by net debt in the Premier League at the end of 2005/2006, two (Chelsea 
and Fulham) were foreign owned. These two clubs had net debt totalling £347m. In contrast, the 
other eighteen clubs held net debt of £687m, thus a significant imbalance in debt was apparent 
in this season. This imbalance was driven by the entry of foreign owners at Fulham and Chelsea, 
as these investors had the ability to lend their clubs significant finance in order to improve 
performance. The top ten clubs by net debt in 2010/2011 are shown in Table 7.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.18: Top Ten Clubs by Net Debt in Premier League 2011 
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Club Net Debt (£m) 
Chelsea* 816 
Manchester United* 308 
Newcastle United 268 
Fulham* 193 
Aston Villa* 153 
Bolton Wanderers 111 
Arsenal* 98 
Sunderland* 77 
Wigan 73 
Liverpool* 61 
(Source: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2012) 
(*and grey shade indicate club has some form of foreign ownership) 
 
Of the top ten clubs by net debt at the end of the 2010/2011 season, seven were controlled by 
foreign investors. In total, the net debt held by these seven foreign owned clubs was £1.7bn. 
However, the remaining thirteen clubs in the Premier League (including the three domestically 
owned clubs in Table 7.17) had a debt of £654m (Deloitte, 2012). Therefore, in comparison to 
2005/2006, net debt was shown to have increased, for both foreign and domestically owned 
clubs. Some of the reasons for this can be seen in the primary data:  
 
“Yes because it’s forced clubs either to increase their investment by owners who were 
benefactors and now have had to become generous benefactors, and this would apply to clubs 
domestically owned” (Respondent D) 
 
 The increase in debt was noted as a significant drawback of FDI entering the Premier League on 
the domestically owned questionnaire. This increased debt has two drawbacks. Firstly, there is 
the increase in debt at individual clubs, and secondly there is a league-wide effect: 
 
“As long as they play by the rules… I suppose as long as they don’t get into too much debt, don’t 
do a Portsmouth” (Respondent E) 
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This reflects a desire for clubs to abide by the regulatory framework but other clubs have 
essentially ‘played by the rules’ but still gained an advantage over rival clubs:  
 
“massive debts, leveraged buyout or in the case of Abramovich pretending the debt has been 
eliminated by converting it into something else” (Respondent D) 
 
The story of ‘pretending’ that debt has been eliminated through the conversion of debt in equity 
implied an unfair advantage in advance of new regulations from UEFA concerning financial fair 
play. The debt was not paid off due to improved financial performance, but instead was related 
to a foreign owner ceasing to have any requirements for their loans to be repaid.  
 
So while some potential issues at league level have been raised concerning regulation, and 
league health, what are the club specific issues with debt?  
 
From 2004/2005 top 2010/2011, debt increased at Fulham by 63.6%. Upon promotion to the 
Premier League, the debt held by Fulham was £40.6m (Armitage, 2002). From 2001/2002 to 
2004/2005, net debt increased by £77.4m to reach £118m, with net debt peaking in the 
2008/2009 season. Since then it has declined marginally, but this still raises questions about 
sustainability over the long-term. This is reflected in Table 7.19.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7.19: Net Debt at the case clubs from 2004/2005 to 2010/2011 
Season Fulham Net Debt (£m) Manchester City Manchester United 
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Net Debt (£m) Net Debt (£m) 
2004/2005 -118 -100.2 65.3 
2005/2006 -167 -93/9 6 
2006/2007 N/A N/A -604 
2007/2008 -197 -147 -699 
2008/2009 -200 -229.6 -566.1 
2009/2010 -190 -40.7 -609.5 
2010/2011 -193 -42.9 -308.3 
(Sources: Fulham Supporters Trust, 2005, Deloitte 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012 and Conn, 2009)  
 
“the problem there is that somebody at some point has to deal with our extortionate debt. It’s 
ridiculous, probably only a twelfth of our debt is corporate; the rest is personal debt to Al-Fayed” 
(Respondent D) 
 
By comparison, in Table 7.17, only three clubs (Chelsea, Manchester United and Newcastle) had 
net debt levels greater than Fulham, but in all three cases the ability to cover debts was also 
greater due to the larger revenue generated by each of these clubs. One advantage for Fulham is 
the vast majority of the club’s debt was owed to Al-Fayed in the form of soft loans (Swiss 
Ramble, 2010, Deloitte, 2012). Thus, potentially high interest charges were not incurred by the 
club.  
 
But despite the loans being classed as “soft”, there were some concerns:  
 
“Now fans have said he can just write that off, well yes he can but of course his children can say 
sorry we don’t fancy having £170 million of our inheritance wiped off... They can object to this 
and the fans don’t really realize it” (Respondent D) 
 
 Unlike Fulham, Manchester City operated with large debts under domestic control. Although 
some of the debt was owed to club directors, in 2005/2006, £43m was also owed in the form of 
hire purchase/leasing of the City of Manchester Stadium (Deloitte, 2007). However, the support 
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of some club directors was critical. Indeed, had it not been for the support of former chairman, 
John Wardle over the last decade, then Manchester City could have gone out of business 
(Manchester Evening News, 2010).  
 
Both of the foreign takeovers at Manchester City coincided with a significant increase in debt. In 
the first takeover by Thaksin Shinawatra, net debt increased to £147m. The increase in net debt 
at Manchester City in this period was due to a reliance on borrowed funds. These came in three 
forms. The first was Shinawatra’s personal investment which was treated as a loan with interest 
charged. The second form was the borrowing undertaken in the summer of 2008 in order to 
keep the club operational when Shinawatra’s assets were frozen, and finally there was the use of 
personal loans from former directors in this same period (Conn, 2012). This period was could be 
summarized as follows. Under the control of Thaksin Shinawatra, Manchester City went into a 
steep financial decline. A loss of £33m was made for the 2007/2008 season, and additional loans 
were taken out alongside mortgaging the next seasons TV payments from the Premier League to 
Standard Bank (Conn, 2012).    
 
Due to the financial losses, Manchester City admitted that they faced a ‘cash challenge’ in the 
short-term. Indeed, Garry Cook [then Manchester City CEO], confirmed that they club had taken 
a £30m bank loan to ease these problems (Taylor, 2008).  
 
Following the takeover by Sheikh Mansour, the repayment of these loans was completed, but 
additional net debt was created, mostly in the form of loans from new shareholders (Deloitte, 
2010). Rather than being repaid, these loans were converted into equity in the summer of 2010, 
reducing net debt to £40.7m (Deloitte, 2011). This presents a different scenario to that at 
Fulham (and some domestically owned clubs) where the loans are still required to be repaid at 
some stage.  
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In domestic ownership, Manchester United was one of a limited number of clubs to operate 
without any debt. In 2004/2005 the only other clubs free from debt were Aston Villa, 
Birmingham, and West Brom (Deloitte, 2007). In contrast, Manchester United, under the control 
of the Glazer family had debt increased significantly, reaching a peak level of £649.5m in 
2007/2008. Unlike Manchester City and Fulham, where the majority of debt under foreign 
ownership was owed to shareholders, in Manchester United’s case the debt was owed to 
commercial sources. This was due to the leveraged buyout used to purchase the club by the 
Glazer family. In order to purchase the club, the Glazer family used Payment-In-Kind (PIK) Notes 
alongside bank borrowings. This was a similar strategy to what the Glazer family used to 
purchase other businesses (Pratley, 2005), but was a rarity in football due to problems in 
generating profits and efficiencies. The total cost of purchasing Manchester United was £790m, 
and £540m of this was funded by debt financing.   
 
In order to alleviate some of the costs relating to this debt, Manchester United held a bond issue 
in 2010:  
 
“The bond issue was to get out of the high interest rates they were paying on the PIK notes, but 
they’re still paying 9%. And it cost what was it £40 million” (Respondent C) 
 
Despite the objective of lowering borrowing costs, the bond issue had a short-term impact upon 
the finances of Manchester United which saw increased losses and the clubs debt:  
 
“Between £25-£40 million it cost to do the bond issue. And you’re thinking well that £40 million, 
even if it was £25 million, that £25 million on top the interest you can see it’s you’re not covering, 
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if you had to pay the capital back we couldn’t pay it, we haven’t got the cash to do it” 
(Respondent C) 
 
However, by 2010/2011 the debt had reduced to £308.3m, as the Glazers repaid £220m of debt 
related to the PIK notes. Despite this reduction, the level of debt was still the second highest in 
the Premier League, and obligations surrounding the bond issue still cost £45m in 2010/2011 
(Kelso, 2010).  
 
In all three cases, debt increased in the short-term as a result of the FDI activity. In two of the 
cases, Fulham and Manchester City (a feature similar to that at Chelsea and Aston Villa), the debt 
was primarily owed to the majority owner of the club. At Manchester City, this debt was 
converted into equity, but at Fulham the debt remained. For Manchester United, the debt has 
been owned to commercial sources.  
 
Over the period of 2001/2002 to 2010/2011, the level of net debt for all in the Premier League 
has risen, although growth in the debt was highest in the period of 2005/2006 to 2008/2009, 
where FDI activity was at its most prominent in the Premier League.  
 
7.3 Management Effects  
 
With the financial effects now investigated the next effect to be considered concerns the effects 
FDI has had on wider club management. This concerns how club management changed due to 
the presence of FDI, and what the effects have been on both foreign and domestically owned 
clubs. Respondents were asked about the effect FDI had on off-field management. Both of the 
respondents from domestically owned clubs, stated that off-field management was 
insignificantly affected by the entrance of FDI into the Premier League, and, only one of the 
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foreign owned respondents suggested off-field management had been greatly improved by the 
arrival of FDI. Nevertheless, some foreign owners were seen to have advantages over domestic 
owners:   
 
“they will be more savvy and experienced to the global marketing opportunities of sport” 
(Respondent A)  
 
As foreign owners brought with them experience benefits, this helped to enhance off-field 
management at acquired clubs, but these effects may not have spilled over to domestically 
owned clubs.  
 
When the case study clubs are examined, all three cases have seen some improvement in 
management structures. At Fulham, there was more scope to improve, as the club was operating 
in the Second Division at the time of the club’s takeover. Therefore, staff numbers were small 
and the clubs commercial operations extremely limited:  
 
“I was also referring to the way the clubs management is structured, in the sense we now know 
who does what and where” (Respondent D) 
 
However, no reference was made to any specific effects in terms of skills or expertise. 
Respondent D suggested the club was now more organised, with the management team also 
larger in size than under domestic ownership. But whilst the structure has improved, there has 
been some breakdown in the relationship between the club and its supporters due to the 
commercialisation of the club:  
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“The arrival of Al-Fayed, or more accurately the arrival of his corporate brand management 
team, there’s been this automatic distancing between the fans and the treatment of fans as 
customers, which as I’ve indicated, I find absolutely horrific” (Respondent D) 
 
The use of the term “corporate brand management team” implied a more business orientated 
outlook. This implied a tension between the sporting and non-sporting aspects of the club.  
 
At Manchester City, the second foreign takeover by Sheikh Mansour enabled significant changes 
to be made to the club’s management. When taking the club over from Thaksin Shinawatra, a 
number of weaknesses were found in the clubs structure. Manchester City did not have a 
‘functioning’ human resources department or a financial director. Additionally, other key roles 
were also absent from the administration of the club (Conn, 2012).  
 
In order to rectify these weaknesses, the new ownership from Abu Dhabi invested in the 
commercial and operational aspects in order to improve performance. The lack of basic 
management or functional provisions before the change in ownership implied a failure to 
adequately treat Manchester City as a commercial entity. In the 2009/2010 period, Manchester 
City recruited 148 non-playing staff members to strengthen areas such as human resources 
(Manchester City Annual Report, 2009/2010).  
 
At Manchester United, the Glazer family provided advantages in terms of commercial expertise 
and experience:  
 
“if you spoke to David Gill he would say that they’ve benefitted from the American ownership. 
Not through direct investment but through the expertise and marketing, because their 
commercial revenue is now over £100 million, which is staggering (Respondent E) 
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By 2011, the Glazer family had invested £40m on the clubs marketing strategy. As part of this 
strategy, a sales force was expanded from just two members of staff. Prior to Glazer family 
ownership, the clubs brand was sold by just these two members of staff (Panja, 2011).  
 
This suggested the ownership advantages held by the Glazer family were successfully transferred 
to Manchester United. Additionally, it also highlighted the weaknesses present in the 
Manchester United operations in domestic control. This has presented a potential model for 
other clubs to follow according to the Arsenal CEO Ivan Gazidis. Gazidis argues that any club 
should ‘look and learn’ at Manchester United, but he also acknowledged that due to differences 
which exist in club stature, not every club is in the position that Manchester United is in. As a 
result, there will be different commercial solutions for individual clubs (Panja, 2011).  
 
The conditions for management spillovers to domestically owned firms, therefore, existed. 
However, the extent to which the strategy of Manchester United would be copied by another 
club was dependent on their size and performance, as well as the absorptive capacity.  
 
Another insider suggested the changes at Manchester United would have occurred naturally:  
 
“I think they would certainly come with that sort of global thinking, and yeah we are going to 
maximise. But whether it is happening a bit quicker and more extensively under the Glazers than 
it would have done under David Gill and British PLC ownership? Possibly, but not a lot, because 
United are such a powerful brand, the world is the next place isn’t it? (Respondent A) 
 
“Will an organisation that was mature and as good as Manchester United have learnt any new 
tricks from the Glazers? I Doubt it personally. (Respondent A) 
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This raised concerns about the exact nature of the ownership advantages provided by the Glazer 
family, and this is supported by the domestically owned questionnaires, which suggested the 
impact of FDI on off-field management to have been limited in nature.   
 
Aside from the consequences for off-field management, there are also effects surrounding on-
field management. Foreign owned clubs have been willing to employ overseas managers, 
coaches, and technical directors to run their football operations. At Chelsea, all managerial 
appointments since 2003 have been overseas managers, whilst foreign managers have been 
employed by foreign owners at Manchester City, Fulham, West Ham, Blackburn, Southampton, 
Aston Villa, Q.P.R, Sunderland, Cardiff and Portsmouth. Additionally, at Arsenal and Liverpool 
foreign managers were inherited after an investment was made. Only at Manchester United, 
Birmingham, Hull and Reading has foreign ownership not coincided with a foreign manager (at 
some stage). The willingness to employ foreign managers has a spillover effect to other Premier 
League clubs. For instance, both Swansea and West Bromwich Albion have employed managers 
with experience of the Spanish La Liga. Therefore, the success achieved by some foreign owned 
clubs with a foreign manager is trying to be replicated by some domestically owned clubs. 
Indeed, this presents a consequence of FDI as the presence of foreign managers and coaches has 
continued to increase in the Premier League. Of course this could limit the opportunities for 
domestic coaches and managers, but some evidence suggests knowledge transfers have taken 
place and domestic coaches have learnt from foreign managers (i.e. Brendan Rodgers at Chelsea 
with Jose Mourinho).  
 
7.4 Infrastructure Effects  
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Another direct effect of FDI entering the Premier League relates to developments in 
infrastructure of the acquired clubs in the form of stadia and training facilities.  
 
In contrast to some of the other effects considered in this chapter, the amount of investment on 
stadia and facilities has declined in recent seasons. During the peak investment season of 
2005/2006, £137m of the £204m expenditure related to a single club (Arsenal). At this time 
Arsenal were not owned by a foreign investor. However, some foreign owned clubs (i.e. 
Manchester City, Manchester United and Chelsea) invested into training facilities and stadium 
improvements. In 2010/2011, £44m of the £99m capital expenditure came from four foreign 
owned clubs (Deloitte, 2012) Likewise, in 2009/2010, four foreign owned clubs (Aston Villa, 
Manchester City, Manchester United and Liverpool), were responsible for £60.5m of the £107m 
expenditure (Deloitte, 2011). Without these investments, the level of capital expenditure in the 
Premier League would have been much reduced. The total capital expenditure on these facilities 
between 2001/2002 to 2010/2011 is shown in Figure 7.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13: Capital Expenditure on stadia/facilities by Premier League Clubs 2001 to 2011 
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(Sources: Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, 2007, 2012)  
 
 The respondents from foreign owned clubs agreed that infrastructure investment was a benefit 
after the foreign takeover. From the case studies, at Fulham, Mohamed Al-Fayed enabled the 
club’s ground, Craven Cottage, to be brought up to Premier League standard, and converted into 
an all-seater stadium. The total investment made into this development was £8m (Fulham FC, no 
date). The redevelopment of the ground was one of the major concerns held by club supporters, 
as Fulham were forced to ground share with Queens Park Rangers for two seasons in 2002/2003 
and 2003/2004 (Fulham Supporters Trust, 2005). Another feature of Al-Fayed’s investment was 
the acquisition of a permanent training ground in 1999 at Motspur Park (Fulham FC, no date).   
 
At Manchester City, Thaksin Shinawatra directed little investment into the clubs infrastructure. 
Rather than invest in the ‘fabric’ of the club, money was directed towards player transfers with a 
large amount of money being spent on agents’ fees. As a result, the clubs stadium remained the 
same, and the training ground was not improved (Conn, 2012).   
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In contrast, Sheikh Mansour ensured that investment was directed towards improving the club’s 
stadium and training facilities (Conn, 2012). In 2009/2010, Manchester City invested £42m in 
improving these facilities (Deloitte, 2011). The most significant infrastructure project undertaken 
by the Abu Dhabi ownership of Manchester City was the Etihad Campus. This will be a training 
campus, which the club states will be the best facility of its kind in the world (Conn, 2012).  
 
“Yeah, and to be fair to them [Manchester City], they’ve not just brought this [Etihad Campus] 
out of the bag recently because of the financial fair play. I went there probably 2008, and all the 
streets around the stadium, they’d all bought up the terraced housing. You could see they were 
going to redevelop the area right from the very day one (Respondent E) 
 
The investment at Manchester City may well have resulted in positive spillover effects for 
younger footballers, as the club expanded their youth system. However,  this was targeted at 
attracting the ‘world’s best’,   enabling  Manchester City to attract better younger players from 
across the world. For those young footballers from Manchester area, there may be no direct 
benefit from the Etihad Campus.  
 
All three clubs have seen improvements in infrastructure, but in the case of Manchester City and 
Fulham, previous domestic ownership would have been unable to conduct such developments. 
At Manchester United, a club with a strong level of infrastructure prior to the clubs takeover, the 
effects on this element have been more incremental. In the case of Fulham, the clubs stadium 
and training ground facilities were in urgent need of modernisation, hence the investment was 
placed into these areas.  
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7.5. Regional Effects 
 
Aside from the consequences which have both directly and indirectly affected clubs in the 
Premier League, further modest spillover effects were suggested in relation to regional effects. 
Some of these effects were directly related to the infrastructure investment undertaken by the 
foreign owned clubs. In particular, at Manchester City, significant benefits to the East 
Manchester region were present through the development of both the clubs and stadia facilities:  
 
“I went there [Manchester City] probably 2008, and all the streets around the stadium, they’d all 
bought up the terraced housing. You could see they were going to redevelop the area right from 
the very day one (Respondent E) 
 
“They’re doing a lot of regeneration in East Manchester…but it’s become a good thing that they 
are doing” (Respondent F) 
 
The benefits to the East Manchester region were mostly employment orientated.  This is longer-
term, as Manchester City sought to increase the size of its facilities, but   there were also short-
term effects through the use of local labour and materials to build various aspects of the 
development (Manchester City, Annual Report 2009/2010).  
 
Employment benefits were not solely related to the construction or development of club 
infrastructure. However, in some cases, the arrival of FDI resulted in a direct increase in the level 
of employment at the acquired club. These short and long-term employment effects were not 
universally applicable. One foreign owned club in their response to the questionnaire indicated 
that employment had increased, whilst another considered there had been little change. At 
Manchester City, the FDI enabled the club to increase the size of its non-playing staff, with an 
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additional 106 employees recruited during the 2009/2010 period (Manchester City Annual 
Report, 2010). At other clubs, the changes in employment were specific to particular 
departments. For example, Manchester United increased employment in their commercial 
department (Panja, 2011). Therefore, from these observations, there does seem to have been 
some employment changes across a range of foreign owned clubs, though the actual increase in 
number employed might be variable and department specific. Moreover, there may be some 
instances were no new jobs were created, but where jobs were saved.  
 
The extent of these employment spillovers was dependent on the balance between foreign and 
domestic staff. From the questionnaire, both responses from foreign owned clubs indicated no 
foreign senior managers had been brought into the respective clubs to run off-field matters. This 
would help to enhance the positive employment spillover effects, as the higher quality jobs with 
higher pay were taken by indigenous staff. Nonetheless, both clubs recruited foreign nationals to 
either manage the clubs first-team affairs or to be involved in senior football positions. 
Additionally, the greater reliance on foreign players after these takeovers did not present 
positive employment benefits to English footballers in the direct sense.  
 
Another regional consequence of football FDI relates to club supporters. There were some 
negative consequences drawn out in terms of the relationship between supporters and the 
football club:  
 
“It’s clear as you say from comments by people such as David Gill [Manchester United CEO] who 
have been very hostile and stuck two fingers up to their own fans, Briatore and Ecclestone [QPR 
co-owners] did exactly the same at QPR” (Respondent D) 
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“Yeah there has, because, there’s been a breakdown between the people that support it, the 
community, and the people that run it” (Respondent B) 
 
7.6 Summary  
 
FDI has been shown to have impacted Premier League clubs in both a direct and indirect 
manner. For the Premier League, it was observed the competitiveness of the league was 
negatively affected by the arrival of foreign capital. Partly, the strong on –field performance 
associated with foreign owned clubs was responsible for this. In contrast, the stature of the 
Premier League was improved through the arrival of foreign investment which brought with it 
the arrival of an increased number of prominent foreign players.  On the sporting side, mixed 
effects were apparent in terms of productivity.  
 
The acquired clubs saw increased revenues, increased expenditure (in relation to transfers and 
wages), as well as increased losses and debt (in some cases). For those clubs not acquired by a 
foreign investor, they too have faced higher costs as a result of FDI, which (in some cases) have 
caused increased losses and debts for these clubs. Therefore, a mixed picture was found in 
relation to the consequences of FDI here. For some clubs, the arrival of FDI has been extremely 
beneficial in terms of direct impacts on revenue, and the ability the club has to spend in the 
transfer market (i.e. Manchester City). However, the arrival of this investment has been negative 
for other clubs who have faced spillover effects in terms of higher wages and transfer fees.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis has applied FDI theory and that of spillovers to the FDI activity which has taken place 
in the English Premier League. The first chapter provided some background to the topic area, as 
well as introducing the aims and objectives of the thesis. The second chapter provided the 
context behind English football, and the economic basis of the game’s development in England. 
The third chapter introduced the literature surrounding FDI and identified the key concepts and 
theories surrounding both economic and non-economic motivations behind FDI. The fourth 
chapter identified the relevant sports economics literature, and highlighted the existing 
literature surrounding football club purchases. The methodological choices were explained in 
chapter five, with the data collection and analysis techniques both set out. The first of the results 
chapter, chapter six, addressed the motives behind FDI, whilst the seventh chapter analysed the 
consequences from FDI entering the Premier League. This final chapter will now consider these 
findings in relation to the debates which have existed in the FDI and sports economics literature. 
 
8.1 Motives  
 
This thesis has identified the complexity of the factors which have influenced FDI flows entering 
the Premier League. These include both economic and non-economic factors, as well as the 
influence of institutional factors. The standard approach to analysing all forms of FDI is 
dominated by economic theorising, and arguments that FDI is to be analysed in terms of a 
rational search for future profit (Bitzenis, 2003). However, profit and sport hold a rather uneasy 
relationship.  We have seen that not a single foreign investor made explicit reference to seeking 
profits in their official statement after purchasing a club. Profit in English football has been a 
“taboo” subject virtually since the game’s formation. This central tension was initially driven by 
the conflict between those who viewed football as an amateur sport, and those who supported 
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professionalism. Whilst looking at modern football through such older constructs is not wholly 
appropriate today, there is still a tension between those who view football as a profit seeking 
investment, and those who view it as being not-for-profit. For instance, some club supporters 
would want any ‘profit’ to be reinvested in improving the club rather than go to shareholders, 
and as such the football club would be treated as a ‘not for profit’ venture.  
 
Data on performance within the Premier League over the 2001 to 2011 period (in chapter seven) 
indicated that combined pre-tax losses have been a consistent outcome. The loss-making nature 
of English football was shown to be well established prior to the formation of the Premier 
League. Worse still, the literature on football has established the negative relationship between 
success on the field and profit and the close relationship between spending and performance. 
Despite this ostensibly different environment did some foreign investors (ex- ante) enter the 
Premier League to generate profits?  
 
For some investors, particularly those from North America, the most influential motive may have 
been a desire to generate profits. For example, at Manchester United, the declared operating 
profits under the Glazer family’s ownership have risen compared to the operating profits under 
PLC ownership. The pattern with other clubs is not as clear. However, profits can come in 
different forms. For some investors, the profit sought has been short-term, for others it has been 
a longer horizon, and in some cases profit can be considered as indirect (to other businesses). 
While some respondents raised questions about the rationality of seeking direct profits, another 
proposed the idea of some FDI being a “value play “with a foreign investor purchasing a club due 
to a perception that it was undervalued and then hoping to sell the club in the future at a profit. 
In terms of indirect profits, some respondents suggested the ownership of a club could benefit 
an investor’s media interests (Stan Kroenke), or the club could be used to promote other 
businesses (Venky’s).  In these circumstances we have argued along with others (e.g. King 
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(1997)) that investors might be willing to cover losses at their football club as benefits were 
forthcoming to other parts of their business empire. In a slightly different way, the takeover of 
Manchester City by Sheikh Mansour was partly motived by a desire to promote Abu Dhabi.  
 
But is this behaviour rational in light of the environment of the Premier League?  Commentators 
like Fort & Quirk (2004), Fort (2000) and Moorhouse (1999) have all suggested that using the 
reported profit levels as a guide to determine investor motives is not sufficient. But even 
allowing for this, some respondents highlighted the difficulty in generating profits and the 
excessive costs involved in competing in the Premier League. Indeed, the potential also existed 
for differences between the ex-ante and ex-post objectives. Whilst profit may have been the 
motive ex-ante, the difficulty in generating profits could lead to investors posting different 
objectives ex-post.  
 
If profit cannot be discounted as a motive for some investors, neither can it be considered as the 
single most important motive. As Zimbalist (2003) suggested over a decade ago there are much 
easier ways of generating profit than through sport, and this has been re-enforced in our the 
discussion in this thesis in chapters four and six.  
 
The relationship of football FDI to the economic theories of FDI is somewhat different to the 
analysis of FDI within other industries. The same applies when seeking to apply one of the most 
well established theories of FDI, the ‘OLI’ paradigm to the FDI entering the Premier League. The 
attraction of the OLI paradigm and what Dunning (1976) called the ‘eclectic approach’ to FDI, 
derives from the difficulty of producing a theoretically rigorous economic explanation of FDI that 
can also be substantiated. FDI in this paradigm is explained in terms of a variety of variables seen 
in terms of ownership, location and internalisation.   
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When investigating the ownership advantages held by foreign investors, advantages in terms of 
financial resources, commercial expertise, and sport experience were noted. But in contrast to 
other forms of FDI, advantages surrounding property rights (i.e. Lundan, 2010) were not found 
to be highly influential in football FDI. The importance of financial resources is obvious: larger 
spending on player wages and transfers should lead to improved performance. However, some 
debate existed about the other advantages.  Our respondents had mixed views on this and 
although our own analysis has identified some possible ownership advantages we too have 
struggled to show that they exist on a sufficient scale to explain FDI. 
 
Insofar as the location tenet of the OLI paradigm is concerned, the most influential aspect 
concerns the revenue generated from television. The Premier League has generated over €1.3bn 
per season from television rights sales between 2010 and 2013. During the same period, Serie A 
was the second highest television right generator received around €900m per season.  The 
Premier League has also been shown to have a large advantage over other European football 
leagues in relation to its market size. One of the insiders mentioned that over 2 billion people 
had access to the Premier League’s television coverage, and its deals in the Far East have proved 
to be highly successful in enhancing the coverage of the league. This coverage also provides a 
range of non-economic motives to investors, as their image and profile can be promoted to a 
wider audience.  
 
Traditionally, FDI has been motivated by elements such as market size, market growth, 
production costs, and the quality of infrastructure (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). In the case of 
football, the size of the Premier League makes it attractive. The market for the Premier League is 
not confined to England, and highlights that markets can be national and supra-national for 
football. However, the supra-national element of markets considers those outside of the EU such 
the Far East where the Premier League is extremely popular. This is in contrast to those such as 
 257 
Fallon & Cook (2009) who note that growth prospects in other regional markets are less 
important in influencing FDI flows than domestic and local markets. Likewise, the potential 
growth of the league was framed in global terms by the insiders as well as observers such as 
Deloitte (2007). There were also other specific issues within the Premier League which enhanced 
its attractiveness. For instance, the insiders also suggested the Premier League was the most 
competitive league in Europe, and investors could have been attracted to the division for this 
reason.  
 
These locational advantages focused on the Premier League, but there was a secondary level of 
locational factor involved in FDI entering the division. This concerned the choice of the clubs for 
takeover. This thesis has found some evidence to suggest that some foreign investors were 
particularly attracted by investing in a London-based club (i.e. Tony Fernandes at Q.P.R, 
Mohamed Al-Fayed at Fulham or Roman Abramovich at Chelsea).  This aspect falls partly within 
an economic framework. Larger cities and catchments enable a football club to attract more 
supporters, which provides an income benefit. Similarly, ownership of a club in London as one of 
the “world’s greatest cities” has obvious football related economic benefits. But this advantage 
should not be seen exclusively in direct footballing terms. In the case of Fulham, ownership was 
clearly related to other business interests of Mohamed Al-Fayed. Additionally, this pattern is 
somewhat similar to UK regional FDI, in that London and the South East account for around 50% 
of FDI inflows entering the UK (UK Trade & Investment, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, ownership of a club in a major global city can just as easily be conceptualised 
through a non-economic narrative, where the owner benefits in other ways from the “big city 
profile”. But is the choice of England more straightforward? The success of Roman Abramovich 
may have convinced some investors to enter the English football market. Whilst there was 
limited evidence for this in the thesis, Campos & Kinoshita (2002) have noted the possible 
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herding mentality involved in FDI decisions. This suggests some possible connection with the 
mimetic behaviour of firms engaging in multinational activity. Foreign investors may have 
targeted certain cities or regions as other investors had already acquired football clubs in those 
areas.  
 
The third strand of the OLI paradigm, internalisation was even more difficult to relate to football 
FDI. Issues surrounding transaction costs were not as prominent in the football context as other 
forms of FDI. In the context of football, a foreign investor cannot enter the market through 
exporting as can happen in other industries. Also, the loss of technology is less important in the 
football context. But have the football clubs been internalized into their other business interests 
held by the foreign investors? This question is hard to assess. The football club has often been 
treated as a standalone investment (as per King, 1997), rather than part of an investor’s wider 
business operations.  
 
There was some evidence which suggested that FDI entering the Premier League was driven by 
asset market and in some cases, resource seeking motivations. The acquisition of some football 
clubs was influenced by the brand, image or history of these clubs, and in football terms, this 
forms an important part of the football club as an ‘asset’.  In terms of market seeking 
motivations, the economic benefits, in terms of league size, club size and location were 
prominent in a number of takeovers. This fits with the theory of market seeking FDI noted by 
Fallon & Cook (2009). However, a smaller number of takeovers were influenced by resource 
seeking motivations. In the FDI literature, this is commonly linked to natural resources   but in 
the context of football access to land was of importance. In particular, the possible use of land 
for housing (Fulham) or other development (Manchester City) was noted as possible motivations 
behind these investments.   
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The frustration with the narrow focus on markets and profits has led many economists in recent 
years to take institutional structures more seriously. This thesis has indicated that FDI in the 
Premier League has also been driven by some institutional elements. Institutions have been 
described as both economic and non-economic in nature. This thesis has found support for both 
of these aspects being important. In sporting terms, the non-economic institutional aspects 
referred to league structure and operation. FDI has mostly entered the Premier League from 
countries which have less developed footballing institutions. However, in contrast to the FDI 
literature, this was not viewed as an industry specific escape investment (e.g. Witt & Lewin, 
2007, Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Although the football-related institutions were weaker in the 
majority of source countries, investors mostly retained a presence within their home country. 
Therefore, institutional quality and league development (in terms of football structures) has had 
some influence on the entrance of FDI into the Premier League, and this supported arguments 
from the wider FDI literature surrounding institutional quality (i.e. Benassy-Quere et al, 2007, 
Daude & Stein, 2007, and Pajunen, 2008). 
 
Although the footballing institutions of England have been considered by some as being 
“strong”, this thesis has suggested that club regulation is, on balance, weak compared with 
leagues in other advanced nations.   Strong regulation of football clubs was cited in Germany, 
where clubs are tightly controlled by the national association and league (Meier, 2008). In this 
context, clubs must also be partly owned by members (supporters), so it is not possible for an 
investor to take complete control at a club (Nauright & Ramfjord, 2010). The English context of 
regulation, was considered as weak due to the ease with which clubs could borrow money, and 
also the ease with which ownership could be transferred (Lago et al, 2006). In England, there are 
fewer restrictions placed on owners compared to other nations.  
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Both insiders and outsiders in the interview data highlighted various weaknesses in club 
regulation in the UK, despite the ‘fit and proper persons test’ which all owners must pass before 
any takeover of a club can be completed. Such a mechanism does not exist in other industries, 
hence in these terms the institutional structure of English football could appear both strong and 
weak depending on the view taken. What investors may want is to balance the general 
institutional strength of an advanced country, with a lightly regulated industry within it. Indeed, 
the established wisdom is that markets with excessive regulation are not attractive to foreign 
investors (Busse & Groizard, 2008). Still, there is a distinction between strongly regulated 
markets, and those which have excessive regulation.  One of the most telling moments in the 
data collection was the unwillingness of one well-placed insider to openly discuss regulation, and 
whether it had influenced the entry of FDI into the Premier League   However, the reference of 
one outsider to tax and financial regulation suggested that in these terms, Premier League 
football may simply be a sub-set of the wider economic activity of the UK. Most industries in the 
UK are ‘open for business’, so why should the Premier League be any different?  This argument 
also reinforces the idea that football clubs are businesses like any other. Finally, the ready 
availability of Premier League clubs due to stock market listings, financial problems, or the desire 
of owner’s to sell was also shown to have influenced football FDI. Compared to other countries 
(like Germany and Spain) with membership-based ownership structures, the Premier League 
presented a quicker option to buy into a football club.  
 
This thesis does not dispute that some FDI has been strongly influenced by the desire to satisfy 
economic motives. However, one of the central weaknesses in the FDI literature has been the 
ability to assess the non-economic motives of FDI. In this regard, football FDI attracted to the 
Premier League has been strongly influenced by a desire to satisfy non-economic motivations. 
These motives have occasionally been alluded to in the football literature (i.e. by Hamil & 
Walters, 2010, Sloane, 1971), but are not found to the same extent in the FDI literature.    
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Perhaps the most influential non-economic motive noted in the collected data was that of the 
‘trophy asset’.  Essentially, the football club has become a form of trophy, with which foreign 
investors can use to enhance their own personal standing. When investment is treated as a 
trophy then profit is not an objective (at least in the short-term, Hamil & Walters, 2010). The 
search for football clubs also expresses a type of ‘trophy hunting’. Our   respondents also linked 
the purchase of a football to other forms of ‘high status’ goods like luxury cars and watches. In 
this sense, the football club is an ideal vehicle to display wealth, and can be considered as a form 
of conspicuous consumption (as per Veblen, 1899). Within the existing football literature, the 
use of the idea of a  ‘trophy asset’ is somewhat limited, with only Hamil & Walters (2010) using 
this term but others, like Sloane (1971) have suggested prestige and status as potential motives 
behind club ownership.  The emphasis on the trophy asset in this thesis adds another dimension 
to the FDI debate by suggesting that FDI entering a club can be viewed as a method of 
conspicuous consumption.  
 
The idea of the trophy asset was not the only non-economic motive identified in the collected 
data. Profile, kudos, and publicity were also noted as possible non-economic influences behind 
FDI entering the Premier League. In addition, also influential in the non-economic factors, was 
the pursuit of sporting success. The sport’s ‘obsessed businessman benefactor’ model for 
example, long predates the more recent commercialisation of football. Ironically, however, this 
commercialisation was supposed to have undermined this ‘traditional’ approach through which 
profit was essentially subsidised by profits made elsewhere. This does not seem to have 
happened. Some foreign investors have purchased a club due to a longstanding interest in 
football, but others have purchased a club due their need to satisfy a desire of owning a club. In 
some cases, it may also be the need to satisfy childhood desires. As a result, the idea of the 
‘sportsman owner’ (Vrooman, 2007) who is more interested in non-economic gains remains 
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important for our understanding. However, concrete evidence of this goal is ambiguous. Whilst, 
some owners (such as Roman Abramovich) seem to have a genuine love for football and 
regularly attend matches, others (like the Glazer family) seem more interested in economic 
aspects. 
 
Finally, another important non-economic element which has influenced FDI entering the Premier 
League concerns political factors. This impacts in at least two-ways, firstly, through personal 
protection, and secondly through country rivalry. The first element could be related to the desire 
to escape from weak institutions, but more specifically, this study has shown the desire for some 
investors to protect themselves.   Football clubs have also been shown to be effective 
promotional tools for nation states as well as individuals and business groups. New ‘actors’ in 
the global economy have sought ownership on this basis. In the case of Manchester City it has 
been shown the club was purchased partly in order for Abu Dhabi to promote itself to offset the 
impact of Dubai. This also implies that asset-seeking motives are important in influencing the FDI 
which has come from the emerging markets. Indeed, this reflected the wider pattern concerning 
outward FDI which has come from these nations.  
 
 This thesis then has shown that FDI entering the Premier League has been influenced by a range 
of different factors. Unlike most other forms of FDI, the investment is cannot always considered 
as being solely on economic terms.  Due to the popularity of the Premier League across the 
world, ownership of a club in the division is highly desirable, as a number of these non-economic 
factors can be satisfied. With the rise in global awareness of the Premier League, greater status 
and kudos can be obtained from club ownership, compared to clubs from most other football 
leagues. Of these non-economic it is status, which is perhaps the most influential motive. The 
use of a football club as trophy asset presents a particular view of a foreign investor, and 
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focusing on their status and reputation. Indeed, ownership of a football club can be viewed as a 
form of self-promotion.  
 
Instead of simply seeking profits or wins, foreign investors have a range of motives, some 
economic and some non-economic which they hold. Therefore, rather than analysing foreign 
investors as being market seekers, or asset seekers, it is more effective to consider them as 
utility maximisers, or as seeking long-term global returns (as per Zimbalist, 2003). In-line with 
Sloane (1971), profit can be considered as one objective in this approach. However, this thesis 
has also indicated different forms of profit exist, so whilst investor may be seeking ‘club’ profit, it 
is not necessarily the prime focus. As a result, the club itself can be loss-making, but the 
investors other businesses benefit from football club ownership. In some cases, direct profit 
(both short and long term) was shown to be a motive influencing the FDI decision, but in the 
context of FDI and the Premier League, there was a variance as to which form of profit was being 
pursued by an investor.  
 
8.2 Consequences of FDI 
 
Given that the key motivations behind FDI have now been established, the second focus of the 
thesis considered an analysis of the consequences of FDI entering the Premier League. Since 
analysis of the motivation behind FDI is in part about the realisation of anticipated benefits, 
there is necessarily some overlap in the discussion of the consequences of FDI. But in this part of 
the thesis, the outcomes of football FDI were analysed more systematically in terms of the wider 
effects on the sporting side of football, football as a business, as well as regional effects.  These 
consequences were considered both directly and indirectly. In comparison to motives, the 
consequences of FDI are considered in the ex-post sense rather than the ex-ante.  
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8.2.1 Direct Consequences  
 
The direct consequences of FDI entering the Premier League refer to those aspects which have 
directly impacted upon those clubs acquired by foreign investors. This included aspects such as 
revenue, wages, transfer spending, profits, and debt.  
 
At all three case clubs, revenues increased following the arrival of a foreign investor. The extent 
to which this was influenced by a foreign investor varied. For example, at Manchester United, 
the Glazer family were able to use their ownership advantages to secure a number of new 
commercial arrangements, whilst this was also the case with Sheikh Mansour at Manchester 
City. In contrast, following the takeover of Manchester City by Thaksin Shinawatra, the majority 
of the revenue increases were driven by the new television deal beginning in the summer of 
2007. At Fulham, the foreign investment enabled the club to rise through the divisions; hence 
additional revenue was generated through promotions.  
 
In order to achieve these greater revenues, it might be assumed that this FDI had brought with it 
improved management and commercial expertise. Despite the assumption that FDI brought 
improved knowledge and expertise, some of the respondents (mostly from domestically owned 
clubs) were not sure as to whether this had been a benefit of FDI. To some this has been an 
evolution of the business strategy in the Premier League itself. However, from the case studies, 
it is clear that the management teams outside of the field of play have been dramatically 
changed in order to improve club financial performance.  
 
Along with revenues, FDI was shown to have had an effect on the level of wage spending in the 
Premier League. This consequence was particularly important at club level, as FDI was shown to 
have driven wages up at all of the case clubs. This, along with evidence of wage spending across 
 265 
different clubs in the Premier League, indicates that foreign owned clubs spend more on wages 
than domestically owned clubs. In the wider FDI literature, Girma et al (2001), Lipsey & Sjoholm 
(2005), and Driffield & Girma (2003) note that foreign firms pay higher wages across a variety of 
industries.  By offering higher wages than domestically owned clubs, foreign owned clubs are 
able to reduce the level of “good employee mobility” and in football terms attract and retain the 
better players. This will then deprive other clubs of better assets. However, foreign ownership is 
not the only factor which influences the level of wage spending. The size of the club and the 
access to a large supporter base also influences spending power. Additionally, increases in 
television revenue were shown to have an effect on the level of wage spending conducted at the 
club level. Despite these issues, FDI was shown to have driven wage increases across those clubs 
under foreign control. In some cases (like Manchester City) wage increases were substantial, but 
at some clubs, who were already large wage spenders (like Manchester United), the increases 
were less substantial.  
 
Investment in player transfers was another factor which influenced performance, and was also 
influenced by the arrival of FDI into the Premier League. Unlike wages, the notion of a transfer 
fee being paid to secure the service of an employee is not covered within the standard FDI 
literature. Like wages, the entrance of FDI into the Premier League has increased transfer costs 
for all clubs across the division. For foreign owned clubs, the data from the three case clubs 
indicated transfer spending was higher after a foreign takeover was completed. As the clubs 
under foreign ownership began to pay higher transfer fees, those clubs still in domestic control 
were faced with a more inflated transfer market. In order to try and compete, domestically 
owned clubs also increased their transfer spending. 
 
What effect has FDI had on profits? In contrast to revenues, FDI was shown to have a negative 
effect on profits at both the club and the league. At the club level, all three case study clubs 
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recorded higher pre-tax losses under foreign ownership than those recorded in domestic 
control. At Manchester United, the most profitable club in the Premier League was transformed 
into a loss-making entity following the takeover by the Glazer family, with the associated 
acquisition debt costs. This was despite a substantial rise in declared operating profits due to 
increases in revenue. At Manchester City and Fulham, the increased losses were driven by 
foreign owners increasing spending on player wages and transfers. In both cases, similar 
operating profits were not consistently achieved. So whilst the causes are different, the outcome 
of FDI is similar. Furthermore, those clubs which have generated the largest losses are under 
foreign control. This supports those who argue that foreign owned clubs generate lower profits 
than those operating under different ownership structures.  
 
Not only has FDI had a negative effect on profits, but, the entrance of FDI into the Premier 
League has led to an increase in debt, at both the club and the league level. From the case 
studies, all three clubs were shown to have increased levels of debt following a foreign takeover. 
Like profits though, the causes of the increases in debt were different. At Manchester United, 
the cause of the debt increase was the takeover method used by the Glazer family. At Fulham 
and Manchester City, the debt was driven by owners injecting finance as a loan in order to cover 
financial losses.  
 
8.2.2 Indirect Consequences 
 
The second group of effects from FDI entering the Premier League concerns indirect effects. 
These effects are the wider consequences of FDI which have affected the league, other clubs, 
and in some cases local regions.  
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When considering revenues, at the league level, the most important source of revenue has been 
from television. In 2006, this revenue stream was influenced by an EU ruling which ended the 
Sky monopoly of live rights. As a result, the market for television rights became more 
competitive as other providers were encouraged to bid for the live matches. This inflated the 
value of television rights contracts, and had a greater impact than the arrival of FDI into the 
Premier League. However, the arrival of FDI also encouraged television companies to bid for 
Premier League rights due to the quality and interest in foreign players and the competition. 
Globally, evidence was found to suggest the Premier League’s ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to 
ownership (as well as players) was an important factor in influencing the demand for overseas 
television rights. Therefore, FDI was more influential in securing revenues from global television 
rights sales than those from domestic rights. Again, this reflects the importance of investment in 
attracting demand for the Premier League. This raises issues about causality. In considering the 
motives of FDI, the importance of television revenues in attracting foreign investors has been 
stated, but this thesis also highlights the importance of foreign investors in attracting television 
companies, particularly at the global level. Although revenues have been influenced, 
competition between broadcasters in the domestic market, the Premier League needs to be an 
attractive product in the first instance in order to attract broadcasters.  
 
In terms of the business acumen and other skills brought into clubs by foreign investors, the 
potential for spillover effects existed. The CEO of Arsenal, Ivan Gazidis suggested that other clubs 
could learn from the operation of Manchester United. However, this thesis did not find a 
substantial body evidence to suggest that domestically owned Premier League clubs are copying 
foreign owned rivals. Such demonstration effects are, however, common across other industry 
forms (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1996). This thesis cannot completely reject the notion of 
demonstration effects in football, but club size and position may also be a factor which 
determines whether clubs can benefit  Indeed, it could be argued  that smaller clubs which have 
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smaller resources cannot generate the same benefits as those clubs which are larger or have 
greater resources. Perhaps, this can be considered as a footballing form of absorptive capacity 
through organisational size and form.  
 
In terms of wage spillovers, there were some indirect effects for domestically owned clubs.  The 
competitive labour market for players in the Premier League has forced clubs to invest 
significant amounts of money into player wages. If a club seeks to restrict wage spending it will 
be faced with poorer player choice and performance. The presence of wage spillovers was as a 
result of the arrival of a foreign investor into a club which is considered to be a direct rival, and 
there is a further effect from the ‘mega’ takeovers at clubs such as Chelsea and Manchester City. 
However, for a domestically owned club in the middle of the Premier League table, the most 
influential impact came from the acquisition of a rival club in a similar position. Despite this, the 
‘mega’ takeovers did have some “flow through” effect on wages in the rest of the division.  
 
There were also further negative indirect consequences from FDI on wages and transfers. Some 
domestically owned clubs are unable to compete with foreign owned clubs who can offer higher 
wages and transfer fees. As a result, domestically owned clubs struggled to compete with foreign 
owned rivals. The qualitative data also suggested a recognition that for some domestically 
owned clubs, it had become more difficult to attract “good” players as foreign owned rivals 
offered higher wages. In some cases, foreign owned clubs may have “stockpiled” players in order 
to stop other clubs signing them. This reinforced the low level of success gained by domestically 
owned clubs in comparison to foreign owned clubs which have dominated the top four places in 
the Premier League from 2005/2006 onwards.  
 
As well as profits being lower for foreign owned clubs, the collected data also indicated that 
profits were generally lower for clubs in domestic ownership. However, the scale of losses at 
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domestically owned clubs is relatively lower compared to those under foreign ownership. Still 
the increased scale of these losses presented a potential challenge for domestic investors who 
do not have access to the same level of capital as foreign investors. An effect of these higher 
losses for domestically owned clubs was an increase in debt. For instance, both Bolton and 
Wigan had large increases in debt over the 2005/2006 to 2010/2011 period. This increase was 
influenced by higher costs leading to higher losses, which then had to be covered by owners. 
Such behaviour was noted within the primary data, as Respondent B suggested domestic owners 
had to move from being “normal” benefactors to generous benefactors due to the arrival of FDI.  
 
For some clubs, the arrival of foreign ownership presented a positive consequence. In the 
literature, Lago et al (2006) argued there were those which were demanders of talent (like the 
foreign owned clubs), and other clubs which acted as suppliers of talent. As transfer fees 
increased, those clubs who were suppliers of talent were rewarded by generating a higher 
income from selling players, and sometimes holding out for a higher price for players. The 
limitation of this positive consequence is that a significant proportion of the transfer spending 
was directed abroad, hence this consequence could not be internalised within England or the 
Premier League.  
 
When addressing competitive balance, the results from this thesis presented a mixed picture. 
The primary qualitative data indicated that FDI had a mostly positive effect on the 
competitiveness of the Premier League. This argument finds support in the wider FDI literature 
which has associated FDI with an improvement in competitiveness. However, this more positive 
anecdotal evidence needs to be contrasted with the actual performance data which suggested 
the competitive balance of the Premier League had declined since the arrival of FDI. This was 
confirmed using various indexes (including Herfindahl, C5 Ratio, and Lorenz Curve). Whilst, there 
was some improvement in the 2010/2011 season, this did not fit the general pattern of widening 
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imbalances between clubs in the Premier League. This decline in competitive balance across the 
Premier League has been identified by Michie & Oughton (2004), Gossens (2006) and Pawlowski 
et al (2010). However, these studies did not make any reference to FDI.  Only Ramchandani 
(2012) has suggested that FDI has negatively impacted the competitive balance of the Premier 
League so this thesis adds to the evidence that this issue needs to be taken more seriously. 
 
This also poses the question of why there is such a contrast between views expressed in the 
game and the evidence of the secondary data. Those who argued that the competitiveness of 
the Premier League was positively affected by FDI were insiders. As they were involved at 
Premier League clubs, they may have felt it necessary to be positive about external investment. 
Those involved in the Premier League have repeatedly used the phrase “the best league in the 
world”.  Admitting that the league was less competitive would not project a suitable image of 
the Premier League. Despite the overall reduction in competitive balance, the entrance of FDI 
also provided an exogenous shock to the competitive order, as there was the entry of a few new 
teams at the top of the Premier League. Therefore, Barros & Leach (2006) can only be partially 
supported. The number of ‘new teams’ competing at the top of the Premier League is extremely 
limited, and these ‘new teams’ required substantial investment in order to reach this position 
(i.e. Manchester City). So whilst some positive remarks were made about the competitiveness of 
the division, it is now virtually impossible for any club to break into the ‘elite’ group without a 
wealthy foreign benefactor.  
 
On a more positive note, FDI was shown to have improved the stature of the Premier League. It 
is highly possible that the enhancement of stature brought by foreign ownership has created a 
desire for other foreign investors to enter the Premier League. Economically, this was shown to 
provide a positive consequence as revenues from global television deals have continued to 
increase.  Another positive benefit has been that more high profile foreign players have been 
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attracted to the Premier League through the possibility of securing higher wages, and playing for 
successful clubs. In the sports economics literature, Lucifora & Simmons (2003) noted ‘superstar 
effects’ or positive spillovers, driven by the arrival of highly performing players who attract 
additional spectators and interest. As one of the respondents noted foreign investment can 
create a virtuous circle for the Premier League, with the high profile players improving the 
‘quality’ of the Premier League, and further attracting even more high profile foreign players. 
This can not only benefit foreign owned clubs, but in some cases domestically owned clubs have 
benefited from attracting high profile foreign players as well.  The difficulty for domestically 
owned clubs is when they face competition to sign a player when foreign owned rivals have 
greater resources.   
 
The literature on FDI has also been shown to indicate a positive effect on product quality 
(Dunning, 1994) But the nature of football itself leads to a debate about what is meant by 
product quality. The quality of a match cannot be guaranteed, it is not like a manufactured 
product that will undergo a quality management process before it is released to the market.  
According to most of the respondents, foreign ownership improved the standard of matches in 
the Premier League. This was not the unanimous view, as some of the outsiders questioned the 
improvements in standard. The arrival of “better” foreign players (often replacing “weaker” 
domestic players) should theoretically improve the quality of matches in the Premier League. 
The negative consequence of this particular trend has been for the number of English qualified 
players in the Premier League to be reduced dramatically over the last decade. Not only have 
“weaker” domestic players been forced into lower divisions, but it has become more difficult for 
young English players to ‘break-into’ Premier League first-team squads. Such a situation presents 
a challenge for the English national team as the number of players available to the coach is 
extremely restricted. Indeed, it may become difficult to replace the current generation of 
players.  
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Not only has there been an effect on players, but there has also been a consequence for coaches 
and managers. Since the arrival of FDI, it has been more common to see foreign coaches and 
managers in the Premier League. Not only have foreign owned clubs been more open to 
employing foreign managers, but domestically owned clubs have also adopted this strategy (i.e. 
Swansea City). This of course can lead to the implementation of new management and training 
methods, which can then be copied elsewhere by other coaches presenting the possibility of 
positive spillover effects. In contrast, the arrival of foreign coaches and managers can also 
restrict the opportunities for domestic coaches and managers, which presents a potential 
negative consequence of FDI.  
 
The improvement in quality within the Premier League also has further spillovers for leagues 
across Europe. Whilst changing the distribution of playing talent across leagues, major clubs, 
such as Bayern Munich and Real Madrid reacted to the English ‘dominance’ of the Champions 
League between 2005 and 2009 by embarking on their own team strengthening strategies. This 
of course has changed the balance of power within the Champions League, and ensured that the 
major European clubs have not been left behind by the top English clubs. Of course for smaller 
clubs in the Champions League (or large clubs from small nations like Celtic in Scotland) 
competing in Europe has become more difficult due to this ‘arms race’ between the elite 
European clubs.  
 
The final league wide consequence under investigation referred to sporting ‘productivity’. For 
domestically owned clubs, it has been established that the arrival of FDI presented challenges, as 
foreign owned clubs had access to larger financial resources. In order to compete with these 
clubs, domestically owned clubs need to use their resources more effectively (as shown in other 
industries by Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998). If they do not use their resources more effectively, 
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there is the threat of being forced from the market (Javorick, 2004). In the football context this 
means relegation.  
 
At the club level, this thesis has found there is a mixed picture for domestically owned clubs. 
Unquestionably, some domestically owned clubs were negatively affected by the arrival of FDI. 
Charlton, for example, had been a club displaying strong on-field productivity (Haas, 2003) prior 
to the arrival of FDI in the Premier League. Unable to compete with the foreign owned clubs 
financially, Charlton   were relegated in 2007. Another example was Bolton Wanderers. In the 
2005/2006 data, Bolton were shown to have performed particularly well in relation to their 
wage spending. However, in later seasons, the level of on-field productivity had declined. 
Without the resources available to enhance their performance, Bolton was essentially ‘crowded 
out’ by foreign clubs. For example, prior to FDI entering clubs such as that at Sunderland, 
Manchester City and Aston Villa, Bolton had several seasons where they had outperformed them 
despite resource disadvantages. Under foreign control, the available resources for these clubs 
were now substantial, and Bolton could no longer compete with these clubs over a season.  
 
In contrast, other domestically owned clubs were shown to have made a more effective use of 
their resources (like Everton and Tottenham). As a result, these two clubs were able to display a 
strong level of on-field productivity.  One respondent noted that on-field productivity could be 
improved through improved medical provision. This would in turn benefit player fitness levels, 
and provides an advantage on the field of play. When considering the acquired clubs, again the 
effects were mixed. Some clubs have increased their on-field productivity, others were already 
considered as being productive before and FDI, whilst some have seen productivity declines. In 
the case of Chelsea, although the club is more successful than under domestic ownership, it was 
not considered as having higher productivity. Despite having the largest budget for the 
2002/2003 to 2010/2011 period, Chelsea has had seasons where they have finished adrift of the 
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league champions (like 2008/2009 and 2010/2011). As such, the league finishes are strong, but 
with the available resource base the performance should and could have been stronger.  
 
Within football, the spread of benefits and costs brought by FDI has not only been at the club 
level (i.e. such as wages and profits), but has also occurred in some cases at the regional level. 
This thesis has found some evidence to suggest that FDI entering the Premier League has 
positively, but modestly, benefitted employment in the local region. This has occurred in two 
ways. Firstly, additional jobs have been created, and secondly, existing jobs have been 
protected. The importance of employment benefits being brought by FDI is well established in 
the literature (i.e. Girma & Wakelin, 2009, Haskel et al, 2007). In terms of job creation, evidence 
from the case studies suggested some job growth was apparent. For instance, at Manchester 
United, jobs were created in the clubs commercial department, whilst Manchester City 
strengthened a variety of non-footballing divisions after the takeover by Sheikh Mansour. 
Furthermore, at Fulham, the club’s change in stature following the takeover by Mohamed Al-
Fayed has provided increased employment. The exact effect on the local region is difficult to 
judge, as in some cases these jobs have gone to non-locals. Indeed, the employment of nationals 
from Abu Dhabi in prominent positions at Manchester City highlighted that some of the high 
value added jobs were not given to local workers.  
 
In one case, clear regional benefits were prominent. At Manchester City, the development of the 
clubs infrastructure was completed through using mostly local workers and local materials. This 
created a positive consequence for sectors outside of football (i.e. construction), so presenting 
evidence of inter-sectoral spillovers. Furthermore, the planned Etihad Campus will enable 
further positive consequences through the redevelopment of the East Manchester region which 
has been heavily affected by de-industrialization (Conn, 2012). But, the case of Manchester City 
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is unique, as the scale of the investment into the Etihad Campus is such that for other investors 
it would be highly difficult to replicate (due to the scale of the investment or land availability).  
 
In terms of regional spillovers existing between local clubs there was no evidence to suggest that 
West Bromwich Albion, for instance, were able to directly benefit from the arrival of Randy 
Lerner at Aston Villa. The FDI arguments suggesting strong regional spillovers were generated by 
firms in the same sector are not wholly relevant to the context of football, although clearly those 
clubs not in foreign hands would not wish to fall behind those who are.  
 
A final consequence of FDI concerned club supporters. From the case studies, differing pictures 
emerge. At Manchester United, the takeover by the Glazer family caused various protests and 
complaints from supporters. At Fulham whilst the change in ownership was welcomed, concerns 
were raised over the running of the club, and the attitude towards supporters. In contrast, at 
Manchester City, the dissent concerning foreign ownership was much less noticeable. Although 
some concerns were raised about Thaksin Shinawatra and his background, Manchester City fans 
welcomed the investment as it enabled them to rebuild what had been a depleted playing 
squad. Additionally, the success achieved by Manchester United is a factor could also have been 
a factor as to why resistance to the foreign investment was less evident at Manchester City.  
 
8.3 Findings  
 
Having discussed the main findings from the thesis, the next part of this chapter will briefly 
summarise these findings in relation to the research questions of the thesis. The first research 
question dealt with the motives of the thesis, and has found from the primary data that there 
are a range of motives which have influenced football FDI. In contrast to other forms of FDI, 
some of the most influential motives behind football FDI have been non-economic factors. In 
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particular, this included aspects such as status, prestige, profile, interest in football, and political 
motives. Indeed, it is argued that the football club can be viewed as a form of ‘trophy’. Hence, a 
Premier League club can be viewed as a ‘trophy asset’ which is used to display the wealth of the 
owner in a similar manner to the notion of the positional good. Indeed, football clubs can be 
purchased as a form of conspicuous consumption. These arguments were not widely reflected in 
the FDI literature which has focused on traditional economic motives.  
 
Football has been found to be an industry where profits are uncommon, but this has not 
stopped some investors from pursuing the purchase of a football club due to other economic 
influences. The growth of revenues in the Premier League has been particularly attractive to 
some investors (mostly those from North America). Indeed, these investors have entered the 
Premier League in the hope of making profits, whilst some of the respondents felt that these 
investors have targeted Premier League clubs due to a feeling that they were undervalued. 
However, the difficulty in obtaining profits has led to a difference in some cases in the ex-ante 
and ex-post objectives. Some respondents also argued that the regulatory framework of English 
football and wider financial regulation were influential. For some investors it was apparent that 
they wanted to make a quick purchase which was possible due to the Premier League’s weak 
regulatory framework, but they also wanted access to some of the institutional advantages 
offered by the UK.  
 
The thesis has also identified a range of different consequences which have arisen from the 
arrival of FDI into the Premier League. These are broadly grouped into two areas which are 
reflected in the second and third research questions.  Firstly, there are impacts which have 
directly affected the clubs acquired by foreign investors, and secondly, there have been indirect 
effects to other clubs and the Premier League. The second research question dealt with those 
impacts which directly affected the acquired clubs. The direct effects found from the data 
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included impacts on wages, transfer costs, revenues, debt, and profits. Through using three case 
clubs, wage spending, transfer spending, revenues were all higher under foreign ownership, but 
profits were lower. Furthermore, debt was also shown to be higher due to the decline in profits. 
However, on the field of play, foreign ownership was shown to have been mostly positive for the 
three case clubs. The increases in spending were particularly beneficial in this aspect.  
 
In relation to the third research question, the arrival of FDI has also had indirect impacts to other 
clubs and the Premier League. As performance and spending are closely association, clubs not 
acquired by foreign investors have had to increase their own spending in order to try and remain 
competitive. As a result of this extra spending, domestically owned clubs have also failed to 
record consistent profits and this has caused increases in debt. There is the presence of wage 
spillovers which is not always apparent in other industries which have received injections of FDI. 
Furthermore, FDI was shown to have widened the gap between clubs in the Premier League, as 
the competitive balance of the division has declined since the entrance of FDI. This is despite 
arguments from those insiders involved in the Premier League who suggested that FDI had been 
beneficial in this respect. There were mixed consequences in terms of productivity, with some 
domestically owned clubs shown to have recorded productivity declines after the arrival of FDI. 
Finally, direct investment in club infrastructure was shown to have created wider benefits for 
local regions (in particular East Manchester through the investment into Manchester City). This 
wider benefit related to wages and employment, but such a feature did not occur in every 
takeover.  
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8.4 Contribution  
 
Using a multi-method approach, this study has added to the existing body of research by 
providing a detailed analysis of both the motives and the consequences of FDI entering the 
Premier League. This thesis has used methods which are not commonly used in the sports 
economics and FDI literature, as both questionnaires and interview data was used to 
supplement more standard secondary data. Through this process, the most crucial motives and 
consequences have been identified, and this helps to address a current gap in the knowledge 
base.  
 
In the introductory chapter, it was suggested that foreign owners of English football clubs have 
often failed to effectively communicate their motives and objectives surrounding changes in club 
ownership. This raised issues surrounding the ex-ante and ex-post objectives held by foreign 
owners. The lack of clarity is compounded in much of the academic literature. This thesis argues 
that there are serious limitations in the economic approach to football, and perhaps, by 
implication, sporting FDI more generally. It has been argued that the analysis of such FDI needs 
to take wider motives (i.e. non-economic) more seriously and not least the desire to use FDI to 
obtain trophy assets. More widely, this thesis raises concerns about the sector sensitivity of FDI 
and spillover theory. As FDI theory cannot be wholly applied to the football context, this does 
raise arguments about FDI theory being sensitive to activities in particular sectors.   
 
A major contribution of this thesis is to apply the FDI literature to the specific context of English 
football. In particular, this involved considering theories such as the OLI paradigm, resource-
based view, and institutional theory to the context of FDI in English football. This study has 
found these theories can only partly explain FDI entering the Premier League. For instance, in 
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the OLI framework, the importance of internalisation was less evident than in other industries. 
However, similarities in terms of ownership and locational advantages did exist. Likewise, when 
considering the motives of FDI, efficiency seeking was not shown to have been a factor which 
influenced football FDI, but the desire to access resources, markets, and strategic assets were of 
more importance (particularly the final two factors).  
 
The theories and motives of FDI considered in main stream business literature are mostly 
economic. If the desire of an investor is to access markets, resources, efficiencies, or assets, 
these aspects will ultimately benefit profits. Hence, profit is considered to be the ultimate 
objective for the FDI decision (Bitzenis, 2003). As this economic narrative underpins most FDI 
theories, the literature has largely ignored non-economic factors which may well have 
influenced FDI decisions. However, the findings from this study have suggested that non-
economic factors are highly important in influencing football FDI flows. This raises concerns not 
only for football FDI but for FDI more generally. 
 
Current FDI theory does not take sufficiently into consideration the non-economic aspects of 
multinational firm activity. As the majority of studies do not reflect non-economic motives in 
their evaluation of FDI, this thesis has contributed to the discussion of other factors which can 
influence football FDI. These include some aspects of institutional theory, conspicuous 
consumption, positional goods, political factors, the ‘trophy asset’ and other elements 
concerning prestige and profile. Some of these elements have been discussed in the wider 
literature concerning purchasing decisions, but they have not been wholly considered in relation 
to FDI. By relating these constructs to the FDI process, this thesis has extended the current FDI 
literature, and makes an important contribution. Whilst it has been assumed by Bitzenis (2003) 
and others that FDI is an economic process, the importance of non-economic factors in football 
suggests that this isn’t true of all industries. With non-economic arguments towards FDI 
 280 
decisions largely ignored in the literature, the use of these non-economic constructs helps to 
evaluate FDI from a different direction to the conventional literature.  
 
In addition to the motives of FDI, this thesis has also attempted to link the consequences of FDI 
to the context of the Premier League. Again, this thesis has shown conventional FDI theory to be 
only partly applicable to football, and as a result of there has been an alternative method 
proposed for the investigation of productivity. The measurement of productivity is based upon 
output per person or output per hour. In footballing terms, this thesis has shown productivity to 
be measured in a different way through points (output) per cost (related to wages). This in itself 
was based upon the link between spending and performance. In the sports economics literature, 
there has been a range of approaches used to analyse productivity (i.e. such as those by Haas, 
2003 and Barros & Leach, 2006), but the use of points and wages focuses on the on-field aspect, 
rather than off-field concerns.  
 
Additionally, this thesis has also addressed the need noted by Ramchandani (2012) to assess the 
impact of FDI on the competitive balance of the Premier League. The findings on this aspect 
were mixed, but the secondary data did reinforce the idea that competitive balance in the 
Premier League had declined due to the entrance of FDI. Additionally, this thesis made a 
contribution concerning other spillovers effects (i.e. regional effects), and how these are applied 
to football. Moreover, the effects of FDI entering the Premier League have previously not been 
investigated through spillover theory.  
 
These arguments raise a wider point about the suitability of FDI theory for some instances. It 
may well be that FDI theory cannot be applied to all industries due to differences in their 
structure and nature. Indeed, FDI is possibly a unique process which is highly industry specific, 
limiting the effectiveness of general FDI theories. In football, the differing attitudes and success 
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in gaining profits presented a different context to other industries, and restricted the ability of 
FDI theory to be applied to football. This could well be the case in other industries where non-
economic objectives are important (i.e. some parts of the newspaper industry).  
 
8.5 Limitations  
 
Although this work has contributed to understanding the causes and impacts of FDI in the 
Premier League, it is also necessary to recognise some limitations present in the work 
undertaken.  The study is based on the analysis of a single league, and the consideration of other 
leagues (such as the Spanish Primera Division or the Italian Serie A) has not been undertaken. 
The use of a wider range of leagues could improve the generalizability of the study, as different 
contexts will be under investigation, and not just those relating to the Premier League. More 
recently, FDI flows have begun to enter other European leagues, and whilst the number of clubs 
foreign owned outside of England is still limited, some high profile clubs like Paris Saint-Germain 
and AS Monaco are now under foreign control, indicating  the possibility of further mimetic 
behaviour. This broadening pattern of FDI is critical, as it is likely to have a substantial effect on 
European football and in particular the demand for players and the results in European 
competitions. For future research, a cross-country study between the top divisions of European 
football would enhance the understanding of these issues, and whether there are any 
differences in motives.  
 
Also this study did not investigate all takeovers of clubs in England, particularly those outside of 
the Premier League. One of the developing trends in English football club ownership has been to 
observe a greater volume of FDI entering those clubs outside of the Premier League. FDI into 
Cardiff City, Leicester City, Nottingham Forest, Hull City, Watford, Sheffield Wednesday, and 
Leeds United has occurred in the last three seasons. Nor has there been a comparison between 
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English football and Scottish football. Perhaps an area for future research concerns those 
investors who have interests in clubs across Europe (i.e. Pozzo family with Udinese, Granada, 
and Watford). The motives behind this FDI could well be different to other football FDI, and if 
this trend continues it will need to be added into the investigation of football FDI.  
 
A second limitation arises from the sample size involved in the research. The study focused on 
just the Premier League where only twenty clubs compete in the league at any one time. This 
sample is reduced further by FDI only occurring in around half of the clubs in the league. In 
addition, FDI can be expected to have dynamics effects, and a longitudinal study, rather than a 
cross-sectional one would be beneficial with regard to the qualitative analysis. This would be 
beneficial due to the small sample size, and the more limited data available.  
 
The research also faced a number of problems and not least that of access to football elites. This 
study uses primary data from the supporters’ movement and senior club officials, but despite 
several attempts, it was not possible to arrange an interview with a regulator. Access to a senior 
official from the Premier League or the FA would have provided a further perspective and added 
to the richness of the study. In particular, this would have been beneficial when considering the 
regulatory aspect. As the research focused on the Premier League there was no approach made 
to the Football League. However, the regulations surrounding ownership and the fit and proper 
persons test differ slightly between the two organisations. These differences could be explored 
in further research. Alongside this, the perspective of a supra-national governing body could also 
have been considered. The stance of the current UEFA President Michel Platini towards FDI has 
been highly negative (Kelly et al, 2012). Although this study has accessed members of the 
supporter movement, it did not access supporters in the wider sense.  
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Similarly, this study has been unable to gain access to a foreign owner of a Premier League club. 
Additionally, there was no contacting of an investor prior to a club takeover. Such access would 
have been difficult due to issues surrounding privacy, but would have added another perspective 
to the study. It should also be noted that the majority of studies in the topic area do not make 
use of interview data from club owners due to access difficulties. The problem is greater for 
foreign investors who, in a number of cases (such as the Glazer family, Sheikh Mansour, Randy 
Lerner, and members of the Fenway Sports Group) spend very little or no time at their particular 
club. In some cases these owners have been reluctant to make themselves directly available for 
any form of interview (but use club media). This has added to the secrecy surrounding some of 
these investors, but it also shows why this thesis is an important beginning in an area whose 
significance will grow in the future.  
 
8.6 Areas for Future Research  
 
The nature of FDI flows into football is changing, with foreign ownership now becoming more 
common in football leagues other than the Premier League. Nearly, 50% of clubs in the second 
tier of English football (Championship) are now either fully or partly controlled by a foreign 
investor. Furthermore, foreign ownership is now becoming more common in the top divisions of 
French, Italian, and Spanish football. However, this thesis has not investigated the FDI in these 
divisions. So are the motives behind these FDI decisions similar to those found in this study? Are 
the consequences caused by the entrance of FDI into these leagues similar?  
 
With the study having established the importance of non-economic objectives in the purchase of 
Premier League clubs, another area for future research is to apply these constructs to FDI 
decisions which have taken place in other sectors. For instance, do issues surrounding theories 
like conspicuous consumption apply to sectors like banking? With FDI investigated through a 
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narrow economic prism, the application of the non-economic concepts to FDI decisions in 
sectors other than football, will allow FDI decisions to be more widely evaluated.  
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Appendix One: Foreign Owned Questionnaire  
 
Foreign Investment and Club X  
 
Guidance: The following questionnaire is based on the investment into Club X from Investor A. 
Please follow the instructions as given. The majority of questions are based on a ranking system. 
Please circle or tick the appropriate boxes. The questionnaire should take you no longer than ten 
minutes to complete. Thank you for your assistance.  
 
 
1. Please rate the strength of the reason as to why you think the investment was made into 
football.  
(5= Very Strong, 4= Strong, 3= Average, 2= Weak, 1=  Very Weak   
 
Club Prestige  5 4 3 2 1 
Passion for 
club 
5 4 3 2 1 
Profit 5 4 3 2 1 
Sporting 
Challange 
5 4 3 2 1 
Onfield 
Success  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
2. To the best of your knowledge did the investor consider investment into football clubs in 
other countries?  
(3=Yes, 2= No,  1= Not Sure )  
3 2 1 
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3. Please rate the strength of the factors that you think may have influenced the choice of 
England as the location of the investment 
(5= Very Strong, 4= Strong, 3= Average, 2= Weak, 1=  Very Weak)  
Facilities  5 4 3 2 1 
Club 
Availability  
5 4 3 2 1 
Revenue 
Generation   
5 4 3 2 1 
History  5 4 3 2 1 
Global Appeal 5 4 3 2 1 
 
4. Did the regulatory environment of English football influence the country choice?  
(3=Agree, 2= No, 1= Not sure)  
3 2 1 
 
5. Do you think that the investment was influenced by the size of the football market in England?  
(3=Agree, 2= No, 1= Not sure)  
3 2 1 
 
6. How would you define the investment?  
  
 
7. What is the current shareholding of the major investor at the club?  
0-24% 25-49%                        50-74% 75-100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial Hostile Takeover Full Buyout  
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8.  Please rate the strength of the factors that you think may have influenced the choice of club 
for investment  
(5= Very Strong, 4= Strong, 3= Average, 2=Weak, 1= Very Weak) 
Location  5 4 3 2 1 
Club 
Availability  
5 4 3 2 1 
History  5 4 3 2 1 
Fan Base 5 4 3 2 1 
Growth 
Potential  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
9.  To what extent do you think that the league position of the club influenced the investment?  
(5= Very Strong influence, 4= Strong influence, 3= Average,, 2= Weak influence, 1=  Very Weak 
influence)  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
10. What attractions in terms of existing capabilities do you feel your club had?  
(5= Very Strong, 4= Strong, 3= Average, 2= Weak, 1=  Very Weak) 
 
11. To the best of your knowledge were other English clubs that were targeted for investment?   
(3= Yes, 2= No, 1=  Not sure)  
3 2 1 
  
12. To the best of your knowledge are you aware if any previous foreign investment into English 
football influenced the choice of club?  
(3= Yes, 2= No,  1= Not sure)  
3 2 1 
  
Playing Talent 5 4 3 2 1 
Off-field Skills 5 4 3 2 1 
Coaching 5 4 3 2 1 
Youth 
Academy  
5 4 3 2 1 
Infrastructure  5 4 3 2 1 
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13. Please rate what advantages you feel have been created through the investment?  
(5=Very Significant, 4= Significant, 3=  Average, 2= Some significance, 1=  Insignificant)  
 
14. Do you think that foreign investment into English football has significantly affected other 
clubs in the Premier League that have not had such investment?  
(5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3=Unsure, 2=Disagree, 1=Strongly Disagree)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improved 
Financial 
Performance  
5 4 3 2 1 
Improved 
Image 
5 4 3 2 1 
Improved On 
field play  
5 4 3 2 1 
Improved Off-
field 
Management  
5 4 3 2 1 
Improved 
Infrastructure  
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
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15. Please rate each of the factors listed below in order of importance as to what you feel the 
major effects of foreign investment into English football have been?  
(5= Very significant Effect, 4= Significant effect, 3=  Average , 2=  Little Effect, 1= No effect) 
 
16. How you think on-field playing performance in the Premier League has been affected by the 
results of the increase in foreign investment?  
(5=Much Improved, 4=Improved, 3=No difference, 2=Worse, 1= Much Worse)  
   
 
 
17. Do you think foreign investment into English clubs has improved the Premier League’s global 
appeal?   
(5= Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3=Unsure, 2=Disagree, 1=Strong Disagree)  
 
 
 
18. What has happened to the level of employment at the club since the takeover?  
(5=Large Increase, 4 =Increase, 3=No Change, 2=Decrease, 1=Large Decrease)  
    
 
 
19. Has the club used foreign senior managers to run off-field day-to-day operations?  
(1=Agree, 2 = No, 3= Not sure)   
 
Wage Inflation 5 4 3 2 1 
Transfer 
Activity 
5 4 3 2 1 
Improved 
Commercial 
Performance 
5 4 3 2 1 
Global 
Marketing 
5 4 3 2 1 
League 
stature  
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
3 2 1 
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20. Has the investment led to any changes in management techniques/styles used at the club?  
(1=Agree, 2 = No, 3= Not sure)   
 
 
21. What do you feel are the most important objectives for a football club?  
(5= Very Important, 4= Important, 3= Average 4. = Minor Importance, 1= Unimportant)  
 
If you have any additional comments, please feel free to provide them in the space below.  
 
Thank you for your assistance   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 2 1 
Profit 5 4 3 2 1 
On-Field 
performance 
5 4 3 2 1 
Global Growth 5 4 3 2 1 
Community  5 4 3 2 1 
Youth 
development  
5 4 3 2 1 
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Appendix 2: Domestically Owned Questionnaire  
 
The effects of foreign investment on Club Y  
 
Guidance: The following questionnaire is based on foreign investment into English football and 
its effects on your club. Please follow the instructions as given. The majority of questions are 
based on a ranking system. Please circle or tick the appropriate boxes. The questionnaire should 
take you no longer than ten minutes to complete. Thank you for your assistance.  
 
1.  How would you describe the investment at your club?  
  
 
2. What is the current shareholding of the major investor at the club?  
0-24%  25-49%                       50-74% 75-100%  
 
3.  How positively do you view foreign investment into other clubs?  
(5= very Positive, 4= positive, 3= unsure, 2= negative, 1= very Negative)              
 
4. How significant do you think the impact of foreign investment has been on English football?  
(5= very significant, 4=significant, 3 =unsure, 2= insignificant, 1 = very insignificant)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
Gradual  Hostile Takeover  Full Buyout  
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5. What impacts do you think foreign investment has had on English football?  
 (5=very Significant impact, 4= significant impact, 3=Average, 2=insignificant impact, 1= very 
insignificant impact)   
Wage Costs 5 4 3 2 1 
Transfer Costs 5 4 3 2 1 
Profitability  5 4 3 2 1 
Standard of 
matches 
5 4 3 2 1 
Off-field skills  5 4 3 2 1 
 
6. Do you think that the level of on-field competition in the Premier League has improved due to 
increases in foreign investment?  
(5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3 =unsure, 2=disagree, 1 =strongly disagree)  
 
7. How do you think your own club has been affected by foreign investment?  
(5=very significant impact, 4= significant impact, 3=unsure, 2=insignificant impact, 1= very 
insignificant impact)   
 
8. Has foreign investment into other clubs made it more or less difficult for your club to compete 
in the Premier League?   
(5=much more difficult, 4=more difficult, 3 =no impact, 2=less difficult, 1 =much less difficult)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
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9. What types of impact has your club faced as a result of foreign investment into other clubs? 
(5=very significant impact, 4= significant impact, 3=unsure, 2=insignificant impact, 1= very 
insignificant impact)   
 
Increased 
wage costs 
5 4 3 2 1 
Increased 
transfer costs 
5 4 3 2 1 
Harder to 
attract players 
5 4 3 2 1 
Commercial 
impacts  
5 4 3 2 1 
Weaker 
profitability  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
10. Do you feel that those clubs that have received foreign investment are able to develop 
advantages in off-field aspects of the club, which domestically owned clubs do not have?  
(5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3 =unsure, 2=disagree, 1 =strongly disagree)  
 
11. What advantages (if any) do you feel clubs that have been recipient of foreign investment 
have over domestically owned clubs?   
(5=strong advantage, 4=advantage, 3=no advantage/disadvantage, 2=disadvantage, 1=strong 
disadvantage)  
Resources  5 4 3 2 1 
Attraction  5 4 3 2 1 
 Potential  5 4 3 2 1 
Off-field 
management 
5 4 3 2 1 
Global growth 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
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12. How has your club responded to foreign investment going into other clubs?  
(5= very strong response, 4= strong response, 3=unsure, 2=weak response, 1=very weak 
response)  
Club placed 
up for sale 
5 4 3 2 1 
Investment in 
playing staff  
5 4 3 2 1 
Investment in 
non-playing 
staff 
5 4 3 2 1 
Commercial 
expansion 
5 4 3 2 1 
No changes  5 4 3 2 1 
 
13. What benefits do you think foreign investment has brought into English football?  
(5=very significant benefit, 4= significant benefit, 3=unsure, 2=insignificant benefit, 1= very 
insignificant benefit)   
Increased 
Revenue Growth  
5 4 3 2 1 
Increased 
Interest/demand 
5 4 3 2 1 
League stature 5 4 3 2 1 
More 
professional off-
field 
management 
5 4 3 2 1 
Global Appeal 5 4 3 2 1 
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14. What drawbacks do you think foreign investment has brought into English football?  
(5=very significant drawback, 4= significant drawback, 3=unsure, 2=insignificant drawback, 1= 
very insignificant drawback)   
15. What effect, if any, do you feel foreign investment into other clubs has had on the global 
appeal of the Premier League?  
(3= positive, 2=No effect, 1=negative effect)  
 
 
 
16. Do you think that the regulatory environment in English football has influenced the rise in 
foreign investment entering English football?  
(5=strongly Agree, 4=Agree, 3 =Unsure, 2=Disagree, 1 =strongly Disagree)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harder for 
domestically 
owned clubs 
to compete  
5 4 3 2 1 
Wage inflation 5 4 3 2 1 
Transfer 
inflation 
5 4 3 2 1 
Increased 
debt 
5 4 3 2 1 
Effect on 
spectators  
5 4 3 2 1 
3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
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17. What other reasons do you think have influenced English as a choice for foreign investment 
into football?  
(5=very strong, 4=strong, 3=indifferent, 2=weak, 1= very weak) 
Facilities  5 4 3 2 1 
Club 
Availability  
5 4 3 2 1 
Revenue 
Generation   
5 4 3 2 1 
History  5 4 3 2 1 
Global Appeal 5 4 3 2 1 
 
18. Why do you feel other clubs have been targeted by foreign investors?   
(5=very strong reason, 4=strong reason, 3=average, 2=weak reason, 1=very weak reason)   
History  5 4 3 2 1 
Image 5 4 3 2 1 
Location 5 4 3 2 1 
Financial  5 4 3 2 1 
Club 
Availability  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
19. What elements of internal club capabilities do you feel have been important in terms of 
influencing foreign investment into other clubs?  
(5= very important 4=important, 3=average, 2= little importance, 1= not very important)  
Playing talent 5 4 3 2 1 
Off-field 
management 
5 4 3 2 1 
Youth 
Academy 
5 4 3 2 1 
Coaching skill 5 4 3 2 1 
Facilities  5 4 3 2 1 
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20. What do you think motivates foreign investors when making investments into English 
football?  
(5= very strong motivation, 4= strong motivation, 3=average, 4=weak motivation, 5= very weak 
motivation).  
Profit 5 4 3 2 1 
Success 5 4 3 2 1 
Prestige 5 4 3 2 1 
Challenge  5 4 3 2 1 
Fan/Passion  5 4 3 2 1 
 
21. Do you think that the motivations of foreign investors are different to domestic investors?  
(3=Yes, 2= Unsure, 1=No)  
3 2 1 
 
22. What do you feel are the most important objectives for a football club?  
(5= Most Important, 4=Important, 3=average, 2=Unimportant, 1= Very Unimportant)  
 
23. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Foreign investment into English football clubs 
should be encouraged  
(3=Agree, 2=Not Sure, 1= Disagree)  
3 2 1 
 
If you have any further comments please feel free to add them in the space below.  
 
 
Thank you for your assistance  
Profit 5 4 3 2 1 
On-Field 
performance 
5 4 3 2 1 
Global Growth 5 4 3 2 1 
Community  5 4 3 2 1 
Youth 
development  
5 4 3 2 1 
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Appendix 3: Club Owner Abbreviations  
 
Club Initials Investor 
Aston Villa RL Randy Lerner 
Birmingham  CY Carson Yeung 
Blackburn V Venky’s Group 
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Chelsea RA Roman Abramovich  
Derby  GSE Global Sports and 
Entertainment 
Fulham MAF Mohamed Al-Fayed  
Liverpool TH & GG Tom Hicks and George Gillett 
Liverpool NESV New England Sports Ventures 
Manchester City TS Thaksin Shinawatra 
Manchester City SM Sheikh Mansour 
Manchester United G Glazer Family  
Portsmouth MM Milan Mandaric 
Portsmouth  AG Alexandre Gaydamak 
Portsmouth SAF Sulaiman Al-Fahim  
Portsmouth BC Balram Chainrai  
Q.P.R FB Flavio Briatore  
Q.P.R TF Tony Fernandes  
Reading AZ Anton Zingarevich  
Southampton  ML Markus Liebherr 
Sunderland D Drumaville  
Sunderland ES Ellis Short 
West Ham BG Björgólfur Gudmundsson  
West Ham CBH Claret and Blue Holdings  
Wimbledon AKER AKER RGI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Club Abbreviations  
 
Club Initials  
Arsenal A 
Aston Villa AV 
Birmingham City BC (B in 2005/2006)  
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Blackburn Rovers BR 
Blackpool B 
Bolton Wanderers BW 
Charlton Athletic CA 
Chelsea C 
Everton E 
Fulham F 
Hull City HC 
Liverpool L 
Manchester City MC 
Manchester United MU 
Middlesbrough  M 
Newcastle United NU 
Portsmouth P 
Stoke City SC 
Sunderland SU (S in 2005/2006)  
Tottenham Hotspur TH 
West Bromwich Albion WBA 
West Ham WH 
Wigan Athletic  WA 
Wolverhampton Wanderers WW 
 
